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ABSTRACT

The study suggests a relationship which exists between
Martin Buber's philosophy of mutuality and a humanistic educational
mainstreaming.

Mandated by parent-initiated legislation, mainstream

ing is intended to reduce the isolation of the handicapped by in
cluding them as nearly as possible within the larger group in the
regular class, and by giving them greater access to educational re
sources.

This becomes problematic even for those handicapped chil

dren in nearest physical proximity.

Among the obstacles are society's

frequent exclusionist response to the different reflected in the
school's preference for homogeneity,

and the ideas of competition which

dominate education.
The literature indicates that mainstreaming in its present
stage is largely a one-sided effort to change the handicapped through
individual remedial instruction.

There is less evidence suggest

ing a substantial coinciding effort to make the structure of the
regular class conducive to their inclusion.
In the introductory chapter, a need is proposed to develop
such a structure, to clarify how any child, not only the handicapped,
may be educated as an individual by strengthening the bonds of human
contact.

Once the essential human relational element is defined,

special methods and techniques can be brought to serve it.

Buber's

thought is relevant to this problem, since his concern was for the
humanization of the modern institution by means of the growth of
ix
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mutuality between its members.

Therefore, the various aspects of

mutuality as indicated in his writings are researched and applied to
mainstreaming.
Biographical information reveals Buber’s attentiveness to the
phenomena of human difference and communication between the different.
Chapter III states that there is a potentiality in all human beings
which can be actualized through mutual relation.

The components of

mutuality, namely, uniqueness, awareness, responsibility, and others
are studied.

A bond of mutuality exists between two persons engaged

in spontaneous communication when they have become "presences," each
for the other.

It is only when each becomes aware of the other's

presence as a whole, and as a unique person of equal worth, and
responds as a whole person on that basis, that mutuality can be
established.

Based on a Jewish w^rld affirming tradition and his

philosophical anthropology, Buber attributes to all people the
capacity to enter into mutuality.

The second basic human relation

is the partial and detached perception of the other as an object
which can be categorized, used, and even changed.
In the remaining chapters, Buber's evolutionary view of edu
cation is presented as a conscious experiment toward equity and humane
ness.

The greatness of the "genuine teacher" is seen in an Impartial,

yet personal involvement with pupils which imbues them with courage
and enables a confirming relation to their world.

Hence, Buber advo

cates strong participatory roles for the teacher and child.

Kis

goal of character education Is fostered in the "community of achieve
ment" founded on mutuality between children in their common learning
x
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pursuit.

Community provides a sense of belonging, educates to respon

sibility, and it is the essential bearer of knowledge.

The teacher

helps pupils to experience their world of people subjectively, and
helps them to see the unity behind the diversity of aspects.

This pre

supposes an objectivity which sets limits to biases, an openness to the
facts and how they interrelate by which prejudice is replaced with a
realistic value judgment.

Individual experience is not weakened, rather

it is enriched by differing experience.

This epistemology links to an

openness to humanity, an integrative perception of the world, and an
independent "world view."
The conclusions emphasize quality education as generalizable to
all students; education as inclusive; education as conscious and willed;
education for community; and education for uniqueness defined by aware
ness and responsible service.

xi
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

This will be a study of a philosophy of mutuality in Martin
Buber's writings, and its significance for educational mainstreaming.
Mainstreaming is a movement toward the education of handicapped
children with the general population of children attending the regular
class.

As viewed in this study, its aim is to enable learners to over

come or live with their handicaps and to develop their potentialities
through authentic participation within the regular educational setting.
Such participation involves children in personal relations with their
teacher, and with other class members.

The second participation is seen

to be concentrated around the common work of learning, and not only in
occasional secondary contacts between class members who accept one
another.

This implies for the educator a conscious effort to provide

the conditions which foster mutual recognition and help between chil
dren in their pursuit of learning.
The mainstreaming impetus comes from the law.

State and federal

legislation mandating mainstreaming has followed court decisions favoring
those parents who have protested the total exclusion of many children
from school, and the isolation of other children in segregated environ
ments where children are often subject to stigma and neglect, as are

1
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other populations so isolated.

Mainstreaming as a movement, as "progres

sive inclusion," brings a greater degree of integration than has existed
in recent decades.

Not every child can be included in the regular class

room within schooling as it exists, but the federal Handicapped Children
Act requires that all of the handicapped be educated and that each one
be educated in the "least restrictive" setting.

This is meant to reduce

the isolation of children by including them as nearly as possible within
the larger group, and to give them better access to our educational
resources.^
Least restrictive alternative is a term used interchangeably with
mainstreaming, and is preferred by some educators, since mainstreaming
has often been misinterpreted to mean that all special classrooms must
close and that all children must be educated in regular settings.

2

Least

restrictive alternative assumes that there are a variety of alternative
settings for the child, ranging from the regular classroom to more
restrictive environments such as special classes on a full or part-time
basis, special schools, and residential institutions which are the most
restrictive.

From a legal point of view, it means that removal of a per

son "from a normal situation as a matter of public policy into one which

2
is restrictive is a limitation of that person's liberty."

-^Alan Abeson and Jeffrey Zettel, "The Quiet Revolution: Handi
capped Children Act of 1975," Exceptional Children 44 (.October 1977):
114-28; Alan Abeson, Nancy Bollck, and Jayne Hass, A Primer on Due
Process— Education Decisions for Handicapped Children (Reston, Virginia:
The Council for Exceptional Children, 1975), p. 29; Edward Martin, "Inte
gration of the Handicapped Child into Regular Schools," Minnesota Educa
tion 2 (Spring 1976): 5-6.
2See Josephine Hayes and Scottie Torres Higgins, "Issues Regard
ing the IEF," Exceptional Children 45 (January 1979): 268.
3Abeson, Bolick, and Hass, A Primer on Due Process, p. 29.
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The concept of a continuum of services was substantially formu
lated in 1962 by Maynard Reynolds and later revised as a conceptualiza
tion of preferred practices for the future.

Before moving a child to a

more restrictive setting, effort is made to adapt the present setting
to the needs of the child.

As explained by Maynard Reynolds and Jack

Birch, regular schools and classes would have, for example, diversified
staffing and offer many forms of individualized programs to accommodate
a greater variety of pupils.

There would be a variety of learning cen

ters, equipment, facilities, and materials to serve pupils with special
noo»js and prsfsrsncss »

Amplification dsvicss for pupils with, hssring

impairments is an example of special equipment.*^
Regular teachers would be challenged to become broadly resource
ful in managing the diverse environment and serving the broad
range of needs of a diverse student population.
Special educa
tors and other professionals with highly specialized knowledge
and skills would be employed in collaborative teaching and sup
porting roles with regular teachers.^
While this is a practical organizational and technical conceptual
ization, Reynolds and Birch conclude that changes represent, at root,
moral issues.

"What do we think of human differences?

we link our lives to people who may be different?

How closely will

How much investment

will we -make in schools for literally all children?"**
Given the present state of schools, least restrictive alternative
implies that special classes must be maintained, improved, and in certain
circumstances even created.

Such classes would include children whose

^Maynard C. Reynolds and Jack W. Birch, Teaching Exceptional Chil
dren in All America's Schools (Reston, Virginia; Council for Exceptional
Children, 1977), pp. 31-39.
5Ibid., p. 35.
6Ibid., p. 700.
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handicaps are more severe in nature, and some would include even the
mildly handicapped where the regular environment is yet unprepared to
minister to their needs.

The point has been emphasized by James Smith

and Joan Arkans that existing regular classes are particularly unadaptive to retarded children with severe multiple handicaps.

They point

to a specific minority population of children "who have all too often
been ignored in special education."

Schooling for them requires highly

specialized personnel and physical facilities.

The increasing numbers

of moderately to profoundly handicapped in the local schools include
net only those children who live at home and have been denied an edu—
cation, but also the former residents of institutions who have in recent
years returned in increasing numbers to the community and who are now
living in foster homes, in hostels, and in community group homes.

■7

Still, the overriding assumption is that
no educational "place" is impervious to change and development
and that through good efforts many of the varieties of spe
cialized and intensive forms of education can be moved into a
developing mainstream . . . that students should be removed
from the mainstream only for limited periods and for compelling
reasons, that when in specialized and limited environments their
progress should be monitored carefully and regularly, and that
they should be returned to the mainstream as soon as feasible.®
Children who do not require extraordinary facilities and services
of the kind referred to by Smith and Arkans are by far the greater propor
tion of children who have been considered, in the typical school, as
likely candidates for segregated placement.

While the prevalence of

"educationally handicapped" among the school age population totals

7James 0. Smith and Joan R. Arkans, "Now More Than Ever: A Case
for the Special Class," Exceptional Children 40 (April 1974): 497-502.
^Reynolds and Birch, Teaching Exceptional Children in All
America's Schools, p. 36.
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roughly ten percent (a figure projected by the United States Office of
Education for 1971-1972, derived from estimates provided by school dis
tricts), Dunn estimated that only 1% percent of the school-age population
are severely disabled.

Dunn arrived at this 1% percent estimate by total

ing the reported numbers of children who are blind, deaf, severely emo
tionally disturbed and socially maladjusted, moderately and severely
retarded, severely cerebral palsied and pupils with other severe condi
tions usually associated with multiple disabilities.^

But even among

these children, ways can and have been found to provide at least partial
contact with the normal environment.
Educational mainstreaming is part of a more comprehensive commu
nity mainstreaming trend.

Increasingly, the foster home and the small

hostel are replacing institutional residence.

Some workers in the help

ing professions have begun to function away from their professional cen
ters and within the life of the community, fostering a variety of support
systems among family, neighbors, employers, and teachers to maintain the
handicapped in ordinary surroundings.

State regulated architectural

change to accommodate the physically disabled is a way of facilitating
community mainstreaming.

Many changes come about through "self emancipa

tion," the organized effort of the adult handicapped, themselves.

As for

education, every state in the nation is now making efforts to admit han
dicapped children into regular settings, and this is reflected in the
efforts of a large number of school districts."^

^Lloyd M. Dunn, ed., Exceptional Children in the Schools:
Special Education in Transition, 2d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1973), pp. 13-16.
^ S e e Reynolds and Birch, Teaching Exceptional Children in All
America's Schools, pp. 22, 37-38, 40-41.
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But much of this change has been accomplished through contrac
tual arrangement; mere physical presence of the handicapped by no means
implies real participation in the sense that mutuality exists between
one person and another around a given common task or living situation.
The state of readiness in the typical school for mainstreaming
depends on prevalent attitudes toward the handicapped, educational
priorities as they now exist, and how these may interact.

How do regu

lar class teachers and their pupils respond to the presence of handi
capped children?

To what extent are their attitudes affected by the

educational priorities established in the classroom?

Do these prior

ities help or obstruct the inclusion of handicapped pupils?

Research

conducted by Orville Johnsou and Samuel Kirk on the social position of
"educable mentally handicapped" or "educable mentally retarded" children
in regular classes (of the kind called progressive as well as the tradi
tional) suggests that it was their very isolation therein which con
tributed to the initial growth of segregated special classes.11* (This
group has by far comprised the largest population of children segregated
from the regular classroom.)

And a sample of recent surveys indicate

that regular class teachers for the most part reject changes associated
with mainstreaming.1^

11G. Orville Johnson and Samuel A. Kirk, "Are Mentally Handi
capped Children Segregated in the Regular Grades," Exceptional Children
17 (December 1950): 65-68, 87-8S. Refer also to Willie K. Baldwin,
"The Social Position of the Educable Mentally Retarded in the Regular
Grades in the Public Schools," Exceptional Children 25 (November 1958):
106-108; J. E. Wallace Wallin, "Trends and Needs in the Training of
Teachers for Special Classes for Handicapped Children," Journal of
Educational Research 31 (March 1938): 525.
1^Maynard C. Reynolds, "Addendum," Minnesota Education 2 (Spring
1976): 69; Jay R. Shotel, Richard P. Iano, and James F. McGettigan,
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Much of the literature about mainstreaming has focused on the
individual and individualized instruction.

Attention is given to the

question of the individual rights of average and gifted pupils versus
the rights of the handicapped to educational resources.^

Particular

importance is attached to the need for teaching to individual differ
ences, since over-emphasis on uniformity and conformity has proved to
be incompatible with the differences which exist among all children.
It conspicuously excludes the "very different" child.

Since individual

ization means more than varying the level and pace of learning tasks,
the task itself is called into question, its purpose, and whether or
not it has meaning for the individual learner.^

Is the child a genuine

participant in learning?
The question of interpersonal relations between the handicapped
and their teacher and classmates has received far less attention in the
literature about mainstreaming.

Such contact is an important problem to

be faced whenever children are brought together in their education, par
ticularly when the regular class includes minority children— the ethni
cally different, the poor, the handicapped, and the intellectually gifted
as well, any children whose experience or capacity differs markedly from
the larger group.

Isolation, then, is not overcome merely by putting*
4
1

"Teacher Attitudes Associated with the Integration of Handicapped Chil
dren," Exceptional Children 38 (May 1972): 677-683; Nicholas A. Vacc and
Nancy Kirst, "Emotionally Disturbed Children and Regular Classroom
Teachers," The Elementary School Journal 4 (March 1977): 309-17.
^•%ichael Scriven, "Some Issues in the Logic and Ethics of MainStreaming," Minnesota Education 2 (Spring 1976): 66-67.
14

See John I. Goodlad, Facing the Future:
Issues in Education and
Schooling (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 126-27. Goodlad does not
speak specifically to the mainstreaming issue. He theorizes a model nongraded school based on a recognition of individual differences among all
learners.
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children side-by-side working at Individual activities of individual
import.

Does the child participate as a person in relation with other

class members?

With the teacher?

Jeanne Frein, centering on the ques

tion of "what schools are for," has noted that the tension between indi
vidual development and communal cooperation is germane to the mainstream
ing movement, and "unless both poles of the tension are dealt with in a
reasoned manner, the movement is in for disaster."*-’
With or without the advance of mainstreaming, the difficulties
faced by the teacher are enormous.

As Seymour Sarason observed during

his long and intensive service relationship to teachers and children in
their schools, the teacher’s role is one of "constant giving" and "con
stant vigilance required by the presence of many children."*
161
7 He empha
sizes the teacher’s serious need for help and advice.

Yet he criticizes

the lack of teacher involvement in some important decisions which affect
their work.

Sarason notes, for example, that the hardship inherent in

the coverage of educational material in fixed time periods increases
with the number and diversity of pupils, but rather than segregate the
different child, he would have teachers question that the time criterion
is necessary.1 '7

The tendency to segregate children is influenced also by

a felt pressure stemming from the need to meet narrow criteria of academic
progress, and by overconcern with technical matters.

Mainstreaming is,

however, facilitated by providing an atmosphere of community involving

*5Jeanne B. Frein, "Changing Public Policies:
Minnesota Education 2 (Spring 1976): 19.

Discussion,"

16Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem
of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 167.
17Ibid., pp. 38; 152-56.
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everyone, teachers and pupils, in problem solving around such issues as
resources, values, and learning.

One consequence of the failure to do

so is that as children grow older "the classroom becomes an increasingly
uninteresting place in which the sense of personal growth and a satis
fying interpersonal mutuality is absent.
Mainstreaming is contractual.
the main problem to be here addressed.

How can it be humanized?

This is

What appears needed in develop

ing a theory and practice of mainstreaming is to clarify the ways in
which any child, not only the handicapped, may be educated as an individua! by strengthening the bonds of human content \ once the essential
human element is defined, it will become clearer how special methods and
techniques can be brought to serve it.
Martin Buber was deeply concerned with the humanization of the
impersonal modern institution by means of a growing mutuality, a more
genuine form of living and working together in which individuality and
group cohesion are complementary.

According to Buber, mutuality is

always a "pluralistic form of association."^®

Mutuality in Buber’s

thought by no means implies a constant togetherness; it does imply, in
Buber's words, a "steady potential presence of the one to the other."*
20
His philosophy accommodates people with handicaps because it makes room
for difference, and centers on the reality of those differences which

■^Seymour B. Sarason, The Psychological Sense of Community (San
Francisco: Jossey-Boss, 1974), pp. 171-72.
*®Martin Buber, Knowledge of M an, ed. Maurice Friedman; trans.
Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith: "Distance and Relation" (New
York: Harper & Row, 1965; Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 67.
20Martin Buber, Between Man and M an, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith:
"Education" (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 98.
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exist in every group.
streaming.

His approach is relevant also to educational main-

He shows that the give and take among individual needs and

involvements results in a sharing of knowledge impossible in contacts
limited largely to material things.
It is believed that the environment characterized by an atmos
phere of mutuality is a necessary condition of true mainstreaming.

There

fore the purpose of this study is to examine a philosophy of mutuality in
Martin Buber’s writings, and then to consider its significance for educa
tion, in particular, educational mainstreaming.

A basic concern will be

the interaction between peers, yet this is part of a larger matrix of
relations and it will be examined as such.

Delimitations and Limitations
"

. . . '■■■

-

. ' ■ ~

■ ■"

v

The study excludes certain information relevant to the advance
ment of mainstreaming, such as information about learning problems and
their alleviation specific to a given disability, and the social-political
complexities surrounding the mainstreaming issue.

The study is limited

largely to the essentials of mutuality and its implications within the
educational setting conducive to mainstreaming.

Need for the Study

The responsibility of educational mainstreaming rests ultimately
with educators, which implies that educators must try to clarify the
values underlying mainstreaming as a guide to practice.

Law as it

accommodates civil rights has directly influenced the mainstreaming
movement, acting on an emergency basis in response to student and
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11
parent complaint; and medical classification systems and treatments have
had a profound influence on education of the handicapped.

While the

cooperative effort of education, the various other professions, and the
public is imperative, the position taken in this study is that the ini
tiative rests with educators to seek to define the value premises of
their own work.

It is proposed that unless this is done, mainstreaming

will signify, for the most part, only a perfunctory reaction to external
pressures.
A second related need is a perception of handicapped children
primarily in reference to what is common to all children.

Only when

children are known in their wholeness can it be understood what a han
dicap implies for their education.

Organization of the Study

The remainder of this chapter contains a biographical sketch of
Martin Buber and a glossary of terms.
A selection of descriptive and critical literature on Buber's
writings will be reviewed in Chapter II.

In Chapter III an interpreta

tion of mutuality is developed by way of answering certain questions
arising out of Buber’s writings.
1.

The questions are:

What is meant by "setting at a distance" and why is setting

at a distance a presupposition of mutuality?
2.

What is meant by uniqueness as Buber defines it?

3.

According to Buber, mutuality begins with the self.

direction is taken to actualize the unique self?
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4.

Buber contrasts awareness with objectification.

What is

implied by "becoming aware" of the unique partner in relation?
5.

How does Buber define responsibility?

Chapter IV applies mutuality to Buber's philosophy of education.
Here follow the main questions to be addressed:
1.

What educational priorities are established by Buber?

2.

What in Buber's view is the nature of the child?

3.

How does Buber define character, and how can the teacher

influence the growth of character?
4.

What is the nature of community?

By what means can the

teacher create an atmosphere of mutuality in the learning community?
5.

What is implied in Buber’s idea, the "reciprocal sharing of

knowledge"?
Chapter V makes direct application of the foregoing to mainstream
ing.

It attempts to answer the central question, How can mainstreaming

be humanized?

Martin Buber as a Person
(1878 - 1965)

Buber's biographical statements reflect a life-long attentiveness
to the phenomena of human difference and communication between the differ
ent, for example:

"Born in Vienna, I came in my early childhood to Lvov

(Lemberg), the capital city of the Galician province in which an unusual
multiplicity of languages stamped upon me indelibly the fact of very
ferent people living next to one another."21

dif

Grete Schaeder, Buber's

21Martia Buber, A Believing Humanism, ed. Ruth Nanda Anschen,
trans. Maurice Friedman: "Reminiscence" CNew York: Simon and Schuseter,
1967), p. 29.
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friend and scholarly interpreter, writes:
Even as a child Buber experienced abstract, intellectual
phenomena with a sense of physical participation. When he
reflected on the misunderstandings that arise among people
attempting to communicate with one another in different lan
guages, his heart began to pound within him. He felt as if
he were probing the secret of the meeting of the two lan
guages at the point of their intersection. And does not
something of that same tension remain, he was to ask later,
when people of different temperament and character speak the
same language? Has a word ever precisely the same meaning
for any two people? The basic problem here is whether seri
ous dialogue is at all possible without grave misunderstand
ings. Is it the philosopher or the poet who raises this
question? The problem is beyond the competency of both.
These questions, which concern man as a whole but find no
place in any philosophical system, are precisely the ques
tions that are characteristic of Buber's thinking.^2
Buber's early life is a mixture of Polish, Austrian, and Jewish
influence.

He inherited a restlessness from his Slavic background as

well as the intellectual tensions of his Jewish heritage.
wrote:

"I am a Polish Jew."

In 1957 he

His acceptance of human difference was

apparently influenced by several factors:
Tolerance, as a form of social convenience and an enlightened
human attitude, was a basic element of the Austrian character.
In Buber it was combined with the ancient Jewish striving for
the supranational and the universally human, and constituted
a counterpoise or antidote to his passionate Zionism. His
rediscovery of Hasidism as a popular religious movement was
also facilitated by the social relations that existed natu
rally in Austria between the upper classes and the common
people; the attitude of his father to his subordinates exem
plified this for Buber. 23
Schaeder characterizes Buber's early and maturing attitude in the
following passage; she emphasizes his "vital interest in human fellowship"*
9
2

22Grete Schaeder, The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Buber, trans.
Noah J. Jacobs (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), pp. 2829.
23ibid., p. 40.
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The convictions that there is a divine spark in all human beings
that can be redeemed and that man's native goodness can find
expression in an atmosphere of tolerance were among Buber's
basic beliefs. The hardships of his early years awakened in
his deeply religious nature a restlessness which, according to
St. Augustine, "finds its rest only in God." To the outside
world his restlessness was expressed as an "out-going soul ele
ment," as a vital spiritual force which imparted to every
"meeting" a specific color and illumination.
In the "Auto
biographical Fragments" this vital interest in human fellow
ship speaks to us in clear tones and illuminates Buber’s
early years as he considered them in retrospect. Again and
again the merely conceptual and the sensuously opaque are
transformed in the pure flame of this life into the same soulelement of a warmer and yet not too intimate humanity. . . .
The personalities and events of his youth, pass before us as
the spoken and heard elemental words of his existence, bound
to the fleeting moment and preserved by memory and imagina^
tion in an ultimate harmony as lived and irrevocable decision.
At the age of three following the separation of his parents,
Buber was brought to the home of his paternal grandparents in Lvov.

A

year later an older girl of the neighborhood told him the harsh truth
that his mother would never return to him.
It remained fixed in me; from year to year it cleaved even more
to my heart, but after more than ten years, I had begun to per
ceive something that concerned not only me, but all men. Later
I once made up the word . . . "mismeeting," or "miscounter,"
. . . to designate the failure of a real meeting.
Schaeder describes the atmosphere in which Buber grew up as char
acterized by "a deep respect for tradition and for the dignity of labor,
by an appreciation of poetry and a candid acknowledgment of responsibility, by an atmosphere of enlightened sincere p i e t y . T h e

grandfather

Salomon Buber was a prosperous merchant, an outstanding Hebraic scholar,*
2

24Ibid., p. 40.
2% a r t i n Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, Vol. 12, Library of Living Philos
ophers (LaSalle, 111,: Open Court, 1967), p. 4.
^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, Ibid., p. 25.
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and an editor of Hebrew books of biblical interpretation, Midrashim.
Buber says that his grandfather manifested "the childlikeness of a pure
human nature and an elementary Jewish being.

The grandfather left

his business in general to his wife Adel who, typical of the Jewish
women of the period, managed the business of their husbands in order
to create for them the leisure to study.

Self-taught, she occupied

herself as well in the study of German classics.

Buber writes that

she reared in her sons and in him "a respect for the authentic word
that cannot be paraphrased."

He relates further:

Tnhen she looked at the street, she had at times the profile of
someone meditating on a problem, and when 1 found her all alone
in meditation, it seemed to me at times as if she listened. To
the glance of the child, however, it was already unmistakable
that when she addressed someone she really addressed him.
My grandfather was a true philologist, a "lover of the
word," but my grandmother’s love for the genuine word affected
me even more strongly than his; because this love was so direct
and so devoted.28
Buber spent several summers at his father's estate and returned
there to live at the age of fourteen.

His father was a landowner with

scientific knowledge of agriculture which increased the productivity of
his land.

Buber describes his father as an unromantic man from whom he

learned a concern about genuine human contact with nature, something he
had not learned from any of the many authors he had read.

This relation

ship with nature was connected with his relationship to the workers
attached to his estate, an active responsible contact.

He was also a

gifted story teller; the stories were always about the simple occurrence2

27Martin Buber, Hasidism and M o d e m M a n , ed. and trans. Maurice
Friedman (New York: Horizon Press, 1958; Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 56.
2®Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in the Philosophy of
of Martin Buber, p. 5.
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"without any embroidery," nothing more than the existence of people and
what took place between them.
At the age of twenty-one Buber married Paula Winkler, a woman of
strength and independence.

Words directed to her in the preface of his

essay "Dialogue" indicate the importance he attached to this life partner
ship:

"Dialogue it is and was with thee."

She was a poet who in 1912

published her first work under the pseudonym Georg Munk, a volume of
mythical stories, and she influenced Buber's own poetical aspirations.

30

From his early childhood Buber's active imagination exposed him
to terrors and confusion.

Schaeder points to the loss of his mother at

an early age which, in a sensitive child, could not fail to have serious
effects.

His sense of insecurity

expressed itself with terrifying vehemence when the child felt
the force of powers that were beyond his understanding. Thus,
Buber recounted how he was overwhelmed by intense emotion when
the principal of the school asked him to describe the rude
behavior of some of his classmates and how, a few years later,
at the age of fourteen, he was almost driven to the verge of
madness brooding over philosophical antinomies, and again the
death of one close to him when he was seventeen affected him
as an almost self-destructive experience.33
He was sent to a secluded place in the mountains; surrounded
there by nature and the elements "as by an active divine power,"
he one day envisaged chaos and cruel destruction as the deadly
struggle of the primordial powers in a mythical world. 32
As a child Buber had mastered Hebrew and had become attached to
Jewish life and prayer.

His Jewish roots were firm, despite many doubts.

He became alienated from Judaism when exposed to European culture after*
2
1
3

2®Ibid., pp. 6-7.
30schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 84.
31Ibid,, p. 27.
32Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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leaving his home to study at a secular secondary school in Lvov and
later at the Universities of Vienna and Berlin.

"The whirl of the age

took me in. . . . Until my twentieth year, and in small measure even
beyond then . . .

I lived— in versatile fulness of spirit, but without

Judaism, without humanity, and without the presence of the divine."

33

The first impetus toward a renewed connection with his Judaic roots
came from Zionism, a movement he joined in 1898.

Zionism also gave

him a sense of reality by presenting him with concrete tasks "which
demanded action and at the same time saved him from too great a pas
sion for abstract truth and disembodied ideals that characterized the
impersonal and generalizing mode of thought of many of the German
poets and writers of his time."3^

Buber later recalls:

That Zionism seized me and that I was newly vowed to Judaism
was . . . only the first step. . . . I professed Judaism
before I really knew it. So this became, after some blind
groping, my second step: wanting to know it. To know— by
this I do not mean a storing up of anthropological, his
torical, sociological knowledge, as important as these are;
I mean the immediate knowing, the eye-to-eye knowing of the
people in its creative primal hours.33
In this way Buber came to value Hasidism.

As a child he had

occasionally gone with his father to visit a Hasidic community.

In

this "dirty village," the showy palace of the rabbi repelled him and
the prayer house with its enraptured worshippers seemed strange to
him.

But as he watched the rabbi, he felt "leader," and when he saw

the Hasidim dance with the Torah, he felt "community."3** Now the
33Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 57.
3^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 70.
33Buber, Hasidism and Modern Ma n , p. 58.
3&Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 20.
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image out of his childhood was recalled, and a lifetime of writings on
Hasidism was begun.

"Along with his 'I-Thou' philosophy and in fruit

ful interrelation with it, Buber is best known for his recreation of
Hasidism."3^
Schaeder points to a number of events which influenced the change
and growth of Buber's concept of human creativity.

After he had joined

the Zionist movement Buber was for a short period of time a follower of
Nietzsche.

Buber's concern was to "instill into the atrophied life of

the ghetto a new sense of nationhood, to infuse it with a new vital
spirit and restore its 'creative cultural force' that had been moribund
for centuries."33

When Buber refers to the "self-redemption, resurrec

tion and salvation" of the nation in his early Zionist essays, Schaeder
discerns the pseudo-religious prophetic tone of Nietzsche.
At the time of Buber's youth prophecy meant one of the forms in
which human genius is expressed, similar to poetic expression.

Buber

linked his own zeal for participation in the creation of things to the
prophetic literary task, which he understood to be his calling.

But in

later years he associated "prophet" with a "distinct, clearly defined
period" and held that other uses of this term are uncalled for.
we first began our service for Israel, our slogan was culture.

"When
We

yearned, actively, to see the Jewish people give valid expression to
its 'reborn* nature in a world of its own making."*
39
*

-^Maurice Friedman, "Editor's Introduction," in Hasidism and
Modern Man, pp. 10-11.
33Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, pp. 76-77.
39Ibid., p. 77.
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Another influence on Buber's concept of creativity was his con
frontation with the thinking of Christian mystics, the subject of inves
tigation in his doctoral dissertation, "The History of the Problem of
Individuation— Nicholas of Cusa and Jacob Boehne." (1904)

Buber demon

strated that all beings participate with God, that the manifold emanates
from the one divine world ground, that gradations of participation exist
but are not indicated, and that "the assigned degrees of participation
are at first only inchoate in the individual and only gradually develop
from potentiality to actuality."

He writes, "It is not the depersonal

izing, but rather the personalizing, process that leads things to Gcd."4^
Of the mystics, Buber links Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), more
than any other, with the certainty of human partnership with God in the
work of creation— Eckhart's conviction was that people are "of divine
race and of God’s kin."

Buber concurred with Eckhart’s teaching of the

personal God, God’s revelation to the individual, and the unity of God
and man.

Some of his early poems and essays were influenced by Eckhart's

vivid imagery.

The union with God, Buber believed, can be expressed only

in imagery because it escapes "categories of thought."

Thus, "language

of sincere deep emotion which borders on the ineffable, where personal
feelings vanish and meet into a nameless unity, was called by Buber,
'brotherly speech’."

Buber’s experience of an all-encompassing unity

is captured in the words:

"This is my body; this is my blood."41

Eckhart also taught that one must be in harmony with oneself in
order to find God.

He believed that the way to God is that of separa

tion, renunciation, unbecoming.

40Ibid., pp. 55-56.

People must leave themselves and all4
0

41Ibid., p. 74.
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creaturely concerns if they would meet God.

"Only in complete poverty of

spirit can God's work be accomplished in the world."

Buber could not

accept this idea; one explanation is that the notion of immanence and
the modern consciousness of personality had by the beginning of the
twentieth century been too far removed from the thought of the medieval
person.

Thus individuation as something problematic had not yet been

confronted in Eckhart's era.42
In 1904 Buber's rediscovery of Hasidism began to influence his
idea of creativity.

The Hasidic orientation is that not through "un

becoming" or by "turning one's back on the world" does one prove one
self worthy of being God's co-worker, "but rather through sanctifica
tion of the world by actively participating in its work and by assuming
responsibility for the fate of creation.1,43

It is this understanding

of creativity which for Buber took on a goal of deeply religious sig
nificance.
In the figure of the Hasidic zaddik Irabbi], as well as in his
own guilty feelings of having failed, he recognized that holi
ness must not only be represented in poetical form but must
also be lived as responsible and sanctifying service. From
that time on the spirit of the zaddick as teacher, helper, and
leader served to light up the path before him and to guide his
steps.
In the upheavals of World War I he had a revelation
which scattered the mists of self-glorifying creativity and
clarified his innate knowledge concerning man's relation to
God.44
The ideal of European humanism had become in the twentieth cen
tury the "caricature" of the alienated intellectual.

3y contrast, Buber's

interpretation of true humanism sees the person "in relation," as an
"open person" in confrontation with other human beings.

42Ibid., p. 75.

"And in addition

43Ibid.

44Ibid., p. 385.
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to this the people are summoned to become the ’open’ community to human-

i t y#"45
Maurice Friedman, a foremost translator and interpreter of Buber's
works, provides the following account of Buber's active career:

In his

twenties Buber was the leader of Zionists who advocated a Jewish cultural
renaissance, rather than a purely political or nationalistic Zionism.

In

1902 he helped establish a German-Jewish publishing house, and in 1916 he
founded Per Jude, the leading periodical of German-speaking Jewry.

From

1926 to 1930 he published jointly with a Catholic and a Protestant the
periodical Die Kreatur. concerned with social and pedagogical problems
related to religion.

Buber taught Jewish philosophy of religion and

later the history of religion at the University of Frankfurt from 1923
until 1933 when he was dismissed from this post by the Nazis.

He then

became director of the Central Office for Jewish Adult Education in Ger
many, where he trained teachers for the new schools which had to be
established after the exclusion of Jewish students from all German edu
cational institutions.

He also helped guide the training activities of

numerous Jewish youth organizations, and he directed a free college for
Jewish adult education.

From these positions, Buber led a large number

of Jews to a deeper understanding and acceptance of their Jewishness,
and he was thus able to save many from spiritual despair.
In 1938, after he was completely silenced by the Nazis, Buber
left Germany to live in Palestine.

Until 1951 he was a professor of

social philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

When he became

emeritus, the Israeli government asked him to expand the size of the

*5ibid., p. 384.
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Institute for Adult Education which he founded in 1949 and directed until
1953.

This institute educated teachers to go out to the immigration

camps to help Integrate into the community the mass influx of immigrants.
According to Friedman, those who met Buber disco ired the "pro
phetic force of his personality and the tremendous strength and sincerity
of his religious conviction."

He has shown what it means to "walk on the

narrow ridge" (accept the contraries inherent in dialogue):
He has . . . been the leader of those Jews who have worked for
Jewish-Arab co-operation and friendship. Pioneer and still the
foremost interpreter of Hasidism, he has preserved in his think
ing the most positive aspects of the Jewish enlightenment,
Hasidism's traditional enemy. Translator and interpreter of
the Hebrew Bible and spokesman for Judaism before the world,
he has been deeply concerned since his youth with Jesus and
the New Testament and has carried on a highly significant
dialogue with many prominent Christian theologians. . . .4°
Perhaps the most striking example of how Buber has followed
the narrow ridge in his life is his attitude toward the German
people after the war. He was the leader of the German Jews in
their spiritual battle against Nazism, and he counts himself
among "those who have not got over what happened and will not
get over It." Yet on September 27, 1953, in historic Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany, he accepted the award of the
Peace Prize of the German Book Trade.*
47
Buber justified his attitude in his speech of acceptance:
Manifestations such as the bestowal of the Hansian Goethe
Prize and the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade on a sur
viving arch-Jew . . . are moments in the struggle of the human
spirit against the demonry of the subhuman and the anti-human.
. . , The solidarity of all separate groups in the flaming
battle for the becoming of one humanity is, in the present
hour, the highest duty on earth.48
Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, so
influenced by Buber's writings on "the age of distrust" and his phi
losophy of unity created "out of the manifold," proposed Buber for the

4% a u r i c e Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 8-9.
47Ibid., p. 9.

48Ibid.
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Nobel Peace Prize (1959).

He had planned to translate some of Buber’s

works into Swedish, and had already begun his translation of I and Thou
before he was killed in a plane crash during a peace mission.

Buber was

a friend of Albert Schweitzer; they cooperated several times on appeals
against the spread of nuclear weapons.

49

The immediacy of Buber's democratic way of thinking is apparent
in a number of biographical anecdotes.

When Aubrey Hodes consulted with

Buber about his work with a group involved in establishing a reformed
synagogue in Israel, Buber asked, Are
women prominent in roles other than seeing to the decorations?
. . . From what you have told me your members are wealthy and
living in a middle-class suburb. . . . You must be careful not
to become narrow and exclusive. Try to bring in people from
other sections of society, even if they cannot pay membership
fees. They have other things to contribute.^0
Malcolm Diamond remarked to Buber that Freud is reported to have
answered a question concerning the meaning of life by saying that it was
work and love.
plete.

Buber laughed and said that this was good, but not com

He would say, work, love, faith, and humor.

On a visit to Buber

after his eighty-seventh birthday when his health was failing, Hodes
brougnt up that conversation.
Diamond.

Buber confirmed what he had said to

He then added, "The real philosopher has to have a sense of

humor, an awareness of the comic, not only about the world we live in
but also about himself."

He will look at his own suffering "a small

distance away," even if "there is a danger to his own life."-’**
1
0
5

^ A u b r e y Hodes, Martin Buber:
Viking Press, 1971), pp. 136-152.

An Intimate Portrait (New York:

50Ibid., pp. 77-78.
51Ibid., pp. 134-35.
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Definition of Terms

AWARENESS:

An action of the mind in perceiving and confirming

the reality of the self or outer reality.
BETWEEN:

A "primal human category," the "mysterious" interven

ing dimension in which dialogue takes place.

When two human beings meet,

there is a reality between them which transcends both; thus the between
is distinguished from that which is localized to one or the other partner.
CENTER:

God; or the meaning of existence which transcends a rela

tive, utilitarian meaning.
COLLECTIVISM:

When Buber contrasts collectivism with community,

he refers to the group existence characterized by centralized control.
Inherent in this system is a loss of individuality and personal respon
sibility.

Buber observed a progressive increase of collectivism as a

way of life, and considered this a great danger to the modern world.
COMMUNITY:

Mutuality in group life.

Community is organized

around a common Center and a common task or goal.
CREATIVITY:

The capacity given to each individual to realize

through dialogue a potentiality in that which meets him, and to give form
to it.

The product joins what is original in the emerging form with the

originality of the producer.

The creative process is found in the social

sphere of interhuman relations, and in the sense world of the artist who
relates to his art form.
creative.

Scientific discovery may also be considered

The creation is not necessarily the "monumental"; it happens

more typically in the everyday form-giving encounter.
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DISTANCE:
and independent.

The fact or condition of existing as different, apart,
When a reality is so recognized as distant, it is "set

at a distance," the presupposition of all relation.
EDUCATION:

(1) The process of learning to choose and act on the

basis of values revealed by participating in one's world.

(2) The influ

ence of the educator who selects the effective world, manifests it in him
self, and guides the learner in the process of valuing its content.
EGOISM:

A tendency to put the self ahead of communal interests.

"Collective egoism" is a thoughtless loyalty to one's group and may be
chauvinistic, i.e., in prejudicial regard of outside individuals or
groups as inferior.
ETERNAL THOU:

God, the Absolute; in each Thou addressed, the

eternal Thou is addressed.
EVIL:

A lack of purposeful direction.

Failure to decide in

service to creation is evil.
EXISTENTIAL:

Existential pertains to authentic existence as such,

experienced in a concrete situation preceding any abstraction, idealiza
tion, or distortion of it.
EXISTENTIALISM:

To Buber, a position which places human existence

itself in the center of rational contemplation.

Auththentic existence as

defined by Maurice Friedman is a tension between the freedom to decide and
the responsibility which means both address from without and free response
from within.
HANDICAP:

A highly elusive term used interchangeably in the

literature with "exceptionality" (excluding giftedness), "disability,"
"impairment," "disorder," "deviance," etc.
least two ways:

Handicap may be viewed in at

(1) As a real functional impairment, such as mental

retardation, emotional/social disorder, orthopedic impairment, blindness,
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and deafness.

(2) As an inability to meet the criteria of competence and

worth established by one's culture, regardless of whether or not objective
impairment exists.

An example of the second meaning of handicap is the

young non-reader who in the school may be perceived as handicapped solely
on the basis of inability to read, owing to the importance attached by
that child's culture to reading competence.

As a corollary to this per

ception, the child may experience a label and a stigma which in turn may
induce a real social/emotional disorder, as well as life-long reading
incompetence or aversion to reading.
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situation is experienced from the standpoint of the other, not with imag
ination but with the entire self.

The reality of the self is not excluded

for the sake of the other but is extended by it.

Inclusive awareness

deepens in proportion to the degree of the self's involvement in the per
son and life of the other.
INDIVIDUALISM:

The belief that the interests of the individual

should take precedence over those of the social group or the state.

Like

collectivism, the practice of individualism precludes individuality and
responsibility.
INDIVIDUALITY:

The state or quality of being unique.

INDIVIDUATION:

Becoming that which one is born to become; a

completion of uniqueness.
INDIVIDUALIZATION:

A teaching method which joins the teacher's

valuation of learning content with the child's freely expressed valuation.
Individualization can be achieved in dialogue with a group of learners,
not only in contacts circumscribed by the teacher and a single learner.
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KNOWLEDGE;

(1) I-Thou, or personal awareness of an object through

direct dialogical relation with it.

(2) I-It knowledge attained in a

relation of monologue, in which the object is reduced to attributes men
tally represented by a general concept.
I-It knowledge provides the symbol (categories, words) necessary
for dialogue.

But the symbol is a product of the concrete I-Thou know

ing which takes place in dialogue.

It Is an expression of what has been

mentally derived from dialogue and stored for future use.
MAINSTREAM CLASS;

The regular class in which handicapped chil

dren are willingly included; mainstream community.

Mainstreaming is a

movement toward this point of inclusion.
MEETING:

The immediate encounter of relation in which each part

ner confirms the other as the unique person he is.
MUTUALITY;

A spiritual stance "between" the different I and Thou

having the same relationship each to the other; a being there for the
other in constant potential presence.
MUTUAL RELATION:

The unfolding of mutuality in the immediate meet

ing of two people; dialogue, I-Thou relation, reciprocity, essential rela
tion, etc.
OBJECTIFICATION:

Characteristic of I-It relation, objectifica

tion is a partial and detached perception of anything stemming from an
"orienting" attitude, as contrasted with a "realizing" attitude.
ONTOLOGISM:

The unending dynamic structure of immediate communi

cation which arises from mutuality In creation.

(Ontic is the adjective

pertaining to ontologism.)
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY:

Philosophical anthropology, as dis

tinguished from scientific anthropology, is the study of human nature
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in relation to being.
POTENTIALITY:

The "possibility" of becoming; the value of any

thing uncovered in dialogue.
PRESENTNESS:

In the interhuman relation, the spiritual fullness

of "being there" as a person which becomes explicit to each partner.
(Present is the here and now in which relation takes place.)
RELIGION:

A bond with everything that is lived in its possibil

ity of dialogue.
RESPONSIBILITY:

Response to the unreduced claim of a Thou-

address and commitment to the Thou of that response.
REVELATION:
humanity.
bout."

The everyday meeting with God which strengthens one's

"At times it is like a light breath, at times like a wrestling

Revelation does not impose a law, but exposes universal values to

human scrutiny.

Revelation means also the "mighty" disclosure of meaning

found in religious tradition.
SPIRIT:

In accordance with the Hebrew tradition, Buber defines

spirit in its human manifestation not as the isolated intellect, but as
the totality which comprises all of one's capacities, powers, and urges.
This totality, the spirit, is the response of the human being to his
Thou.

Buber defines spirit also as the human power to give order to

the world, which happens only through bodily participation in it.
SPIRITUAL FORCE:
ing."

"The practice of the religion of communal liv

It does not mean "intellectual standards or cultural achievements."
STRUCTURE:

The configuration of anything.

The diverse parts and

processes which, in complementation of one another, comprise and enhance
the purposeful whole.
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UNIQUENESS:

The unrepeatable reality of an existent as a uni

fied whole.
VALUE:

Value as defined by Maurice Friedman is the intrinsic

good or worth of anything.

According to Friedman, VALUING is deciding

what is good and what is evil, and the subsequent attitude toward the
possibility of avoiding evil or changing it into good.
WHOLENESS:

A person becomes whole when his individual impulse

unites with the single, absolute direction which renders it capable of
love and service.

(In the meeting between two people, perception of

wholeness refers to becoming aware of the other as a presence.)
WILL:

A power of the mind which chooses to relate, or the

exercise of that power.

(Arbitrary self-will is not true will and

choice.)
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CHAPTER I I

DESCRIPTIVE AND CRITICAL LITERATURE

Literature Related to Mutuality

In a commentary on the work of Martin Buber, the Roman Catholic
philosopher Gabriel Marcel writes:
Buber . . . has shown with the greatest possibly cogency that
only what he calls a philosophy des Zwischen [the mutuality of
the between]— I would say, for my part, a philosophy of inter
subjectivity— can rescue us from either the impasse of an indi
vidualism which considers man solely in reference to himself or
the other impasse of a collectivism which has eyes only for
society. These are, indeed, but complementary expressions of
a single state of affairs, a humanity uprooted that no longer
feels at home in the cosmos, and that has, moreover, seen the
circumscribed communities such as the family, of which everyone
used to feel himself a member, collapse one after another. . . .
It is only when the individual recognizes the other in his very
otherness, as a human being other than himself, and when on this
basis he effects a penetration to the other, that he can break
the circle of his solitude in a specific, transforming encoun
ter.1
By a remarkable coincidence, Marcel discovered the "particular
reality of the Thou" at approximately the same time Buber was writing
his book I and Thou.
His name was quite unknown to me, moreover, as were the names of
Ferdinand Ebner and Friedrich Rosenzweig, who appear to have
preceded us on this path. Thus, we are faced with one of those
cases of spiritual convergence which always merit attention. . . .
At a time when a philosophy which concentrated more and more
exclusively upon the world of the It . . . was leading into
technocratic developments increasingly perilous for the inte
grity of man and even for his physical existence— the current
G a b r i e l Marcel, "I and Thou," in The Philosophy of Martin Buber,
p. 42.
30
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atomic threat representing merely the paroxysm of this trend—
it was surely inevitable that here and there men were moved
to bring clearly and methodically to consciousness a counter
poise, that is, a consideration of the Thou.
Having underscored this convergence of the thought of
Buber and my own investigations as these appeared in my
Journal Mdtaphysique, I feel bound to stress the fact that
the Jewish thinker went much further than I in elucidating
this structural aspect of the fundamental human situation.2
As Buber has said, Marcel continues, it was a remark by Feuerbach
which contributed initially to Buber's realization:

Feuerbach writes,

The individual person does not contain in himself the essence
of man either in so far as he is a moral being or in so far as
he is a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only
in the community, in the unity of man and man— a unity which
rests upon the reality of the difference between 'T ' and
’Thou’."
Feuerbach himself did not succeed in exploring or drawing the consequences
of this discovery, which Buber terms Copernican.
In Buber's own development of the I and Thou, the starting point
is his philosophical anthropology, the problem of man in relation to his
world.

Maurice Friedman has succeeded in condensing this philosophy,

stated in Buber's classic I and Thou, into the single page of an essay
(Buber himself edited the essay), which serves as an introduction to
those who are unacquainted with Buber's thought:
Man's two primary attitudes and relations, according to I and
Thou, are "I-Thou" and "I-It." The I of man comes into being
in the act of speaking one or the other of these primary words.
But the two I's are not the same: "The primary word I-Thou can
only be spoken with the whole being. The primary word I-It can
never be spoken with the whole being." The real determinant of
the primary word in which a man takes his stand is not the
object over against him, but the way in which he relates him
self to that object.
I-Thou is the primary word of relation
ship.^

2Ibid., p. 41.

3*
2
I bid., p. 42.

^Maurice Friedman, "Introductory Essay," in Knowledge of M a n ,
p. 12.
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I-Thou is mutual, and it is characterized by directness, presentness, intensity, and ineffability.

Although it is only within this rela

tion that personality and the personal exist, the Thou of I-Thou is not
limited to people, but may include animals, trees, objects of nature, and
God •
I-It is the primary word of experiencing and using. It takes
place within a man and not between him and the world. Hence
it is entirely subjective and lacking in mutuality. Whether
in knowing, feeling, or acting, it is the typical subjectobject relationship.
It is always mediate and indirect, deal
ing with objects in terms of the categories and connections,
and hence is comprehensible and orderable.
It is significant
only in connection and not in itself. The It of I-It may
equally well be a he, a she, an animal, a thing, a spirit,
or even a god, without a change in the primary word. Thus
I-Thou and I-It cut across the lines of our ordinary dis
tinctions to focus our attention not upon individual objects
and their causal connections, but upon the relations between
things. . . .5
What at one moment was the Thou of an I-Thou relationship can
become the next instant an It and indeed must continually do so.

The

It may again become a Thou but will not be able to remain one, and need
not become a Thou at all.

People can live continuously and securely in

the world of It, but if they live only in this world they are not real
persons.u
Although Buber refers to the meeting with human beings as the
main sphere of worldly relation, he insists that mutuality is possible
in the sphere outside the human.

Of this Malcolm Diamond says:

Whatever encounters Buber may have experienced, his talk of
mutuality in man's relation with beings that lack conscious
ness introduces more confusion than illumination. Our mode 5
6

5Ibid.
6Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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of apprehending any and all beings does vary radically as
between the It and the Thou postures, but mutuality is not
one of the factors that constitutes the difference.?
It would have been better, Diamond suggests, if Buber had given
up the notion that mutuality is also applicable to a general description
of the I-Thou encounter as are the categories of exclusiveness, present
ness, engagement, concreteness, and the rest.®
Friedman admits a difficulty in understanding Buber's meaning when
he writes in his essay "Dialogue" that all things "say" something to us.
What is mutual is the fact of "otherness" and active being:
We cannot help suspecting Buber of "animism" or mystical
"projection" when he speaks of an I-Thou relation with non
human existing beings: we can only imagine such a relation
as possible with things that have minds and bodies similar
to ours and In addition possess the consciousness of being
an I.
In the presentness of meeting, however, are Included all
those things which we see in their uniqueness and for their
own selves, and not as already filtered through our mental
categories for purposes of knowledge or use.
Though natural things may "say" something to us and in
that sense have "personal" relations with us, they do not
have the continuity, the independence, or the living con
sciousness of self which make up the person. A tree can
"say" something to me and become my Thou, but I cannot be
a Thou for it. This same impossibility of reciprocity is
found in the work of literature and art which becomes Thou
for us, and this suggests by analogy that as the poem is the
"word” of the poet, so the tree may be the "word" of Being
over against us, Being which is more than human yet not less
than personal. This does not mean, however, any monistic or
mystical presupposition of unity between subject and object.
Quite to the contrary, this view alone allows to non-human
existing beings their true "otherness" as something more than
the passive objects of our thought categories and the passive
tools of our will to use.***
8

York:

^Malcolm L. Diamond, Martin Buber:
Oxford Press, I960), p. 31.

Jewish Existentialist (New

8Ibid., p. 32.
9Friedman, Martin Buber:

The Life of Dialogue, pp. 170-171.
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The meeting on a Thou-to-Thou basis, Schaeder emphasizes, was
for Buber a single, undivided act felt as both a sensuous and a spirit
ual experience.
And this conjunction of sensuous and spiritual spontaneity as
an inseparable unity in the depths of the soul was character
istic of Buber’s personality and is the key to the understand
ing of his philosophy. . . . Poets will readily understand this,
although it would be an error to underestimate Buber as a phi
losopher simply because of his undeniable poetical gifts. We
are dealing here with a dimension of existence that not only
goes back to the common root of poetical and religiousphilosophical experience but also transcends the purely
poetical.10
Of the book I and Thou, Schaeder comments that the extension of
reality from which Buber proceeded made it impossible for him to develop
a systematic philosophy.

He could only illuminate partial areas of being

out of the fullness of his basic insight, so that his teaching developed
naturally and unsystematically and not as a coherent theory.

After

describing the nature and function of the primary attitudes in I and
Thou, he attempted, by means of a series of separate questions and by
referring to fragmentary though exemplary life situations, to contribute
to the basis of mutuality or the "ontic" basis of the I-Thou relation.
It is not basic concepts but rather basic attitudes which
Buber took for examples; the I-Thou relation is for him above
all a way into life and not a philosophical principle. . , .
He was now not so much interested in elaborating a life phi
losophy as in finding a life teaching that would serve as an
antidote to the crisis of the age. Although Buber had always
inquired into the unchanging basic conditions of human exis
tence, from the very outset he deliberately directed his word
to the needs of his own a g e . H
Buber’s main concern was to show that the I-Thou relation is not
a problematic mysticism, but a reality that leads to the depths of being

^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 28.
i;LIbid., p. 177.
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and which can be tested in daily life.

What is required is a "complete

acceptance of the present" in the context of a meeting.

Not only must

the partner be accepted but the fact that the moment of meeting is not
permanent must also be accepted, the fact of "discontinuity" in the
I-Thou relation.

Buber points out that there is something in things

of the nature of a gift, a value that reveals itself only to the one
who loves and who embraces them with his whole being.

In I and Thou

the "effective" presentness of things, the knowledge of the cosmic
love-unity inherent in things and in beings which is to be realized
"between" them, signifies "mutuality.
It is required that the other be known as an "independent oppo
site," not as an extension of the self and not as an object of appropri
ation for one’s own use.

The sphere in which mutuality takes place is

called by Buber the "between," to Marcel a "creative middle."1
13
2

Buber

and Marcel acknowledge this between to be a "mysterious" concept.
cannot be defined in an arithmetical or geometric language.

It

Yet it

seems mysterious "only because one has not up till now been concerned
about it."1^

The between is defined by Schaeder as a field of energy,

as it were, which actualizes man's personal aspects:
that man says ’Thou,' he becomes I.

to the extent

The between of the interhuman is

the sphere "that must be strengthened if m o d e m man's fast disappearing
personal life is still to be saved so that genuine community, beyond
individualism and collectivism, might be restored."15

12Ibid., p. 162.

13Ibid., pp. 185-186.

1% a r t i n Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 707.
15Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 186.
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In Schaeder's view, "the language of I and Thou reflects Buber's
character and spiritual quality more perfectly than any other of his
works, since it was at the same time a panegyric and a religious tract,
a philosophical treatise and a modern myth in one."

The Thou which is

directly addressed is the human and God the eternal Thou within the same
life movement.

Man transcends his I through the "embrace" of the Thou.

The uniqueness of this work, which was composed in a spirit of
"irresistable enthusiasm" and which ranges from mysticism to
the speech usages of primitive peoples, thus anticipating an
anthropological basis of a highly personal experience of faith,
was apparent from the very outset. . . . The work Dialogue,
which was written many years later, is calmer in tone, but it
is characterized by the same . . . indifference to philosophi
cal conceptual language. In it the author is concerned with
illustrating dialogic life by giving examples of concrete
situations in which it appears in the daily life of individ
uals and society. . . . The presentation of Dialogue makes no
claim to completeness, but it adheres as closely as possible
to lived life.
Over time, however, Buber sought to find a "generally understood
conceptual language for a non-conceptual unique experience."

The change

which occurred in his language between the works I and Thou and "Elements
of the Interhuman" is a clear indication of his efforts to find a suitable
language and a philosophic method stemming from his urge to communicate.
In "Elements of the Interhuman" Buber took pains to keep in the back
ground the basic religious experience and the knowledge of mutual ontic
participation within creation.

"He did not speak of it but out of it,

and confined himself to the limited sphere of the problem he was dis
cussing."!^
Diamond helps to clarify the meaning of the It, and how it con
trasts with the Thou in Buber's formulation.

16Ibid., p. 428.

Since the I-Thou posture1
6

17Ibid., p. 187.
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is the one to which the deeper meaning of existence is revealed, Buber's
readers are sometimes misled into thinking that the I-It is meant to
imply a negative, or even an evil category.

This is not at all accurate.

It is true that the "I" of the I-It differs from the "I" of the I-Thou.
In the I-It posture the "I" holds back, measuring, using, and even seek
ing to control the object of its attention, and never, as in the I-Thou
relation, affirming the other just as it is in itself.

But the I-It

relation is necessary and appropriate to many activities.
Through knowledge acquired in detachment, man is able to achieve
a reliable perspective on the world and a considerable degree
of control over nature.
It is in the It perspective that phys
icists all over the world can communicate by means of mathemati
cal symbols that are free of the cultural nuances that haunt
words such as "democracy" and "freedom" and make them susceptible
to so many radically conflicting interpretations. 8
The I-It posture is not evil any more than power or any other
basic element of existence is in itself evil. Power becomes evil
when it is abused. . . . In the realm of thought, the It posture
becomes evil when it oversteps its limits and claims to encompass
the totality of truth, thereby choking off the possibility of
response to the deeper levels of meaning that may energe from
I-Thou encounters.
The I-It attitude becomes a source of evil whenever the
individual becomes so addicted to it that he remains absorbed
in his own purposes and concerns when he should be responding
in a fresh way to the beings he meets.
As a philosopher, Buber does not fit into any category, unless
it is that of his own dialogical approach to philosophical anthropology.
Nevertheless, he is often referred to as an existentialist.

Buber agrees

he can be so categorized, if existentialism means the transposing of
"human existence itself into the center of rational contemplation."
adds that the genuine existentialist must himself "exist," must not

*8Diamond, Martin Buber;

Jewish Existentialist, p. 22.

19 Ibid.
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content himself with theory a l o n e . F r i e d m a n gives Buber an important
place among existentialists, but points out that existentialism is not
a single philosophy but a mood uniting a number of philosophies more
divergent than they are similar.
Existentialists like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Tillich,
and Berdyaev tend to see existence as centered in the self and
to see man's relations to other men and to the non-human world
as dimensions of this self. In contrast to them, existential
ists like Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Franz Rosenzweig, and
Ferdinand Ebner see existence as inseparable from communication,
dialogue, or the I-Thou relationship. But it is Martin Buber
alone who has placed at the center of a monumental corpus the
task of pointing to the essential difference between the direct,
mutual meeting, into which one enters with one's whole being and
in full presentnessj and the indirect, non-mutual relationship
of subject and object, the "I-It."21
Friedman points to i.ue importance of this teaching for drama,
literature, theory of knowledge, theology, psychotherapy, and education.
"Precisely through this concrete application, indeed, some readers may
come to understand the life of dialogue for the first time from within."
In Diamond's critique, the mutual meeting takes into account
these factors— multiplicity in existence, the primacy of actual experi
ence over intellectual speculation, and resolute decision.
emphases cut across all the various existentialisms.

The last two

"The central task

for the individual is to achieve authentic selfhood by means of resolute
decision.

This summons to free and responsible decision is the stuff of

existence and the focus of existentialism."

Concrete experience has been

emphasized also by empiricists.

^^Martin Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, eds.
Sydney and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964),
p. 18.
23-Maurice Friedman, "Introduction," in Pointing the W ay, by
Martin Buber (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957; Harper Torchbooks,
1963), pp. ix-x.
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But the empirical tradition has taken all the data of experi
ence— of willing and thinking, sensing and feeling— and analyzed
them in an attitude of detachment. This tradition, no less than
the rational one it opposed, attempted to strip human judgments
of subjective involvement and passion. By contrast, the existen
tialists have consciously adopted the posture of passionate
engagement as an integral part of their philosophizing.22
Most existentialists summon the person to authentic life, but
they stress the obstacles to its realization, the anxieties and anguish
of the decisions involved in authentic, free expression.

Although Buber’s

affinities with existentialism are apparent, his thought has also inter
acted with "the world-affirming tradition of Judaism, which has always
cautioned its adherents against overanxious preoccupation with sin.
Friedman points to a fundamental difference between Buber and
Jean-Paul-Sartre.

Sartre defines value as the meaning of life which the

individual chooses; this implies an "invention" of value and a selfcreated morality.
Such a self-created morality means freedom without genuine
responding and responsibility, just as a "moral duty" imposed
from without means "responsibility" 'without either freedom or
genuine responding. The narrow ridge between the two is a
freedom that means freedom tc> respond, and a responsibility
that means both address from without and free response from
within.
Sartre's definition of value as the meaning of life
which the individual chooses. Buber points out, destroys all
meaningful notion of value.2^
Friedman quotes directly from Buber’s statement:
One can believe in and accept
has discovered it, not if one
me an illuminating meaning, a
it has been revealed to me in

22Diamond, Martin Buber:

a meaning or value . . . if one
has invented it. It can be for
direction-giving value, only if
my meeting with being, not if I

Jewish Existentialist, p. 17.

23lbid., p. 19.

2^Maurice Friedman, "The Bases of Buber's Ethics," in The
Philosophy of Martin Buber, p. 177.
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have freely chosen it for myself from among the existing pos
sibilities and perhaps have in addition decided with a few
fellow creatures: This shall be valid from now on. 25
To Ernst

Simon (Buber's close colleague and co-worker for inter

national peace), Buber's ethic most resembles a "believer's occasional
ism."

He compares it with other ethical views.

The ethical for Buber

cannot be identified, for instance, with pragmatism, relativism, or for
malism:

"It surely is not a pragmatic or utilitarian one, nor a psy

chologically relativizing or sociologically relativizing one.

Nor is

it a formalism in the Kantian sense, because it does not recognize a lawgiving categorical imperative, which stands rigorously in every situation.
It most resembles a believer's occasionalism (but one which is not limited
to a belief that the mind and body cannot interact).

It "refers to the

'occasions,' or in Buber's language, to the situations, which are sent by
God to man so that he may live up to their demands," and each of these
requires individual choice and action.
values of revelation are also essential.

At the same time, the universal
Buber negates "the possibility

of a 'moratorium of the Decalogue,' as if 'killing would become a good
deed if it is done in the interest of one's own society' and false wit
ness, on behalf of one's own nation."26
Buber is also referred to as humanist.

Schaeder shows that Buber'

humanism is in contradistinction to Western humanism.

The latter is con

cerned more with the individual in his release of creative powers, whereas
Buber's humanism has to do mainly with the "open person."

This person is

"directed to the community and as such is not concerned with noble form

25Ibid.
^ E m s t Simon, "Martin Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy
of Martin Buber, pp. 570-71.
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but with relation. . . . Meaning is not to be found in structure and form
but in confirmation from moment to m o m e n t . W e s t e r n humanism derives
from the Greeks.

"In the Crito and The Republic," Friedman says, "the

good is Intrinsic to a person's being but not to relations between man
and man themselves. . . .

In the Psalms, in contrast, man's very exis

tence is set in relationship with reality that confronts him."

So to

Buber what is meant by happiness has its home in a sphere other than
self satisfaction, transcends the realm of ethics as well as that of
self-consciousness.^8
Again, Buber describes his thought as proceeding along a "narrow
rocky ridge between the gulfs where there is no sureness of expressible
knowledge."

This implies an acceptance of uncertainty and insecurity

but one which is, Buber says, a "holy insecurity."

Friedman sees Buber's

position as a genuine third alternative to the Insistent either-or's of
our age.

Thus Buber does not ignore the reality of "paradox and contra

diction" which produce "suffering.
E. la B. Cherbonnier asks, How might Buber's philosophy be cor
rected should it contain any errors?
Specifically, how does one determine which paradoxes are true
and which are not? Unless these questions can be answered,
would not the "narrow ridge" of "holy insecurity" broaden, in
practice, into a boundless plain with unlimited room for
maneuver? Would not I-Thou statements then begin to resemble
statements ex cathedra?30

^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, pp. 433-34.
2®Friedmau, "The Bases of Buber's Ethics," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 199.
^Friedman, Martin Buber:

The Life of Dialogue, p. 3.

la B. Cherbonnier, "Interrogation," in Philosophical Inter
rogations , pp. 50-51.
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Diamond points out that Buber’s philosophical accounting is based
on experience, but also on reason and consistency:
Buber is not an irrationalist; he does not set some nonrational faculty, such as intuition, above reason and use it
as the path to truth. He regards reason as relevant to all
human concerns, and he uses reason to explore the I-It pos
ture to social, moral, and religious issues.31
Buber employs criteria frequently, and his thought has
more content than that of almost any other contemporary
thinker, but neither the criteria nor the content are
objective.32
Buber seeks an understanding between himself and his readers by
pointing them to their own experiences:

"I know no criterion for the

’objective existence’ of what becomes present to me in the I-Thou rela
tion.

...

He who wishes to live securely would do better to stay far

from the way which I have indicated."33

Ultimately for Buber's readers,

Diamond believes, "his illustrations provide the only reliable guide to
his meaning."3^

Literature Related to Education

Before his acceptance of the chair of Social Philosophy at the
Hebrew University, Buber was offered the Chair of Pedogogy but declined
it on the grounds that the field had
rather than theoretically.

always

interested him practically

To Simon, this assertion has been vastly

contradicted but becomes comprehensible in the light of Buber's

31-Diamond, Martin Buber:

Jewish Existentialist, p. 35.

32ibid., p. 33.
33suber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 54.
3^Diamond, Martin Buber:

Jewish Existentialist, p. 20.
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characterization of a Hasidic master who was a teacher, though evidently
not "by profession."

Buber’s yearning "is for a 'master,' but his

insight into the essence of the epoch and of his own nature drives him
to teaching, and even beyond that, to an almost unwillingly adopted
pedagogical theory," one which is without system.-*5

Haim Gordon observes

that during the half century Buber wrote on such topics as the essence of
education, the education of character, and national education, he always
linked the topic to contemporary need, spoke as a participant in a spe
cific "historical situation," and directed himself to fellow educators
who sight benefit from his insights.55
The consistent main goal of education for Buber is the education
of character.

Schaeder describes the background of Buber's addresses

having to do with character education; the content of the addresses have
broad application to m o d e m Western society.
Schaeder writes that during the rise of Naziism Buber's addresses
to German Jews conveyed that after all external assurance had failed,
"the Jews needed a new, personal, existential hierarchy of values, and
that they must rediscover the sources and goals of their Jewish destiny."
German Jewry at that time of crisis was not in consensus, but was divided
into groups with different world views, religious and non-religious.

In

an address of 1933, "Education and the World View-," Buber insisted that
education confront all the different groups having different world views
with the common reality of humankind.

The groups within a community are

35simon, "Martin Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 544.
3 % a i m Gordon, "An Approach to Martin Buber's Educational Writ
ings," Journal of Jewish Studies 29 (Spring 1978): 85.
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united not by bustling activity directed toward different ends but by
"the common unfolding of the common reality."
A further educational consideration is the need to help implant
a world view in the soil of one's own world, to train one's "world view
conscience," the individual existential responsibility for a world view.
Education must be a constructive "inner-forming power" and not "the dis
mal uniform step of marching columns" prevalent in nationalisticoriented modern societies.

Buber says, "In the uniform marching line

of the group today there is no distinguishing any more between one per
son's step which is the expression of his direction-moved existence and
another person’s step which is nothing else than an eloquent gesture."
Buber’s teaching had both Immediate and universal application.

She

observes, "To the German reader of today it appears as a mene tekel
[writing on the wall] that proved true ten years later."3?
Schaeder points to the theme which can be read between the lines
of "The Education of Character":
the test and prove themselves.

Buber here asks that Jews also stand
Before coming to Palestine he had

appealed to the Zionist community to realize a model society founded
on peace and national justice, a society founded on the "common memory"
preserved in history, the tradition of Jewish spiritual strength.

This

was the goal of spiritual Zionism to which Buber for decades had been
calling the youth.
th e

c o u n tr y

in

But when he came to Palestine in 1938, he found

tu r m o il,

w ith

te n s io n

b e tw e en

Jew s and A ra b s.

Under the pressure of historical events the youth in the
country had succumbed to rabid nationalism, rejected reli
gious calling, and In a desire to be like all the other

37schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, pp. 197-98.
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nations, were prepared like them to suspend the Ten Command
ments if the existence of the people was at stake. Much of
this can be read between the lines of "The Education of
Character"— an impressive testimony to Buber's incorruptible
sense of justice and love of truth. . . .
Thus enormous difficulties attended character training at the
time, yet it was under just these difficulties that Buber's pedagogical
genius fully came to light:
Despite the fact that he was deeply rooted in the tradition
of his forefathers, he could "accept" the young generation
wholeheartedly and "comprehend" it. . . . Buber's point of
departure was his trust in creation, in "its being permeated
throughout by vital dialogue," in the common participation
of its creatures and their need of one another.
If direct
contact is restored between man and man, the eternal Thou
will by that same token also be the object of personal
address, and we shall have entered the sphere of reconcil
iation.
The capacity was given to Buber, as to few people of the
older generation, to "accept" the young generation and to
confirm it in its refusal to have fixed values imposed upon
it. It is in such a situation that the educational ideal
can be realized, the ideal that Buber regarded as the high
est, even though it appeared so seldom: a person of great
character, one who in every situation acts with his entire
substance, who realizes that every situation is a unique
portion of life . . . and demands the entire person.3°
To Buber, the teacher's power of influence rests in the fact that
the trusting pupil will ask for his advice in his moral dilemmas.

"Hugo

Gaudig," Simon writes, "had once defined the school ironically as that
remarkable institution in which questions are asked by those who know,
while the answers are attempted by the ignorant"; thus he "unmasked most
of the questions of teachers as open and undisguised examinations, and he
had wished to replace them from centrality by the genuine unrhetorical
OQ

questions of students who really wished to learn."-"

In character

38Ibid., pp. 199-201.
33Simon, "Martin Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 566.

oduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
education Buber wants a similar reversal from the catechized teaching of
morals to the spontaneous questions of pupils, who examine their own con
science as well as that of the teacher.

The teacher might be faced with

a moment of surprise, an ethical difficulty.
In mere instruction an unanswered question can only lead to a
transitory embarrassment, and not even that, if the teacher
had not assumed the false nimbus of omniscience.
Should it
occur, he ought to have the courage to say: "I don't know it
at the moment, and I shall give you the answer tomorrow," or
better still, "We could find that out together in the follow
ing way: . . . "
Therefore, here the delay of an answer is
only of an accidental nature. But it is different in charac
ter education. The inability to answer is there existential
and belongs to the substance of the value crisis of our time.4®
Buber believes in eternal values but would not have the teacher
dictate them to his pupils.

Buber's solution is to refer the child to

his disturbed relation with his own self.

The first step to recovery

is the consciousness of illness which, in Simon's interpretation, is
"carefully awakened and never drugged by the understanding educator who
knows the secret remedy."41

In order to achieve trust, in Buber's view,

the teacher needs not moral perfection, but needs to be really there for
the pupil.
The democratic-elitist dichotomy in Buber's educational philosophy
is explored in depth by Simon, and here summarized:

Buber opposes every

detachment of the intellectual from life, and in particular, against every
"bourgeois privilege of education," which threatens culture with collapse
everywhere.

He sees the solution of the division between the exemplary

lives of the few, and the dull vegetation of the many, between the "elite"
and the "masses," to lie mainly in the future.

But this is a future which

one can anticipate and for which one must prepare now by means of4
0

40Ibid., p. 567.

41Ibid.
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education for leadership.

Simon cites Buber's conviction, "It is not

the aim that there should be only leaders and no followers any more.
. . . The aim is that the leaders should remain leaders and not become
dominating rulers.

More precisely stated, they should assume only those

elements of dominion which are necessarily demanded by the circumstances."
Buber knows very well, Simon relates, how prolonged control in every
society works toward class formation, "estranges the leaders from their
original legitimate task and makes them to be mere representatives of
vested or even imperialistically expanding interests."

But a legitimate,

"serving" elite can maintain itself through education, by influencing
youth to continue their work of service.

Here Simons points to a

paradox:
Decisive assignments fall to the educators— parents and teachers—
and again a vicious circle is generated, which Buber does not
discuss in this form. Namely, to select and educate the elite,
the educator himself should belong to it. This is not and can
not be the case, since they, as teachers, constitute a mass
profession.^2
Relevance to the contemporary situation is also central to Buber's
address "Education," which contains what he calls the general "groundwork"
of educating:

The nature of the teacher-pupil relation in our time of the

"crumbling" of values is a major part of the address.

As observed by

F. H. Hilliard, it was presented during the period following the First
World War, when freedom and creativity in Germany were the watchwords of
a form which aimed to develop a progressive education in contrast to the
authoritarian education of an earlier era.
Buber recognizes that at a time when traditional values were
still widely accepted it was all too easy for a teacher of the4
2

42Ibid., p. 553.
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"old" school to use his position in an authoritarian manner.
But so, indeed, is it all too easy in a time when the old
traditional values and beliefs have been shattered for a
teacher of the "new" education to project himself and his
own values into his teaching in a manner which distorts the
true educational process.^3
Hilliard points out that Buber was very much alive to the danger
of indoctrination which he described as "interference" or "arbitrariness."
At the same time, Buber viewed education as a process which required the
educator not merely to assist but also positively to influence growth and
development.

As Hilliard writes, "For schools and teachers to provide

merely . . . exploratory experience . . . was not enough.

It was their

task to select the sort of experience which would lead to the kind of
education which was judged to be desirable.”*
44

Like Dewey, Buber was

aware of the influence which progressive education was exerting and was
likely to continue to exert on educational thought and practice.

That

he clearly perceived its limitations as a theory of education, is in
itself some indication of his abilities as a student and a teacher of
the pedagogy from which he deliberately turned away.4-*
But, Hilliard asks, "how are influence and arbitrariness to be
distinguished, and how and in what circumstances does a teacher cross the
ill-defined boundary which separates the exercise of educationally desir
able from undesirable influence?
satisfactory answer but . . .

Buber attempts more than once to find a

he fails to do s o . " ^

Haim Gordon comprehends from Buber's address that influence ("con
veying the spirit") relates to the whole person by involving oneself as

4^F. H. Hilliard, "A Re-Examination of Buber's Address on Education," British Journal of Educational Studies 21 (February 1973): 45.
44Ibid., p. 46.

45Ibid., p. 45.

46Ibid., p. 48.
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a whole person.

He suggests the need for inquiry into the possibility

of a curriculum which facilitates openness toward nature and human
beings.

"Most curriculum thought stresses individual achievement or

teamwork, but not knowledge acquired through relating on a personal
level."

No model can assist the teacher in this, since a model con

fines education too narrowly to behavior, skills, and intellect . ^
The personal relation in education, called by Buber the dialogi
cal "inclusion" of the other side, is that which enables the teacher to
experience the standpoint of the pupil as well as his own, and to thereby
avoid arbitrariness.

Ernst Simon considers inclusion, along with Buber's

concept of the "line of demarcation," to be Buber's most original con
tribution to pedagogy.^®

Hilliard makes no mention of inclusion, nor

does he discuss Buber's point that the experience of the pupil’s side is
often necessarily "uncertain," and must be constantly renewed, hence
Buber offers no security.

Nevertheless, one gains from Hilliard's article

a helpful insight into the historical context in which Buber's address
"Education" was stated.

In addition, he underscores the dangers of

indoctrination, while showing that the line between it and educational
influence is a recurring question for the sensitive practitioner, one
which cannot be dismissed lightly by the theorist.
That education is an art more than a science is stressed in Zvi
Kurzweil's commentary.

The outstanding features of the address "Educa

tion" are its focus on the teacher-pupil relationship, the "most simple
and essential factor of the educational process," and its emphasis on a

^Gordon, "An Approach to Martin Buber's Educational Writings,"
pp. 222-23.
^Simon, "Martin Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 571.
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profound religious element.

"God, the teacher, and the pupil are the

three focal points around which the fabric of his educational thought
is woven. . . . The Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo also based his edu
cational thought on these three points."

Buber’s thought is an important

balancing factor in the current trend in education:
The modern trend emphasizes in a most one-sided manner the mul
tifarious aids, techniques, and other "scientific" devices,
sometimes of a very trivial nature, which are associated with
the practice of teaching, such as audio-visual aids, statis
tical surveys, intelligence and aptitude tests, etc., while
quite failing to recognize the essential purpose of education
as opposed to mere instruction. The enormous flow of American
magazine-literature on the minutest technicalities of instruc
tion is witness to the alarming proportions that the new trend
is assuming. This educational literature presents a distorted
picture of educational values. . . . In our materialistic civil
ization the exact sciences and technology are preferred to phi
losophy and the arts. . . . An ever-increasing number of educa
tionists like to see themselves as educational technologists
. . . thus emulating their colleagues in the exact sciences.
A g a in s t

th is

te n d e n c y

th e v o ic e

of

B ub er

is

r a is e d

in

lo u d

a n d lo n e ly ^ p r o t e s t . ^

Kurzweil cites Herbert Read who, in his interpretation of Buber's
pedagogy, stresses the importance of the creation of an atmosphere of
"spontaneity, of happy childish industry," the main secret of successful
teaching; this atmosphere is the creation of the teacher and can exist in
"a village school, or in a dingy barracks in some industrial city."

To

Buber, Kurzweil points out, education cannot "teach" to belief in God nor
inculcate religion.

Yet the I-Thou relationship to God and to the human

being are two facets of the same universal principle, and belief in God
can arise spontaneously out of the experience of meeting human beings.
According to Buber, Kurzweil reports, education can lead the pupil a step
further towards a spiritual perception of the universe, first, by

^®Zvi E. Kurzweil, "Buber on Education," Judaism 11 (Winter
1962): 54.
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fostering in him a critical attitude free of prejudices propagated by
political parties or other organizations through the various media of
mass propaganda, and then by helping him to become an independent "per
son" who is sensitive to spiritual influences.-*®
Howard Rosenblatt, who has written extensively on education and
minority youth, comments that within Buber’s frame of reference, "tech
niques are not discarded; rather they seem to be included as important
tools leading to professional competence.

Teaching techniques are

learned to enhance opportunities for person-to-person dialogue, but
they are not seen as ultimate goals in and of themselves.
Buber's emphasis on education of the "whole person" stands in
opposition to materialism; as noted by Simon, it also opposes intellectualism as the sole purpose of the educational endeavor.
concurs, he is against a one-sided intellectualism.

Robert Hutchins

Nevertheless, he

expresses the following concern;
No doctrine has promoted the disintegration of American education
as much as that of the "whole man"; it has been used to justify
the inclusion of the most frivolous trivialities in the course
of study.
There is grave danger in too literal and immediate an inter
pretation of Buber's insistence on "our present situation" and
"our hour". . . . The whole view of American education that we
must adjust the student to his environment . . . can be justi
fied by an interpretation of Buber's language, of which he would
be the last to approve.52
A great teacher, like Socrates or Buber, can start with any
thing and move by ordered stages to the most tremendous issues.
The ordinary teacher who begins with triviality is almost

50Ibid., p. 53.

5lRoward Rosenblatt, "Martin Buber's Concepts Applied to Educa
tion," The Educational Forum 35 (January 1971); 217.
^ R o b e r t M. Hutchins, "Interrogation," in Philosophical Inter
rogations , p. 64.
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certain to end there. The virtue of great hooks is that they
are the thoughts of great men about great issues, most of which
are so fundamental that they are issues of our present situa
tion and our hour in any definition of these terms. We must
bring our own concrete reality to our reading, of course.53
Buber, too, sees a great danger in a too literal interpretation of
his view of the educational task.
of a truth is dangerous.

’’Every all-too-literal interpretation

What is important is not formally to fix the

true, but to preserve it in its living context."
of adjusting the student to his environment.

He also opposes the view

"We must not adjust our

selves to the changing situations, but we have to take our stand toward
them and master them."

As to Socrates, his method is at odds with that

of Buber:
I know of very few men in history to whom I stand in such a rela
tion of both trust and veneration as Socrates.
But . . . Socrates
overvalued the significance of abstract general concepts in com
parison with concrete individual experiences. General concepts
are the most important stays and supports, but Socrates treated
them as if they were more important than bones. . . . Stronger,
however, than this basic objection is my criticism of a peda
gogical application of the Socratic method.
Socrates conducted
his dialogue by posing questions and proving the answers that he
received untenable; these are not real questions; they are moves
in a sublime dialectical game that has a goal, the goal of reveal
ing a not-knowing. But when the teacher whom I mean . . . enters
into a dialogue with his pupil and in this connection directs a
question to him, he asks . . . because he wants to know something . ^
Like Socrates, Buber believes that the teacher must strive to
awaken in the pupil the need to communicate of himself and thereby bring
him to a greater clarity of existence.

But he also learns, himself, con

cretely the becoming of the human being which takes place in experiences.
Although this is not full partnership, it is still a real dialogue.

53Ibid., p. 65.
S^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 67-68.
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CHAPTER I I I

MUTUALITY

When Buber speaks of mutuality between two people, he refers to
the continuing potential presence of one for the other, an attitude and
a willingness in each to enter into dialogue and a trust that the other
will reciprocate.1
Buber ascribes several terms to dialogue, the unfolding of mutual
ity, such as mutual relation, I-Thou relation, essential relation, and
reciprocity.

In this relation persons become presences for one another

in the context of a concrete and transforming meeting.

Each confronts

and responds to the other not as an object, as happens in the relation
of monologue or I-It, but as a partner in a shared event.

Mutuality and

its unfolding are necessary to the inmost growth of the partners of rela
tion:

"I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say

Thou."2
But Buber understands the relation not only as a psychological
phenomenon or something which occurs within each self.

It refers to

the ontology of meeting, to both the within and the without, to the
intersubjective.
precise sense.

What happens takes place between the two in the most
"Each considered by itself, is a mighty abstraction.

1Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Education," p. 98.

2Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2d ed., trans. Ronald Gregor Smith
(New York: Charles Scribner's, 1958), p. 11.
53
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The individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into rela
tion with other individuals."3

Distance and Relation

The presupposition of all relation is distance and the act of
setting at a distance.

Distance is just the state of being, that is,

each partner exists as unique, and within this uniqueness has the qual
ity of wholeness and unity.

Setting at a distance the unique other

being means granting it an independence and allowing it to exist for
itself as a separate identity, as different from oneself.
Distance and setting at a distance create a contradiction and a
tension— an "over-againstness"— to which the self reacts in one of two
ways:

Either it wills to enter into mutual relation or it wills to with

hold itself from this relation.

In the first instance the overcoming

gives rise to unity, the polar tension of distance and relation together
This means that the primary uniqueness of each partner is not changed
but enhanced or completed through the relation.

The second choice con

stitutes a "thickening" of the distance corresponding to the I-It rela
tion, by which the self persists in a detached manner of perceiving.
The self may

then begin to make the other its object, that is, by

observing and using the other, it is made a part of the objective
world and no longer an independent subject with whom the self has
to deal as another self.^

^Buber, Between Man and M a n :
^Buber, Knowledge of M a n ;

"What is Man?", p. 203.

"Distance and Relation," pp. 59-71.
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There are gradations of both the I-Thou and I-It relations.

And

people vary in the extent to which they relate to the other as a Thou or
an It.

People must live in the impersonal, more secure world of It in

order to survive, but to exist as human being3 they must step out of it
repeatedly and meet the Thou in ever changing form, in new and unpre
dictable situations.^

At times the tension of difference seems unsur-

mountable, but to Buber it is also true that the humane mutual relation,
which includes the other, serves it, and learns from it, is made possible
only by the fact of difference and the confirmation of difference.
Buber explains the principle of distance and relation by con
trasting human reality with the existence of animals.

It is only for

people that an independent opposite exists; an animal does not know the
state of relation because it cannot perceive anything as contrasting
and existing for itself, and as whole and unified.

He therefore sug

gests that human beings have moved into a special category; they have
moved into "reality," have a world.

One cannot view individual beings

as independent and whole, repeat this again and again, without viewing
the world that way, both temporally and spatially.

"An animal's actions

are concerned with its future and the future of its young, but only man
imagines the future."

An animal has no world but is limited to a realm.

Its "image" of its realm and its activity have only to do with a "selec
tion of elements" which meet the necessities of its life and the functions
of its life which are to be performed.

"Wherever swallows or tunny wander

their bodily being (Leiblichkeit) carries out this selection from 'nature,
which as such is completely unknown to them, and on which they in turn

^Buber, I and Thou, p. 34.
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have an effect, again as on something which they neither know nor can
know."6
Given distance, the fulfillment of mutual relation requires the
inner and outer actions, awareness and responsibility.
more than just acknowledging the other as different.

Awareness implies
Being aware means

to accept the different and to confirm it in its wholeness and uniqueness
as a "being made in this particular way."
excludes every variation and reward.

By contrast, an insect state

In responsibility the partner is

helped to unfold through one's presence and one's influence, but the
{Joeiro

"Kg

tC

C

dO 0S

THS2.H

s- fcirt

to change the essential being of the other, to inject one's own right
ness into the partner in relation.

Rather it means "the effort to let

that which is recognized as right, as just, as true . . , through one's
own influence take seed and grow into the form of individuation."7
Such influence is the heart of education, contrasted by Buber
with propaganda.
There man learns not merely that he is limited by man, cast upon
his own finitude, partialness, need of completion, but his own
relation to the truth is heightened by the other's different
relation to the same truth— different in accordance with his
individuation and destined to take seed and grow differently.6
One finds it difficult to understand Buber's meaning of mutual
relation with non-human beings which "say" something to the self.

Since

the non-human lacks consciousness, it cannot, of course, respond to the
self as the self responds to it.

Buber describes the character of the

relation by pointing to an element common to all mutual relation, the

6Buber, Knowledge of Man:

"Distance and Relation," p. 61.

7Buber, Ibid., p. 69.
6Buber, Ibid.
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active reciprocity of being.

On the question of mutuality with nature,

Buber writes:
That living wholeness and unity of the tree, which denies
itself to the sharpest glance of the mere investigator and
discloses itself to the glance of one who says Thou, is there
when he, the sayer of Thou, is there: It is he who vouchsafes
to the tree that it manifest this unity and wholeness; and now
the tree which is in being manifests them. Our habits of
thought make it difficult for us to see that here, awakened
by our attitude, something lights up and approaches us from
the course of being.
In the sphere we are talking of we have
to do justice, in complete candor, to the reality which dis
closes itself to us.®
This, Buber adds, is not a meeting of Platonic ideas, but a meet
ing with the on-going course of b e i n g . ^
Setting at a distance, awareness, and responsibility are not
viewed by Buber as firmly separate entities, nor are they understood
strictly as sequential steps in the relational process.

Rather, aware

ness of the Thou makes possible an attitude of responsibility, and
awareness deepens with the act of responding.

The integrity of the

difference between the I and the Thou, distance and independence, is
maintained throughout.

"The Thou is not another I."

The remainder of this chapter will examine more fully Buber's
concept of mutuality, with particular emphasis on the human sphere.
This calls for further description of the concepts uniqueness, aware
ness, and responsibility, each of which will be treated in terms of
its constituent components.*
0
1

®Buber, I and Thou, p. 126.
10Ibid., p. 129.
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The Unique Person

Wholeness
Uniqueness is often associated with an observable attribute or a
loose aggregate of attributes.

There is a tendency to compare the

attributes of one person with those of another, which says nothing of
the whole existence of that person.

Buber, however, speaks of the unre

peatable "wholeness of the person defined by spirit," and of the "dynamic
center" which stamps one’s "every utterance, action, and attitude with
the recognizable sign of uniqueness."^
Uniqueness is "not analysable into any elements and not compoundable out of a n y . " ^

The Thou response is directed to the other in his

unified entirety, not to single attributes or allegiances abstracted and
generalized to the whole.

Similarly, the self confronts itself as irre

ducible to attributes:
Just as the melody is not made up of notes nor the verse of
words nor the statue of lines, but they must be tugged and
dragged till their unity has been scattered into these many
pieces, so with the man to whom I say Thou. I can take out
from him the color of his hair, or of his speech, or of his
goodness.
I must continually do this.
But each time I do
it he ceases to be Thou.-^
Consistent with Buber's idea of wholeness and unity is his denial
that the distinguishing feature of humanity is only reason, as has been
so often claimed, especially since Descartes.
tute the whole of the person.

Nor does emotion consti

"Man is not a centaur, he is man through

^•Buber, Knowledge of M a n :

"Elements of the Interhuman," p. 80.

^ M a r t i n Buber, Good and Evil, 2d ed., trans. Ronald Gregor Smith
(New York: Charles Scribner's, 1953), p. 141.
l^Buber, I and Thou, pp. 8-9.
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and through," thinks with "his whole body to the very fingertips."^
The Thou is perceived as whole when relation takes place in the
present and becomes exclusive to the partners in relation.

The one to

whom I relate has "no neighbor," but occupies my fullest attention.
"This does not mean that nothing exists except himself.

But all else

lives in his l i g h t . R e l a t i o n to the It is removed from the present,
compares and categorizes.

Here Buber illustrates how categorizing pre

vents a tree from becoming a unique Thou:
I can classify [a tree] in a species and study it as a type in
its structure and mode of life. . . . I can dissipate it and
perpetuate it in number, in pure numerical relation. In all
this the tree remains my object, occupies space and time, and
has its nature and constitution.^
Attributes must, in fact, be acknowledged and dealt with, but in
real relation they are seen as they are in actuality, in their relativ
ity:
To become bound up in relation it is not necessary for me to
give up any of the ways in which I consider the tree. There
is nothing from which I would have to turn my eyes away in
order to see, and no knowledge that I would have to forget.
Rather is everything, picture and movement, species and type,
law and number, indivisibly united in this event.
Everything belonging to the tree is in this: its form
and structure, its colors and chemical composition, its inter
course with the elements and with the stars, are all present
in a single whole. 17
Wholeness comprises also the actual and the potential.

Buber

repeatedly characterizes the Thou not as a static entity, but as the
dynamic being before you with all of its possibilities.

■^Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"What is Han?", p. 198.

l^Buber, I and Thou, p. 8.
l6Ibid., p . 7.
^Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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Equality of Worth
The wholistic view of uniqueness confers on each partner an
equality of worth.

The uniqueness and irreplaceability of every per

son, Buber points out, is a basic teaching of Hasidism.
the teaching of Rabbi Pinhas:

He refers to

"In everyone is something precious that

is in no other," and each has "an importance in which none other can
compete.The

essential uniqueness, that which one is and can become

in one's whole being is, after all, immeasurable.

It is not one's

relative position on a hierarchy of physical attributes, nor skills
and knowledge attainments, nor attitudes of faith and ethics, even
though such differences are recognized as actual.
Certainly, there are great and small, those rich in teaching
and those poor in teaching, those adorned with virtue and
those seemingly bare of virtue, those devoted to God and
those who have crept away into themselves, but God does not
deny Himself even to those decried as foolish and as wicked.
. . . So every man who wishes to walk in God's way must
avoid making absolute differences out of relative ones.
The capacity for uniqueness and genuine relation exists in all
people.

It is not a privilege of intellectual skill like dialectic,

nor of "spiritual luxuriousness.
humanity begins.

. . It begins no higher than where

There are no gifted and ungifted here."

Thus Buber

includes the factory, mine, and office worker, and the "yoked," the
"turbid," and the "repressed."^

He includes the "evil" as well;

"only their evil deeds shall one hate."^l*
9
1

l^Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 251.
19Ibid.
^^Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," pp. 35-36.

^ B u b e r , Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 247.
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Hasidism taught Buber to value people who take responsible direc
tion, who turn toward existence with the whole self without being able to
grasp conceptually this turning.

For them "1 have saved m y love," he

22

writes.

Here a paradox presents itself:

For Buber, the unique potential

ity of each person is immeasurable and incomparable.

Yet, as Ernst Simon

states (see Chapter II), the point can be made that some of his ideas are
suggestive of elitism.

For instance, Buber defines the "Great Character"

in his essay "Education."

Simon infers that a "serving elite" is in fact

established in Buber's way of chinking.

Buber answers that "serving" and

"organizationless" elites are necessary to the growth of the spirit on
earth.

But he firmly discounts the notion of norms or standards for them,

since each Ihou responds to its world in its own particular way.

"The

distinction to be made here is not between norm and norm, but between
way and way."*
23
Further insight is gained into Euber’s perspective of the diffi
cult concept equality by knowing he considers the devotion to all things
an expression of welthaftes Wirken— a cosmic love, a world-permeating
action and influence.

To Buber love is an attitude, not a feeling.

Feelings accompany love, but are of greatly differing kinds.

The lasting

attitude of responsible love contained in one's posture toward the world
.
24
is actualized in exclusive encounter with a single Incomparable Thou.

^Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin
Buber, p. 724.
23Ibid.
2^Buber, I and Thou, pp. 14-15.
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Creativity, Individuation, and Power
Uniqueness, for Buber, has an obvious positive connotation, and
this is bora out further in his view of its origin and its purpose.
"Uniqueness is the essential good of man that is given to him to unfold. "25
It is given, but only partly developed, and what remains to be developed
exists as the potential for creativity and individuation.
genetically underivable.
"author" of uniqueness.

Uniqueness is

It is designed or preformed by the creator, the
But that a unique being is created does not mean

that it is put into being for mere existence.

For creation has a goal.

Uniqueness "is entrusted to me for my execution, although everything that
affects me participates in this execution."26

Actualization of one's

endowed uniqueness, then, is vitally conditioned by the world, but respon
sible action toward this goal begins with the self.
What goal Is intended for one's creativity and individuation?

The

goal is a single one generalized to all people, the "humanly right" direc
tion in service to the work of creation.

Taking the right direction is,

at the same time, personal and situational and therefore dependent upon
free decision.
Basic to Hasidic beliefs was the Cabbalistic myth of the holy
sparks and its implication for "service to the work of creation" by
actualizing the potential within the self and the other.

The "world-

vessels" broke in the time before creation because they could not hold
the creative overflow.

Sparks fell into all beings and are imprisoned

in them until repeatedly people use a thing in holiness, and thereby
free the concealed sparks to re-unite with God as they yearn to do.27

25suber, Hasidism and Modern M a n , p. 111.
^Buber, Good and Evil, pp. 141-42.
27l$uber, Hasidism and Modern M an, p. 32.
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It was not the Hasidic speculations indicated in this myth about the
world's origin which held lasting meaning for Buber, but rather the
underlying implication of the potential for human participation in
redemption.

Through partnership with God in world redemption, indi-

vidual energy became the purpose and task of humanity.

As said by

Buber in his old age, he had no views of the origin and the future of
the cosmos and within it of humanity.
I have never sought to philosophize about beginning or end
or the like.
I have in these matters nothing to establish
other than my faith, and my faith in the meaningfulness of
creation and in its completion as a goal seems to -me to
exist beyond optimism and pessimism. . . . I do not philos
ophize more than I must.29
The human "admittance to power" which Buber took from the Hasidic
teachings appealed to his nature and enlisted his deepest allegiance.

30

Power as a necessary tool in becoming a unique person is emphasized by
Buber, but he makes a careful distinction between power and the avidity
for power.

In a critique of Nietzsche's "will to power" concept, Buber

cites the view of that philosopher that ascetic ideals give one a "bad
conscience" toward power attainment and suppress the will to power,
whereas good conscience to this will has fostered all "great humanity"
and "great culture."

Nietzsche defines the will to power as the striv

ing for "increase in power," for a "maximal feeling of power," and as
the "insatiable desire to display power, or to employ, to practice
power,"

Buber argues that, from a psychological and historical point

of view, real greatness cannot be understood as either an increase or

2®Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 77.
Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin
Buber, p. 702.
^Schaeder, Hebrew Humanism, p. 77.
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or a display of power.33
The productive person is "involuntarily and composedly powerful,"
but not avid for power.
What he is avid for is the realization of what he has in mind,
the incarnation of the spirit. Of course he needs power for
this realization; for power . . . means simply the capacity to
realize what one wants to realize; but the great man is not
avid for this capacity . . . but for what he wishes to be cap
able of. This is the point from where we can understand the
responsibility in which the powerful man is placed, namely
whether, and how far, he is really serving his goal; and also
the point from where we can understand the seduction by power,
leading him to be unfaithful to the goal and yield to power
alone.32
Buber goes on to say that people have a sick attitude toward
their work who desire power instead of their real goal, and that cul
ture is judged from the same standpoint.

Power, then, is not to be

isolated from responsibility and thought of as a possession.

In oppo

sition to Nietzsche, Buber concludes that the will to power "corrupts
the history of the world,"33
Love is "responsibility of an I_ for a Thou.
likeness . . .

In this lies the

of all who love, from the smallest to the greatest."

The egoistic self lives only in monologue, a "world of mirrors and mir
rorings," in which people enjoy their feelings.
gratification.

Love is for self

Such lovers love only their individual passion and

enjoy their own effect, their excitement, and their power.

33suber, Between Man and M a n :

34

"What is Man?", pp. 148-51.

32ibid., p. 151.
33ibid., p. 153.
3^Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," p. 29.
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Buber is more troubled by a kind of "leader” such as the demonic
leader Napoleon whose mission requires him to know nothing but a connec
tion with his particular cause, that is, "no longer to know any real
relation with or present realisation of a Thou— to have everything about
him become an It, serving his particular Cause.
thing flames, but his fire is c o l d . " ^

. . . Towards him every

According to Buber, the world is

truly received by the person who turns to another human being:

"Only

the being whose otherness, accepted by my being, lives and faces me in
the whole compression of existence, brings the radiance of eternity to
me."*
36

Authenticity
The human power to participate in creation includes predomininantly the power to communicate authentically with other human beings.
Buber compares living from being "what one really is" with living from
an image of "what one wishes to seem."

Being and seeming are usually

combined in human existence, since few people function independent of
the impression they make on others, and virtually no one exists who is
entirely motivated by the desire to make an impression.

By way of

illustration, Buber describes a situation in which two people exchange
glances:

The first person, while wanting to be understood, is never

theless unmoved by any thought of the effect his look will have on the
other's perception of him, and so communication remains unimpaired by
such anxiety.

This is the spontaneous, unreserved look of someone

engaged in direct, personal communication.

The second person "makes

35fluber, I and Thou, pp. 67-68.
36Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," p. 30.
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a look," since he is concerned with the image his glance produces in the
other.

A look is produced "which is meant to have, and often enough

does have, the effect of a spontaneous utterance.”

But this is not the

same as the "genuine seeming" of a child, for example, who while imitat
ing a heroic model learns the meaning of heroism; or the person who
believes it important to try to perform a life role which gains authen
ticity in the doing, however unspontaneously or imperfectly carried out.
In these situations the imitation, the part, and the mask are
all genuine.
But where the semblance originates from the lie and is perme
ated by it, the interhuman is threatened in its very existence.
It is not that someone utters a lie, falsifies some account.
The lie I mean does not take place in relation to particular
facts, but in relation to existence itself, and it attacks
interhuman existence as such. There are times when a man, to
satisfy some stale conceit, forfeits the great chance of a
true happening between I and Thou.3?
Yet true communication does not depend on two people saying every
thing that occurs to them, but only on their letting "no seeming creep
in" between them.

It is not a matter of letting go, or total unreserve.

It is a matter of becoming transparent to the extent that the other can
share in one's presence as one really is.

Buber sees the common tendency

to live from the impression one makes not as an aspect of one's "nature."
It originates on the other side of mutuality itself, in people's depen
dence upon one another.

Making an image is seen as a step one person

can take to receive the confirmation from another which is crucial to
their communication.

But here only the image, "the ghost of semblance,"

can be confirmed, not the reality.

^Buber, Knowledge of M a n :
pp. 76-77.

"Elements of the Interhuman ,"

oduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67
Still, the child, and even the adult encompassed in an "increas
ingly tough layer" of semblance, is redeemable.

Though at times with

great personal risk and sacrifice, one can struggle to become authentic
through "confidence in being.

Self Awareness:

The Particular Way

The important confidence in one's own uniqueness is an idea which
Buber expresses concretely in his interpretation of Hasidic teachings.
Everything in the world is new, "God never does the same thing twice."
The great possibility of humankind lies precisely in the unlikeness of
human beings.

And everyone's task is the "actualization of his unique,

unprecedented, and never-recurring potentialities, not the repetition of
something that another . . . has already achieved."

One is only to recog

nize and learn from the contribution another makes, not duplicate it.
Rabbi Susya said, shortly before his death:
shall not be asked:

"In the world to come I

'Why were you not Moses?'

were you not Susya?'"

I shall be asked:

'Why

Thus however small our achievements may be in

comparison with others, "they have their real value in that we bring
them about in our own way and by our own efforts.
Here is a principle which recognizes that people are "essentially
unlike one another" and which therefore "does not aim at making them
alike."

Each person starts from his particular place in a way deter

mined by his individual quality and inclination, and God is reached
through this "multiple advance" of humankind.

It is useless to envy

other people, and it is misleading to study and imitate them in

Ibid., p. 78.
®®Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, pp. 110,139-41.
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disregard of one's own particularity, since that which is intended for
the self is thereby precisely missed.

At the moment someone seizes the

"rung" of another person and abandons his own, neither person is actu
alized.
Buber illustrates the principle of individual direction in a dis
cussion of participation versus withdrawal from the world.

Hasidism

emphasizes participation, and it emphasizes rejoicing in the world by
"hallowing" it with one's whole being.

But it is peculiar to some

people that only by asceticism at certain crucial moments of their
lives can they gain freedom from their "enslavement to the world."
Still, one may withdraw from nature only to return to it.4®
How is the particular way known to the self?

Through self knowl

edge, through perceiving one’s own "essential quality" and perceiving
that which moves the self’s inmost being.

Of course, it often happens

that the central inner wish is known only in the shape of direction
less impulse.

One naturally begins by rushing at objects which lie

across one's path.

It is necessary, therefore, that the power of even

this impulse be diverted "from the casual to the essential" and "from
the relative to the absolute."4
414
0
2 Everything depends on listening to
the question:

the conscience.4^

Thus Buber's unwavering trust is in

the power of human beings to authenticate themselves through decision
to follow the single direction of service, each one according to his
particular way.

40Ibid., pp. 141-44.
41Ibid., pp. 140-42.
42Ibid., p. 134.
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Despite the fact of uniqueness, a person does not exist who is,
in himself, whole and individuated.

Ultimately the human being can

become whole not in relation to himself but through relation with
another self.

This is not understood, however, as self-abnegation.

According to a Hasidic saying, "Everyone mu3t have two pockets, so that
he can reach into the one or the other, according to his needs.

In his

right pocket are to be the words, 'For my sake was the world created,'
and in his left:

'I am dust and ashes'."^3

Buber emphasizes self com

prehension, which requires solitude and reflection, but in keeping with
the Hasidic world-affirming tradition he warns against not only self
glorification, but also against incessant preoccupation with sin and
self-reproach.

Rabbi Eliezer says:

"Do not keep worrying about what

you have done wrong, but apply the soul power you are now wasting on
self-reproach to such active relation to the world as you are destined
for.

You should not be occupied with yourself but with the world.

Awareness of the Other

To enter into relation, one must become genuinely aware of the
other, not only the self, as independently unique.

Buber contrasts

becoming aware with objectification, the prevalent way of perceiving
in our time.

Awareness is identified with ideas of directness, pre

sentness, and confirmation.

^^Martin Buber, Ten Rungs: Hasidic Sayings, trans. Olga Marx
(New York:
Schocken Books, 1947), p. 106.
^ B u b e r , Hasidism and Modern Ma n , p. 163.
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Awareness vs. Objectification
To be aware of a thing or a being encountered means to experi
ence it as a whole, and yet at the same time without reduction or
abstraction, in all its concreteness.

Awareness of a human being is

similar but now a different element enters in.

Here the person encoun

tered is grasped on the basis of the spirit which belongs to human
beings alone and determines what they are.

This is vastly different

from knowing someone as a separated object of contemplation or even
observation.

The key to understanding the difference, and central to

Buber's entire philosophy, is his point that the wholeness and center
of the person "do not let themselves be known to contemplation or
observation," but are revealed only in spontaneous communication, when
the other is "made present."

Such awareness is uncommon.

Today the

objectifying or analytical, reductive, and deriving look is the domi
nant way of perceiving.
This look is analytical, or rather pseudo analytical, since
it treats the whole being as put together and therefore able
to be taken apart— not only the so-called unconscious which
is accessible to relative objectification, but also the psy
chic stream itself, which can never, in fact, be grasped as
an object. This look is a reductive one because it tries to
contract the manifold person, who is nourished by the microcosmic richness of the possible, to some schematically surveyable and recurrent structures. And this look is a deriv
ing one because it supposes it can grasp what a man has
become, or even is becoming, in genetic formulae, and it
thinks that even the dynamic central principle of the indi
vidual in this becoming can be represented by a general con
cept. An effort is being made today radically to destroy
the mystery between man and man. The personal life, the
ever near mystery, once the source of the stillest enthu
siasms, is levelled down.

^Buber, Knowledge of M a n :
pp. 80-81.

"Elements of the Interhuman,"
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Buber’s grave assessment of the modern attitude is not, however,
meant as an attack on the analytical method of the human sciences.

The

scientific method is useful when it advances the knowledge of a phe
nomenon without impairing one's awareness of its uniqueness— an aware
ness that transcends the valid analytical method.
therefore stay within its boundary.

This method must

When transmitted from scientific

study to "life," the boundary becomes ambiguous.^
"Observing" and "looking on" are two ways of objectifying.

They

are similarly oriented because their very purpose is to perceive what
exists before them, and because what is seen is an object detached from
the personal lives of the perceivers.

The observer, Buber explains,

carefully "notes" the object, "probes him and writes him up.
he is diligent to write up as many 'traits' as possible.
wait for them, that none may escape him.

That is,

He lies in

The object consists of traits,

and it is known what lies behind each of them."

The onlooker, however,

is not intent, ignores traits, "traits lead astray," and "gives his mem
ory

no tasks, he trusts its organic work which preserves what is worth

preserving."

But awareness involves the self in meeting:

It is a different matter when . . . a man meets me about whom
there is something, which I cannot grasp in any objective way
at all, that "says something" to me. That does not mean, says
to me what manner of man this is. . . . But it means, says
something to me, addresses something to me, speaks something
that enters my own life.
It may be something about this man,
for instance, that he needs me. But it can also be something
about myself . ^
Were an attempt made to describe him, that would be the end of
the saying:6
4

46Ibid., p. 81.
4?Buber, Between Kan and Ma n :

"Dialogue," p. 9.

xtuced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
This man is not my object; I have got to do with him. Perhaps
I have got to accomplish something about him; but perhaps I
have only to learn something, and it is only a matter of my
"accepting". . . . In each instance a word demanding an
answer has happened to me. We may term this way of perception becoming aware.

Directness
According to Buber, much of conversation is devoid of such aware
ness.

People today typically do not listen to one another, nor do they

really speak directly to one another but only "speechify."

This is the

monologue of Chekhov's characters in The Cherry Orchard, where family
members talk past each other to a "fictitious court of appeal," that is,
the life of the other is perceived to consist of nothing but listening
to the concerns of the self.

Chekhov portrays only the deficient type

of person who is "shut up in himself."

Sartre, however, has raised

such enclosure to a principle of human existence.

One has to do only

with oneself and one's own affairs; there is no direct mutuality, nor
can there be.

"This is perhaps the clearest example of the wretched

fatalism of modern man, which regards degeneration as the unchangeable
nature of [the human being] . . . and which brands every thought of a
breakthrough as reactionary romanticism."

Buber encourages anyone who

understands the meaning of the loss of free giving between the I and
Thou to practice directness, even if he were the only person who did
so, and to persist until those around him "hear in his voice the voice
of their own suppressed longing.
Directness means that each speaker becomes aware of the other as
different from himself, in the unique way peculiar to him, and that each

A8Ibid., p. 10.
A^Buber, Knowledge of M a n :

"Elements of the Interhuman, p. 79.
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accepts the person thus seen so that the words go out to him as the one
he is.

In the course of conversation, the views of the speakers may be

in strict opposition, but the other is accepted in his being out of which
his conviction has grown, even when a stand must be taken against this
very conviction.

It now depends on the partner whether dialogue, or

mutuality in speech, takes place.

The address may indeed remain unan

swered, but if the partner is given his authentic standing as a person
"with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I may trust him and
suppose him to be also ready to deal with me as his partner."^

Making the Other Present
Buber also believes that awareness exists at different levels,
and that the intensity of awareness corresponds to the intensity of the
involvement of oneself in meeting with the other.

"Making the other

present" is to imagine the other's reality, his attitude and partici
pation, and not as a detached content but as a living process in the
person.

"Inclusion," the full making present, does more:

becomes more actively a participant in the meeting.

Now the self

An event occurs in

which there is an experience, of pain for example, not as a general suf
fering but as the pain specific to the other.

This making present

increases when two partners are involved in a common living situation
and one experiences the pain he inflicts upon the other, revealing the
"contradictoriness" of interpersonal life.

At this point the other, a

component of the independent world confronted, is no longer a component
but becomes truly "a self for me" and "a self with me."

When the other

other knows he is so perceived, it becomes an "ontological" event which5
0

50Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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brings about his inmost self becoming.
For the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished., as
people like to suppose today, in man's relation to himself,
but in the relation between the one and the other . . . pre
eminently in the mutuality of the making present— in the
making present of another self and in the knowledge that
one is made present in his own self by the other— together
with the mutuality of acceptance, of affirmation and con
firmation.

Confirmation
Buber defines confirmation in a dialogue with Carl Rogers.
Rogers emphasizes unconditional acceptance in a therapeutic relation
ship, whereas Buber emphasizes confirmation which, although it accepts,
may also help the other struggle against himself.

Rogers says that

full acceptance releases individual potentiality, "because . . . there
is no longer any need for defensive barriers, so then what takes over
are the forward moving processes of life itself."

A relationship of

warmth and safety, which allows the person his feelings and attitudes
and to be what he is, will help him to realize what is "deepest in
the individual, that is the very aspect that can be most trusted to
be constructive or to tend toward socialization or toward the devel
opment of better interpersonal relationships."’’^
Buber answers, "I would say every true existential relationship
between two persons begins with acceptance" which makes the other person
feel "that X take you just as you are."

There is a basic trust, then,

but what may be trusted stands in polar relation to what can be least
trusted in the person.

The positive pole through the influence of*

^Buber, Knowledge of M a n ;
^ B u b e r , Knowledge of M a n :
Carl Rogers," p. 180.

"Distance and Relation," p. 71.
"Dialogue Between Martin Buber and
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another

person can be strengthened, and "perhaps we can even strengthen

the force of direction in him because this polarity is very often direc
tionless . . . chaotic."

So confirmation is acceptance of the whole

potentiality which can evolve and answer the reality of life.

It is a

discovery and a legitimizing of the person with whom I have to do in
real dialogue as "a being meant to become."

This being meant to become

is a concept for which simple, factual language has no word.33
Buber presupposes an innate capacity in people to confirm other
people in this way.

In his view, however, this capacity lies fallow,

and that is what "constitutes the real weakness and questionableness of
the human race:

actual humanity exists only when this capacity unfolds."

It is noted that an empty claim to confirmation, without devotion for
being and becoming, repeatedly mars the authentic relation between
people.

Nevertheless, in human society people have always to some

extent confirmed one another in a practical way, not only in their
personal qualities but also their functions:
And a society may be termed human in the measure to which its
members confirm one another. Apart from the tool and the
weapon, what has enabled this creature . . . to assert him
self and to achieve lordship of the earth is this dynamic,
adaptable, pluralistic form of association, which has been
made possible by the factor of mutual individual completion
of function and the corresponding factor of mutual individual
recognition of function. Within the most closely bound clan
there still exist free societies of fishers, free orders of
barter, free associations of many kinds, which are built upon
acknowledged differences in capacity and inclination.
In the
most rigid epochs of ancient kingdoms the family preserved its
separate structure, in which, despite its authoritative qual
ity, individuals affirmed one another in their manifold nature.
And everywhere the position of society is strengthened by this5
3

53Ibid., pp. 180-82.
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balance of firmness and looseness. . . . An animal never suc
ceeds in unravelling its companions from the knot of their com
mon life.54

Responsibility

For Buber responsibility is the readiness to enter into dialogue
by responding to the address of a spoken or silent "word" out of the
creation entrusted to us.

Creation is not identified with anything

esoteric or remote from human experience, but in the immediate Thou's
encountered during the on-going course of daily life.

One becomes

responsible only as one is able, and "a creative glance towards a fel
low creature can at times suffice for response."55

Responsibility is

life related and it requires resolute decision.

Responsibility as Related to Life
Ronald Gregor Smith points to a quality of immediacy and con
creteness in Buber's application of the "word."

Smith says of respon

sibility, the main point of the essay "Dialogue," that its significance
is brought out more acutely in German than in English:
Wort. Antwort, antworten, verantworten. etc., are part of a
closely interrelated situation in which speech and response,
answering for and being responsible for, and so on, are more
intimately connected than the English version can hope to
show.
If the reader will remember that "responsibility" car
ries in itself the root sense of being "answerable," then the
significance of the "word" in actual life will not be lost.
Buber's teaching about the "word" always carries a strict
reference to "lived life," and is very far from being an
abstraction, theological or other.56
54Buber, Knowledge of Man:

"Distance and Relation," p. 67.

55Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," p. 39.

^ R o n a l d Gregor Smith, "Translator's Notes," in Between Man and
M a n , p. 206.
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Buber says, "The idea of responsibility is to be brought back
from the province of specialized ethics, of an 'ought' that swings free
in the air, into that of lived life."-^

This is not to suggest a

denial of absolute values but only that each absolute, honesty for
example, is realized in the concrete situation in which it is practiced,
and that the uniqueness of every situation calls for a unique response.
So the mutuality of address and response takes place in actual meeting,
in what Buber calls the between.

This between

does not exhibit a smooth

continuity, but it is ever and again reconstituted in men's meeting with
CO

one another.
There is a continuity, however, in the sense of commitment to
that which one answers.

"A situation of which we have become aware is

never finished with, but we subdue it into the substance of lived life.
Only then, true to the moment, do we experience a life that is something
other than a sum of moments."

We respond to this moment, but at the

same time we respond on its behalf, we answer for it.^®

Decision
While countless decisions are made in day-to-day living, deci
sion as here applied is the exercise of one's "will to relate."

Deci

sion implies freedom and "turning to the other."
Buber attributes to m o d e m society a more oppressing belief
than has ever before existed.
room for freedom.

Belief in the dogma of fate leaves no

It fails to recognize the meaning of personal

57suber,

BetweenMan

andM a n :"Dialogue," p.

16.

5®Buber,

BetweenMan

andM a n :What is Man?",

p. 203.

•^Buber,

BetweenMan

andM a n :"Dialogue," p.

17.
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responsibility assumed when one is no longer prone to merely "let things
happen," but instead decides.

The dogma of fate or determinism— "the

unlimited world of causality"— belongs to the closed system of the Itworld.
tion.

The Thou world is not closed but frees one to enter into rela
This is not fate, Buber says, but human destiny.

This dogma of

fate "is always willing to allow you to fulfill its limitation with
your life and to 'remain free' in your soul; but he who is turning
looks on this freedom as the most ignominious bondage."^
Buber contrasts people who exercise the will to relate with
those who exercise an arbitrary self will.

The first are recognized

in free persons who believe in the reality of the I and Thou.
believe in destiny and believe that destiny needs them.

They

Destiny does

not restrict them but "awaits" their decision, even though the conse
quence may not correspond to what they decide.

Those who will arbi

trarily are in fact determined, since they see no alternative to the
use and appropriation of things.

They are concerned with their "my—

my kind, my race, my creation, my g e n i u s . T h e

disposition to will

freely and the disposition to will arbitrarily are combined in all
people, but those who are defined by free will attain the fuller human
existence.
Good is identified with decision to enter into mutuality and evil
with the failure to so decide.

The human being is neither radically good

nor radically evil, but always good and evil mixed together as "two ser
vants" who accomplish their service in collaboration.

The "evil urge" is*
6

^Buber, I and Thou, p. 57.
6lIbid., p. 64.
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described by Buber as passion, impulse, a whirling potentiality— "the
ferment placed in the soul by God, without which the human dough does
not rise."^2

it is positive in the sense that without it there would

be no competition whatever, and no survival of humanity itself.

One's

task is not to eliminate the evil urge but to unite it with the good.
This is accomplished by deciding in the direction of love and service.
"Good is direction and what is done in it; that which is done in it is
done with the whole soul, so that in fact all the vigor and passion
with which evil might have been done is included in it."^3

Turning
The Jewish concept turning, Teshuvah, means that with a reversal
of his whole being a person who had been lost in indecision, in the maze
of selfishness, finds a way to the fulfillment of a particular task for
which he has been destined by God.

Turning requires a full acceptance

of the present and the attitude which values that which is present.
This does not mean a mystical relinquishing of the self.

What

is given up is rather the false, self-asserting urge that causes people
to place the possession of things above the uncertain world of relation
"which has neither density nor duration and cannot be surveyed.
To what does one turn?

To nothing extraordinary, and yet to a

"world happening" in the form of an address of the existential moment,
to "what happens to one, to what is to be seen and heard and felt by
the 'attentive* person."

Each moment with Its content is an address."6
3

^Buber, Good and Evil, p. 94.
63Ibid., pp. 130-31.
^Bub e r , I and Thou, pp. 77-78.
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A dog has looked at you, you answer for its glance, a child has clutched
your hand, you answer for its touch, and a host of men move about you,
you answer for their need."®^
People throw up a defense to ward off the "signs" of address
because they carry with them a risk.

And so only by "sterilizing" the

happening and removing the "seed" from it, can one take it as that
"which does not refer to me."

Modern civilization provides the ready

means by which the turning can be evaded.

The address can be ignored

• by referring not to its meaning but how it is understood physically,
biologically, and sociologically.

Response to what is significant in

the event seems to have no place in the logical world and denies an
immediate and secure mastery of the situation.

But for the attentive

person, the relation to the Thou is direct, and thus nothing from the
past is readily applicable, "no knowledge and no technique, no system
and no program."
classify.

Now one is confronted with concretion impossible to

"This speech has no alphabet, each of its sounds is a new

creation and only to be grasped as such."
In the essential action of turning, one person steps forth and
becomes a presence, giving the world its very form.

The modern tendency

to think of this turning to the other as sentimental and out of place in
the bustling activity of life is judged by Buber to be false and "gro
tesque."

It reveals only that people let the condition of the time

determine what is possible, instead of stipulating for themselves what
form is to be given to human existence.^®*
6

^Bub e r , Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," pp. 16-17.

6^Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," p. 22.
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Knowledge, precept, and preparation are important to relation,
but can never supersede the simple immediacy of turning.

God is a

"moment God," Buber claims, and above and below are bound inseparably
to one another.

Nothing about God is known, rather the address of

God is experienced through the signs of creation.

Buber suggests

the following analogy:
When we really understand a poem, all we know of the poet is
what we learn of him in the poem— no biographical wisdom is
of value for the pure understanding of what is to be under
stood: the I_ which approaches us is the subject of this
single poem. But when we read other poems by the poet in
the same true way their subjects combine in all their mul
tiplicity, completing and confirming one another, to form
the one polyphony of the person's existence.67
This is made clearer in Buber's account of an event which took
place at a time when, Buber indicates, religious experience was for him
the experience outside the context of life.

After a morning of "reli

gious enthusiasm," Buber was visited by a young man whom he treated as
openly as all of the other visitors who came to him for advice.

Soon

after, Buber learned that the man had taken his life, had come to Buber
in despair and for a decision.

He realized he "omitted to guess the

questions" which the man did not put, because Buber was not there in
spirit.
man?

"What do we expect when we are in despair and yet go to a

Surely a presence by means of which we are told that neverthe

less there is meaning."

Buber then experienced a "conversion," gave

up the pseudo-religious, the separate and the ecstatic, for a religion
of worldly claim and responsibility.
I do not know much more. . . . religion is . . . simply all
that is lived in its possibility of dialogue. Here is space6
7

67Ibid., p. 15.

)duced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82
also for religion's highest forms. As when you pray you do
not thereby remove yourself from this life of yours but in
your praying refer your thought to it.88
The turning to the other in responsibility is not for Buber
synonomous with solicitude nor with altruism, since they do not neces
sarily set a person's life "in direct relation with the life of
another," but may only imply one person's solicitous help in relation
with the other's "lack and need of it."®^

The person who has access

to the "otherness of the other" apart from solicitude will also find
it in the solicitude practiced by him.

But if someone does not have

access without solicitude, "he may clothe the naked and feed the hungry
all day and it will remain difficult for him to say a true Thou.

If

all were well clothed and well nourished, then the real ethical prob
lem would become wholly visible for the first time.
Nor is responsibility the same as duty.

"Duty and obligation

are rendered only to the stranger; we are drawn to and full of love
for the Intimate person."

Responsible decision is calm and sponta

neous, purposive and not empty; this action "is no longer imposed upon
the world, it grows on it as if it were non-action.
Mutuality is two-sided; it means being chosen and choosing, being
at once passive and a c t i v e . ^

But what if one's address to the other6
2
7
*
8

68Ibid., pp. 13-14.
8^Buber, Between Man and Ma n :

"What is Man?", p. 169.

7QBuber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin
Buber, p. 723.
71fiuber, I and Thou, p. 109.
72Ibid., p. 11.
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is not reciprocated?

Buber suggests that one begin with confidence in

being itself, trusting that response is forthcoming so the "barriers of
individual being are in fact breached," while remembering that a rela
tionship cannot be forced— the Thou "is not found by seeking but meets
me through grace."

Accordingly, initiative rests with the self, yet

only will, not control, is the self's responsibility.

Buber says,

then, "We have to be concerned, to be troubled, not about the other
side but about our own side, not about grace but about will.

Grace

concerns us in so far as we go out to it and persist in its presence;
but it is not our object."73
Again, Buber generalizes to all people the capacity for Thou
responding.

In this connection, Walter Blumenfeld poses the following

question:
Is "the human being of Buber the real human being or a rare,
if ever realized, ideal, the "authentic" and especially the
mature, normal person?
Buber's teaching can hardly be
applied to the mentally ill, to small children, and to
idiots.
Is not his "man" potentially and in no case a
universally prevalent being?
To this Buber answers that what is of concern to him "does not
belong to an upper story of human nature . . . the I-Thou relation
establishes itself, naturally as it were, in the small child as in
the 'primitive*. . . .

As for the so-called idiots, I have many times

perceived how the soul of such [a person] extends its arms— and thrusts
into emptiness."

By contrast, Buber indicates, he has known people who

possess remarkable conceptualizing powers whose basic nature was to
withhold themselves from others,

73Ibid., pp. 76-77.
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even if they let this one and that one cone near them. No, I
mean no "spiritual elite," and yes, I mean man as man. Hin
drances everywhere place themselves in the way, from without
and from within; it is heart-will and grace in one that help
us mature and awake men to overcome them and grant us meeting.
What is of importance? That the spirit execute in a
spiritual manner the projects that nature lays before it. 74

Breakthrough
Although Buber stresses responsible decision, he is fully aware
of the risk and the difficulty:

"It is a cruelly hazardous enterprise,

this becoming a whole, becoming a form, of crystallization of the soul."75
Buber insists that his concern is not for perfection but for a
"breakthrough."

The speech of dialogue takes many forms, and it is open

to everyone in all places.

Once Buber had a dispute with a Christian

over the situation between Jews and Christians in which, owing to the
"unreserve" and the "actuality" of the words between the men, the dis
cussion ended in the kiss of brotherhood and the beginning of a friend
ship.^

A breakthrough in Soviet-American relations is possible when

one person here sees the standpoint of a person there in his mind's
eye.7 7
It is not a question of "all or nothing."

Dialogue is just the

quantum satis, sufficient amount, of which this person at this hour is
able to give and receive.

The director of a huge technical organiza

tion can practice the responsibility of dialogue at the point of

74Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogation, p. 36.
^Buber, Good and Evil, p. 129.
7^Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," pp. 5-6.

77Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 79.
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comprehending an employee not as a "number with a human mask but as a
person," and responding indirectly through mediation when necessary,
but also directly whenever he is able.

The workers toughens himself

to get through his tasks and return to the personal world when his
shift is over, yet no setting "is so abandoned by creation that a
creative glance could not fly up from one working-place to another,
from desk to desk," a sober and kindred look which communicates the
"reality of creation which is happening— quantum satis."7**

In this

way creation is helped to unfold in the way it is intended.

7 ®Buber, Between Man and Man:

"Dialogue," pp. 34-39.
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CHAPTER IV

MUTUALITY AMD EDUCATION

For Buber, education is a conscious and willed "selection by man
of the effective world; it means to give decisive effective power to a
selection of the world which is concentrated and manifested in the edu
cator."*
In Buber's view, the words conscious and willed are especially
relevant to modern education.

Whereas education is consciously pro

vided today, in former times apprentices lived with a master and learned
from participating in his work.

They also learned, without his or their

noticing it, "the mystery of personal life," but nowadays such a thing
is exceptional, it happens "only on the heights,"
Although the old form of educating is irretrievable, the loss is
advantageous to society, because the way is now open to replace the
incidental with a deliberate experiment toward equity and humaneness.
We can as little return to the state of affairs that existed
before there were schools as to that which existed before, say,
technical science.
But we can and must enter into the com
pleteness of education's growth to reality, into the perfect
humanisation of its reality. Our way is composed of losses
that secretly become gains. Education has lost the paradise
of pure instinctiveness and now consciously serves at the
plough for the bread of life.
It has been transformed; only
in this transformation has it become visible. 2

*Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Education," p. 89.

^Ibid., p. 90.
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Yet Buber points to the former master as the model teacher, whose
strength was marked by personal contact and non-interference.

Even

Socrates' decisive influence was not what he taught but through his
life.

"Contact is the primary word in education ."3

In Buber's peda

gogy, then, educating is a paradoxical composite of "willing" and "non
doing", the teacher must do it "as though he did not."^
The genuine teacher wills to be a chooser of curriculum; the
choice is a "gathering in" of the constructive forces of the world.
The teacher lives what is chosen and becomes educated by it.
foreus of th.s world ^hlch

"The

child uusds for thu bol.ldi.og up of bis

substance must be chosen by the educator and drawn into himself."^
In 1922 Buber said, "Education is opening up."

Education is ready to

serve without subservience to the political realm, "without fanaticism,
prepared to wait and yet beginning— and reflecting on the mystery of
how the starry sky, the forest, and everything unarbitrary educates
in incomprehensible moments, the man already stands in his new work."®
The teacher wills to mediate those constructive forces not by
enjoying or dominating children, for this "stifles the growth of their
blessing."

Rather, he meets pupils, accepts those he finds before him

in all their diversity.

"From this unerotic situation the greatness

of the modern educator is to be seen."'

3guber, A Believing Humanism:
^Buber, Between Man and Man:

"On Contact," p. 102.
"Education," pp. 89-90.

5 Ibid., p. 1 0 1 .

®Buber, A Believing Humanism:
^Buber, Between Man and Ha n:

"The Task," p. 100.
"Education," p. 94.
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In this chapter, the exposition of Buber’s pedagogy along with
his clarifying examples indicate there are I-Thou relationships which
do not, by their nature, attain full mutuality.

What does prevail in

all I-Thou relationships is the mutuality of "being" and "action,"
that is, each being exists as a unique subject in its own right, and
each in some sense responds to the address of otherness.
The rest of the chapter will focus on those elements of Buber's
pedagogy which deal with goals, the nature of the child, character edu
cation, community, and knowledge theory.

Goals

What goals determine the teacher's choice and mediation?
priorities are discerned in Buber's writings:
sion and the growth of character.

Two

spontaneity of expres

Youthful spontaneity must not be

suppressed, and the right opportunity must be provided for it to give
what it can.

The influence of character is the teacher's actual task.

This influence is manifested at the point where the self-assertive,
spontaneous child through the teacher's guidance becomes responsible
for a Thou, while still retaining its selfhood and independence.

The

Thou is met in all things, subject matter and people, everything in
nature is a potential Thou.
streaming of all things."

Yet education is not a "purposeless
The teacher selects and guides.

Nature of the Child

In 1925 Buber addressed the Third International Conference on
Education at Heidelberg.

Here he discusses the content and method of
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education, but only in relation to the nature of the child and its sig
nificance for the teacher's work.

He develops the connection between

individual spontaneity and freedom on the one hand, and character
(responsible participation) on the other.

He expresses serious doubts

concerning the topic of discussion, "The development of the creative
powers of the child"— except for the last two words, the child, an
undeniable reality.

Buber questions the meaning of creativity, appar

ently assuming the Conference organizers to equate it with aesthetic
achievement.

He rejects such a limited concept of creativity, and he

rejects any notion that aesthetics should be the major goal of educa
tion.

Second, he opposes the view held by some progressive educators

that education means only to let children "develop" spontaneously out
of themselves and to preside over their development.
Consistent with his concept of the human being, Buber calls the
"reality child" above all a phenomenon of uniqueness, both in his
present manifestation and his potentiality.
is already determined at birth.

To an extent the child

The child inherits a given disposi

tion characteristic of all human beings, and is born into a given
culture.

But the fact of past life and culture must not obscure the

other fact that in every hour as thousands of children are born, "the
human race begins . . .

a creative event if ever there was one, new

ness rising up, primal potential might."

Buber could set no societal

aim above that of education for the strengthening of the individual
force of youth.
What greater care could we cherish or discuss than that
this grace may not henceforth be squandered as before,
that the might of newness may be preserved for renewal. . . .
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The deeds of the generations now approaching can illumine
the grey face of the human world or plunge it into dark
ness.®
He is clearly unselective of children in his judgment of unique
potentiality for positive determination and educability:

The part to

be played in future history "by everyone alive today, by every adoles
cent and child is immeasurable, and immeasurable is our part if we are
educators."

In another context he says:

It is an inadmissable simplification to assume that in all
children the same general treasure is hidden. Despite all
common traits, we are ultimately without exception unica.
and the treasure that is hidden in each child is something
irreducibly personal.
However cruelly injuries of all kinds
affect the child from his mother’s womb to school and beyond
it, the primal fact of the positive determination of the per
son is to me certain.®

Spontaneous Expression
People are a part of creation and are purposeful participants in
the transformation of the world, but are not literally creative.

The

meaning of creation was originally "only the divine summons to the life
hidden in non-being,” and later, metaphorically, the human genius for
forming.

The human "imaging of God is authenticated in action."

Over

the centuries the metaphor creative deteriorated, and in its lowest form
was equated almost with literary ability.

In designating one power of

human expression, Buber chooses the term "instinct of origination."1®
This instinct is not limited to a select few— it exists in all people
and reaches its completion in art.

®Ibid., p. 84.
®Buber, A Believing Humanism:
l^Buber, Between Man and Man:

"Education," p. 98.
"Education," p. 84.
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This instinct is autonomous in that it does not derive from
other instincts, such as the libido and the will to power.

The tend

ency in psychology to derive the multiform person from a single ele
ment is really a generalization to all people of certain degenerate
states in which a single instinct dominates the individual.

That many

such individuals exist in our times Buber attributes to "the inner
loss of community and oppression."

But the sick person does not repre

sent what is essential to the nature of humankind.
What is natural to all children is to want to produce pictures,
sounds, and ideas, to sake something that was not there before, to be a
subject of the event of production.
some pathological wish.

This wish is not a sublimation of

Nor is it an urge for purposeless activity:

children want to "set up or destroy, handle or hit," hut never to "busy"
themselves.

Just witness the phenomenon of children engaged in the

self-initiated construction of coarse, unrecognizable tools, and the
astonishment shown at their own inventions.

But even in destruction,

the originative instinct begins to express itself and becomes dominant.
Here Buber provides a telling example:

A child tears up a sheet of

paper or some other object, but is soon preoccupied with the forms of
the pieces, then tries, still by tearing, to produce definite forms.
Despite the value of one’s product and the recognition it receives,
the instinct cannot be identified with greed, "hecause it is not
directed to ’having’ but only to doing. . . . Here is pure gesture
which does not snatch the world to iself, but expresses itself to
the w o r l d . " ^

^Ibid., p. 8 6 .
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Such expression is a starting point from which the originators
themselves are formed.

Buber speaks of the person's growth into form

so often imagined and lost, and the implications that has for the work
of education.

In putting something together children learn much that

they can learn in no other way, its possibility, origin, and struc
ture.*^

In I and Thou Buber writes that children must gain for them

selves their own world by seeing, hearing, touching, and shaping it.
"Creation reveals, in meeting, its essential nature as form.

It does

not spill itself into expectant senses, but rises up to meet the grasp
ing senses."*^
The effort to establish relation is already seen in the infant.
Even when there seems to be no desire for nourishment, tiny hands reach
out to meet something indefinite and become lovingly aware of the com
plete body of a toy animal.

Searching glances settle on a red carpet

pattern, and remain fixed there until "the soul of the red has opened
itself."

Unintelligible sounds later become conversation— "does it

matter that it is perhaps with the simmering teakettle?"
the child's "instinct for communion."

This expresses

It is the instinct to "make every

thing into Thou, to give relation to the universe, the instinct which
completes out of its own richness the living effective action when a
mere copy or symbol of it is given in what is over against him.
A fine demonstration at the Heidelberg Conference was a perform
ing choir of crippled children who, under the leadership of their

*^ibid., pp. 86-87.
**Buber, I and Thou, p. 26.
1 4 Ibid., p. 27.
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teacher, were "released to a life of freely moving persons, rejoicing in
their achievement."

They exemplified what is "formable and forming" in

children, knowing "how to shape sights and sounds in multiform patterns
and also how to sing out their risen souls wildly and gloriously."

But

more, they showed how a "community of achievement" made known in glance
and response, can be brought together . ^
Here, in the example of children set off from other children by
virtue of a physical limitation, Buber introduces his view that the deci
sive influence of learning is not limited to the release of an instinct;
rather, it centers in the meeting of the educative forces with the
released instinct.

Influence Toward the Thou
What becomes of the child’s expression depends on the influence
of the teacher.

In the example just mentioned, pupils are led to mutual

relation with the content of learning and with their classmates through
the mutual relation established with their teacher.
for peer relations will be considered later on.

The implications

Meanwhile there is

found a transition from the self's involvement with form as an object
to knowledge of form as a Thou.

The pupil answers the demand of a form

to be perceived as a subject in its own right.
Another specific example helps to clarify this movement; at the
same time, it describes what the teacher must do to help bring it about.
The example, drawing instruction, contrasts the authoritarian method with
the freer one.

The former began with rules and current patterns which

pupils followed "either in apathy or in despair"; while the latter

15suber, Between Man and Man;

"Education," p. 8 6 .
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encourages the individual expression of pupils who draw what they see
before them or who draw what they remember having seen.

Youthful spon

taneity is suppressed by the compulsory practice, and the newer way
stops short of educating.

Buber adds to the child’s free experiment

the teacher’s "delicate, almost imperceptible and yet important influ
ence," that of criticism and guidance.

The teacher individualizes:

The children encounter a scale of values that, however unaca
demic it may be, is quite constant, a knowledge of good and
evil that, however individualistic it may be, is quite
unambiguous. The more unacademic this scale of values, and
the more individualistic this knowledge, the more deeply do
the children experience the encounter.
In the former
instance the preliminary declaration of what alone was
right made for resignation or rebellion .16

Toward the Human Thou
The capacity for mutuality existing in all children, then, is
realized in relation to the created form through guidance from the
teacher.

But mutuality is here limited since the created form, of

course, can never respond with consciousness.

Rather, "mutuality

itself as the door to our existence" is realized in communication
with other human beings.

So the urge in the child is to transform

the world and even to meet a Thou in what is transformed, yet Buber's
acknowledgment of this urge is not the same as the pedagogical belief
of radically "free" educators that education is only a "liberation of
the powers."
While committed to aesthetic creativity in education, Buber
points out that an individual achievement is nevertheless a "one
sided event," painful and solitary, no matter how directly as being1
6

1 6 Ibid., pp.

38-89.
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"approached and claimed" by the art form, "as perceiving and receiving
in . . . facing an idea which awaits embodiment."

Even those artists

of wide acclaim cannot know if their anonymous receivers appreciate
their efforts.

The teacher who leads the child to a community of

achievement, a blend of the balanced curriculum and mutuality with
other children, thereby educates the whole person of that child.

Now

there is shared participation in work and a partner who recognizes
one's contribution.

There is also someone to grasp one's hand "not

as a 'creator' but as a fellow creature lost in the world . . . beyond
the arts.
True community depends on the genuineness of its individual
members.

Education for community therefore implies character educa

tion.

Character Education

"Education worthy of the name is essentially education of char
acter," said Buber in 1939 in an address to the National Conference of
Jewish Teachers of Palestine at Tel-Aviv.

In this address Buber does

not negate technical knowledge and functions, that which helps children
find their way in the world.

But his prior goal is the education of

character, of which the technical is only a part.

Character education

fosters the growth of the self as a unified whole in relation to the
surrounding world.

Character Is the connection between the child's

given personality and the sequence of his actions and attitudes.1
7

1 7 Ibid., p. 87.
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Buber immediately cautions teachers to recognize the real limitations to
what they can do to influence character— teachers gain humility by admit
ting they are only one of the multiple life forces affecting the charac
ter of their pupils.

But at the same time they gain a sense of respon

sibility in knowing it is only they who will to educate and that they
represent to their pupils a selection of what should be.
For the most part, children come to school with an expectation
they will be taught subject matter, and they tend to accept their role
as learners of the various subjects, "even if not overmuch."

But char

acter education is mere problematic £ it is not easxly taught directly,
and it is not a course of instruction in ethics.

The teacher is advised

by Buber to bear in mind that children tend to resist such methods to
educate their characters.
I try to explain to ray pupils that envy is despicable, and at
once I see the resistance of those who are poorer than their
comrades. I try to explain that it is wicked to bully the
weak, and at once I see a suppressed smile on the lips of the
strong. I try to explain that lying destroys life, and some
thing frightful happens:
the worst habitual liar of the class
produces a brilliant essay on the destructive power of lying.
I have made the fatal mistake of giving instruction in ethics,
and what I said is accepted as current coin of knowledge;
nothing of it is transformed into character-building sub
stance.*®
Another difficulty is that teachers are resisted precisely by
children of independent character, especially those who seriously
struggle with the question of good and evil.

Such children "rebel

when one dictates to them, as though it were some long established
truth, what is good and what is bad; they rebel just because they
have experienced over and over again how hard it is to find the right*

*®Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"The Education of Character,"

p. 105.
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way."

Nor is teaching by subterfuge the way to educate character, for

here even if the child does not catch on to the teacher's motive, the
teacher himself suffers a loss of the directness which is his important
strength.
How, then, does the teacher influence character?

Access to

pupils is through their c o n f i d e n c e . T e a c h e r s are humanly fallible,
they cannot be perfect, but they must be "really there" for their
pupils and must participate responsibly in their lives.

Teachers can

not, however, be continually concerned for pupils either in thought or
action.

The important point is that when a teacher "has gathered the

child into his life, then that subterranean dialogue, that steady
potential presence of the one to the other is established and endures.
Then there is reality between them, there is mutuality."

The child,

lying with half-closed eyes in face of the lonely night, feels guarded
and secure in the knowledge that his mother addresses him in a dialogue
which never ceases.

Children develop trust in the truth of existence

because a nurturing human being exists for them:

"Trust in the world

because this human being exists— that is the most inward achievement
in education."^
Buber depicts a situation in which a newly employed teacher
begins with an attitude of trust in his pupils.

The class is in chaos,

it is "like the mirror of mankind, so multiform, so full of contradic
tions, so inaccessible."

The pupils are noisy troublemakers, they stare

at him impudently, and the teacher’s first impulse is to rely on1
9

1 9 Ibid., p. 106.

^^Buber, Between Man and Man:

"Education," p. 98.
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compulsion by giving orders.

Instead he thinks, "I have not sought them

out; I have been put here and have to accept them as they are— but not
as they now are in this moment, no, as they really are, as they can
become."

He reads on a child's face, which is not beautiful or partic

ularly intelligent, the question:
that concerns me?

"Who are you?

Do you bring me something?"

addresses the face with an ordinary question:
last in geography?

The Dead Sea?

Do you know something
The teacher then

"What did you talk about

Well, what about the Dead Sea?"

But

the question is stated in a way that provokes a spontaneous answer
filled with meaning, an account of the child's impression of the awe
some Dead Sea during a visit to its shores, and the class becomes
attentive.2*
Confidence is not won by laborious effort to win it.

The alive-

ness of the teacher radiates out to children, affecting them most deeply,
when no thought is given to affecting them.

Ultimately, it is not the

educational intention but the meeting between teacher and child which
is productive.

Pupils sense that the teacher is trustable, does not

want to "make a business" out of them, but takes part in their lives
and accepts them before wanting to influence them.

At this point of

trust in the educator as a person, children learn to ask.

The respon

sibility of the teacher is not to dictate a code of ethics but to
answer what is right and wrong in a particular situation.

"A soul

suffering from the contradictions of the world of human society, and
of its own physical existence, approaches me with a question.

By

trying to answer it to the best of my knowledge and conscience I2
1

21 Buber, Between Man and Man:

"Education of Character," pp.

112-13.
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help it to become a character that actively overcomes the contradic
tions."
Given this attitude of teachers coward their pupils, the will
to participate in their lives and the establishment of mutual trust,
all communication can now become a medium for the education of char
acter:

"Lessons and games, a conversation about quarrels in the class

or about the problems of a world war. "22

Conflict
In an atmosphere of trust it is possible to engage pupils in
open discussion, and out of this, sooner or later, conflict is bound
to arise.

Although the teacher must state his values forthrightly,

he cannot count on total agreement, and must realize that conflicts
are also educational if they take place in a wholesome atmosphere.
A class discussion concerning Jewish acts of reprisal against
Arabs brought from a pupil the idea, It is a question of the profit
of my people, past present, and future.

The teacher asked, "But what

was it that made those past generations of the Exile live?
them outlive and overcome all their trials?

Wasn't it that the cry

'Thou shalt not' never faded from their hearts and ears?"
cried out, "But what have we achieved that way. . . .
life?

We want to live!"

What made

The pupil

Do you call that

Conflict of this kind seems to reach an

impasse, since it involves more than opposition between two genera
tions; it is one between a generation of faith in truth superior to
man and a generation influenced by relativistic values.

Buber

believes, however, that conflict is the teacher's critical test.2

2 2 Ibid., p. 107.
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"But if he is the victor he has to help the vanquished to endure defeat
and if he cannot conquer the self-willed soul that faces him (for vic
tories over souls are not so easily won), then he has to find a word of
love which alone can help to overcome so difficult a situation ."23
Buber recalls that a friend, a master of conversation, once
argued with another friend equally skilled "but given more to objective
fairness than to the play of the intellect."

For the first man the

discussion became a "duel" of words, he "did not speak with his usual
composure and strength, but he scintillated, he fought, he triumphed.
The dialogue was destroyed."2^

The purpose of discussion for Buber is

clearly not a monological talking past the other, an impersonal exer
cise in dialectics.

Communication is never a contest of wills.

The educator is not to

rely on compulsion or propaganda.

Com

pulsion means "humiliation";its opposite is not unconditional freedom,
but dialogue .23

Propaganda means "depersonalization" and "sublimated

violence," but the very world of the educator is comprised of individ
ual persons.

The teacher depicted by Buber is patient, sees "every

personal life as engaged in . . .

a process of actualization, and he

knows from his own experience that the forces making for actualization
are all the time involved in a microcosmic struggle with counter
forces."

The teacher does not wish to impose himself because he

believes the actualizing forces to be "what is right established in
a single and uniquely personal way," and is committed to help the

23ibid., pp. 108-109.
2^Buber, Knowledge of M a n ;

"Elements of the Interhuman," pp.

87-88.
23 Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Education," pp. 91-92.
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right to develop in that special form of the independent person.
propagandist relies on special pressures, feverish and nervous.

The
He

"does not really believe even in his own cause, for he does not trust
it to attain its effect of its own power without his special methods,
whose symbols are the loudspeaker and the television advertisement."

26

In true dialogue, the teacher responds to the occasion, at times quite
directly, and other times with a simple suggestion, or an analogy
stated "without spinning it out and tying together the threads"— the
pupil has the task of working over what has been said and supplying
the missing parts .27
Teachers who face a conflict in values with their pupils, then,
cannot rely on the imposition of their attitudes in order to overcome
the difficulty.

According to Buber, the denial of the absolute reflects

a sickness with which the human race has been afflicted.

Today "we are

standing on the ruins of the edifice whose tower was raised by Kant."
It is self deceptive to believe

that the disease can be cured by

formulae which assert that "nothing is really as the sick person imag
ines," to call out, "Look! the eternal values I"2**

Image of Character
Kerschensteiner's definition of character is "voluntary obedi
ence to the maxims" and Dewey's the "interpenetration of good habits."

2 ^Buber, Knowledge of H a n :

"Elements of the Interhuman," p. 83.

27Martin Buber, Tales of the Basidim (New York:
Classics, 1958), p. 16.
28Buber, Between Man and M a n :

The Commentary

"Education of Character," pp. 110-

111.
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In Buber's conception, the teacher should indeed want for each child an
acceptance of genuine norms and the formation of good habits.

Discip

line and order must be introduced, law has to be established, and the
teacher can only hope that the law will be internalized in his pupils.
But the teacher's real goal is what Buber calls "the great character"
who responds to the challenge of what is unique in every situation, for
whom such response means more than mere habitual obedience to fixed
maxims, "since what is untypical in each situation remains unnoticed
and unanswered."

A great character is "one who by his actions and

attitudes satisfies the claim of situations out of a deep readiness
to respond with his whole life, and in such a way that the sum of his
actions and attitudes expresses at the same time the unity of his
being in its willingness to accept responsibility."29

From this his

active life and even the diversity of challenging situations become
unified for him.
Although the teacher cannot hope for every pupil the becoming
of a great character, insight into the "structure of the great charac
ter" provides an image to bring before pupils in their formative years.

Conscience
What is open to each child is the possibility to "elevate" his
conscience.

This is a task for which teachers can provide guidance by

directing the child to the distorted relationship with his own self,
and to thereby enter into a personal relationship with the absolute.302
0
3
9

2 9 Ibid., p. 114.
3 0 Ibid., pp. 110 - 1 1 .
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In Buber's essay "Guilt and Guilt Feelings" directed to the
therapist, he opposes the modern assertion of psychologists that no
real guilt exists, only guilt feeling and neurotic illness from viola
tions of social convention.

Freud wished to "relativize guilt feeling

genetically," that is, to deny the ontic, existential guilt which is
more than one's individual conception of it and the mere violation of
social taboos.

The human being is for Buber "the being who is capable

of becoming guilty and is capable of illuminating his guilt" which
exists consciously when he himself overcomes his resistance to it.
People can set at a distance not only their world, but also them
selves, as detached objects whom they can approve as well as censure.
According to Buber, there exist both groundless, neurotic guilt
and existential guilt.

The latter occurs "when someone injures an order

of the human world whose foundations he knows and recognizes as those of
his own existence and all common existence," such as "betrayal of a
friend, or of his cause."

Feeling the pain of guilt, the conscience

responds in a threefold action of self-illumination, perseverance, and
reconciliation.

Buber suggests that a step towards illumination was

taken by Joseph K in Kafka's Trial when he admitted to himself, "I
always wanted to snatch at the world with twenty hands, and not for
a very laudable motive, either."

In the fullness of such self

illumination, one identifies and differentiates the person one was
and the person one is intended to become.

The personal, "dynamic"

conscience perseveres in this self-identity.

Whereas the neurotic

conscience persists monologically in self-torment, the higher con
science takes the path of reconciliation by helping the injured
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victim to overcome the consequences of one’s action against him.

This

happens naturally out of a new disposition to serve the world construc
tively.^
The injured may be out of reach, yet "the wounds of the order-ofbeing can be healed in infinitely many other places chan those at which
they were inflicted ."32

This illustrates Buber's statement, the Thou

"comes to bring you out; if it does not reach you, meet you, then it
vanishes; but it comes back in another form. . . . Between you and it
there is mutual giving:

you say Thou to it and give yourself to it ."32

The task of the teacher is not to remove the pain of a guilty
conscience suffering from the loss of personal responsibility.

In fact,

the teacher, through meeting, ought even to awaken the pain by eliciting
values which he can make credible in their application to a given situa
tion and which lead to the "real attitude,"

For a "generation which

honors the mystery in all its forms will no longer be deserted by
eternity."*
3*
^

But the teacher can do no more than help the child gain

the courage to distinguish for himself between those of his past and
future actions, those which should be approved and those which should
be disapproved.

The private sphere of the child, that of the relation

between the child and God, is not his legitimate affair .-*5

3 *-Buber, Knowledge of M a n :

"Guilt and Guilt Feelings," pp.

121 ff.
3 2 Ibid., p. 136.
33 Buber, I and Thou, pp. 32-33.
3 *Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Education of Character," p. 117.

3 3 Buber, Knowledge of M a n : "Guilt and Guilt Feelings," p. 134.
Between Man and Man: "Education of Character," p. 115.
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The child must gradually learn to decide for himself with his
whole being what he will and will not do, must choose "the constructive
forces of the world," or else he becomes "sterile in soul."

How can

the child be educated to the many unrepeatable and unpredictable situa
tions which confront him?

Four points address this question:

3uber

acknowledges that people experience how hard it is to find the right
way.

Both human faith and human conscience can err, and both must

place themselves in the hands of gr a c e . ^

Second, the teacher "can

show that even the great character is not born perfect, that the unity
of his being has first to mature before expressing itself in the
sequence of his actions and attitudes ."37

Third, the teacher is to

help the pupil to experience widely and in depth by which the pupil
gains insight into the truth of authentic e x i s t e n c e . A n d finally,
one always strives to draw the right "line of demarcation."
Simon asserts that Buber, often falsely labeled a "doctrinaire
ideologist," clearly reveals in his line of demarcation concept an
attitude of realism.

This line is drawn time and again between the

absolute command and its relative answerability, for which no fixed
rule can guide one since each situation is unique.

Simon states

another dilemma related to the question of choice:

How can "a modi

cum of coordination between ethical and civic education . . .
reached in the unredeemed world?"

be

Buber's answer is that you cannot

remain guiltless, but be resolved "never to do more wrong that you

3&Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Education of Character," p. 105.

37 Ibid., p. 116.
3®Buber, Pointing the Way:

"Education and the World View,"

p. 104.
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must in order to live."

Two examples from politics are considered, the

first concerning revolution and the second governmental control:
Revolutions cannot take place without violence.

Buber does not dis

approve of revolutions without exception, but he insists that those
who think them necessary make a prior resolution "to go so far and no
farther."

The insurgents must include not only their own right of

self preservation, but also the right of others.

As to the need for

centralized government, Buber assumes that "there necessarily never
will be freedom so long as man is such as he is, and for that time
there will always be a state, wkxch means compulsion.
is this:

What xs demanded

from day to day there should be no more state than is indis

pensable, and not less freedom than is admissable."39

C o m m u n ity

"Vital dissociation is the sickness of the peoples of our age,"
writes Buber.

It exists alike in social groups characterized by indi

vidualism and collectivism.

Whereas individualism sees the human being

only in relation to himself, collectivism sees only society.

Community,

the third alternative, is the "overcoming of otherness in living unity.
The type of individualism common to Western cultures tends "to
understand the individual self . . .
lute.

as the self simply and as the abso

Despite all stress on the interest in the 'outer world* . . .

what unmistably rules here is the tendency toward the primacy of the

3®Simon, "Buber, the Educator," in The Philosophy of Martin
Buber, p. 574.
^^Buber, Pointing the W a y :

"Education and the World View,"

p. 1 0 2 .
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individual existence and toward its self-glorification."^
glorifies the group, and it denies selfhood.

Collectivism

It is identified with the

"totalitarian countries" and with "the parties and the party-like groups
in the so-called democracies."

Passive allegiance to the collective and

its values results from a fear in people of being left to depend on them
selves "in this age of confusion."^”
The reader is referred to Buber's Paths in Utopia for his inten
sive study of community, his religious socialism.

Out of Buber's study

of community, he concludes that the values underlying communal life, if
they are to be transmitted, will first have to be reawakened in the new
generations.

The problem of regenerating man's spirit and redirecting

human history is mainly a task of education.^
not be "founded."

Community, as such, need

In the family, school, office, or factory, wherever

historical destiny brings a group of people together in a common fold,
there is room for its growth.^

Moreover, an increase of the world's

"community content" occurs through every comradely gesture in the
gigantic apartment house and in the rationalized and bureaucratic
institution.
Buber defines community in the most general sense as a connec
tion of people,
who are so joined in their life with something apportioned to
them in common or something which they have apportioned to

^ B uber, Knowledge of M a n :

"What is Common to All," p. 97.

42guber, Between Man and M a n :

"Education of Character," p. 115.

^ E ph r a i m Fischoff, "Introduction," in Paths in Utopia, by Martin
Buber, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. xi.
^Bub e r , Paths in Utopia, p. 135.
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themselves in common that they are, just thereby, joined with
one another in their life. The first and second unity are
not meant as continually actual, but as of such a nature that
no essential hindrance stands in the way of its transition
from time to time from a vital latency to an actuality.
Buber has been interpreted to mean that the immediacy of rela
tion is founded upon the fact of community.
pretation:

Buber corrected this inter

"Rather, in my view, it is the other way round:

nity is founded upon the immediacy of relation."

the commu

To bring about a true

transformation of society, human relations must undergo a c h a n g e . I n
order to understand Buber's particular concept of community, one must
know that he views as its core an atmosphere of mutuality between its
members, and that such mutuality is made possible by their common,
immediate relation to a "living Center."

This is a spiritual Center,

that which transcends immediate egoistic concerns.

"It is not the

periphery, the community, that comes first, but the radii, the common
quality of relation with the Center.
tic existence of c o m m u n i t y . F o r

This alone guarantees the authen
Buber, even for those who believe

themselves to be godless, the Center resides in a faith in that which
is suprapersonal:

There is meaning in creation, "there Is purpose to

the human race, one we have not made up ourselves, or agreed to among
ourselves.
Mutuality between community members rests not on a state of
constant togetherness, but on a quality of openness.

Number and*
6
4

^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 20.
4 6 Ibid., p. 6 8 .
4 ?Buber, I and Thou, p. 115.

4®Martin Buber, Israel and the World (New York:
1948), p. 186.

Schocken Books,
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space are critical factors.

Buber calls the Kibbutz of six or seven

hundred people a "social monster,"
Any place which threatens to become as large as this should
be organized on the basis of smaller groups, interlocking
with one another. Then the individual can feel a part of
his group, within which he can discuss his problems without
feeling lost in the efficient, smoothly run collective.
It is important also that enough space exists around a person so
that his individuality may remain intact.

If the density does not allow

a community member "to look at his comrade, to have some perspective, he
will not be able to acquire any relation to him.

And then the fact that

they follow the same cause will not be enough to avert a poverty of
bonds."^®
Still, size and space are not the primary determinants of commu
nity:
The question is rather one of openness. A real community need
not consist of people who are perpetually together; but it
must consist of people who, precisely because they are com
rades, have mutual access to one another and are ready for one
another. A real community is one which in every point of its
being possesses, potentially at least, the whole character of
community.*’®
Buber states an additional component:

the thing in common, a

shared cause and task around which communal relations take place.

The

living community thrives "where people have the real things of their
common life in common; where they can experience, discuss and admin
ister them together. . .

To this end it is understood that each

each member can contribute, something uniquely important.

Wherever 5
1

^®Hodes, Martin Buber, p. 199.
^®Buber, Paths in Dtopia, p. 145.
5 1 Ibid., p. 15.
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genuine human society has developed, it has always been on the basis of
mutual "functional autonomy, mutual recognition, and mutual responsibil
ity. . . . The individual human being, despite all the difficulties and
conflicts, felt himself at home at once in the clan, felt himself
approved and affirmed in his functional independence and responsibility ."'52
Responsibility in communal life implies a hard, existential real
ity, never a mere sentiment:
[Community is] a living form that wants to be shaped in the
daily stuff of this earth. Community should not be made into
a principle; it, too, should always satisfy a situation rather
than an abstraction. The realization of community, like the
realization of any idea, cannot occur once and for all time;
always it must be the moment’s answer to the moment's ques
tion, and nothing more. . . . Community is never a mere atti
tude of mind, and if it is feeling it is an inner disposition
that is felt. Community is the inner disposition or constitu
tion of a life in common, which knows and embraces in itself
hard "calculation," adverse "chance," the sudden access of
"anxiety." It is community of tribulation and only because
of that community of spirit; community of toil and only
because of that community of salvation.53
Responsibility implies free decision.

Community members must

decide for themselves what they will and will not do; they must also
have a say in the determination of the community to which they will
belong.
Finally, the community so based has a committed leader who helps
its members "hallow life" and from just this starting point to live as
brothers and sisters with one another . ^

5 2 Ibid., p. 131.

53ibid., p. 134.
S^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 6 8 .
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Peer Relations and Mainstreaming
The regeneration of community is mainly the task of education,
but there can be no learning apart from the doing.

Buber warns against

the severance of learning and deed, against "cutting off the propagation
of values" from action, since one thereby fails to reflect on one’s pur
pose, thus one's act may become the "very caricature" of what one set
out to do.

On the other hand, "It is bad to have teaching without the

deed, worse when the teaching is one of action.
In an educational setting, therefore, the teaching and learning
of communal values are inseparable from the living of the same values in
that setting.

Buber's pedagogy implies that education for community

aims at both the near and the remote of one's world, at both present
and future in its effect.

The atmosphere of community evident among

the performing choir of children cited earlier in this chapter was,
for Buber, more important even than the integrity of their music which
moved him so deeply.

The description of his own class in a Polish

school conveys a melancholic memory of the lack of real community:
The language of instruction and of social intercourse was
Polish, but the atmosphere was that, now appearing almost
unhistorical to us, which prevailed or seemed to prevail
among the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian empire: mutual
tolerance without mutual understanding. The pupils were
for the largest part Poles, in addition to which there was
a small Jewish minority. . . . Personally the pupils got
on well with one another; but the two groups as such knew
almost nothing about each other.56

55guber, Israel and the World, p. 14l.
S^Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in The Philosophy of
Martin Buber, p. 8 .
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In his old age, Buber was visited increasingly by young people
who came to him for counsel.

One such group was from Kibbutz Afikim.

Pinchas, a teacher, brought up the fact that many immigrant children
came to the kibbutz from various places and widely different back
grounds, and some were from "problem1' homes.

The other children under

stood that these newcomers "had to be absorbed into the life of the
kibbutz, but, practically speaking, the established kibbutzniks were
not ready for this.

It was very difficult to get them to accept the

immigrant children."
tive egoism."

Buber called this rejection a display of "collec

He fully realised how difficult it is to combat such an

attitude, and suggested no attempt to force relationships.

Neither

did he recommend that teachers try to ignore the situation (to acknowl
edge merely the ubiquity of pecking orders, it always goes hard for
some).

Rather, his answer to Pinchas was "experiment."

He recommended

as a first approach the way of explanation:
The way of explanation means telling them that what they are
doing is detrimental to their way of life. You must explain
this both at formal gatherings of the young people and in
private conversation. You can prepare the ground and atmos
phere for the group meetings through these private talks.
But it needs a certain knowledge of psychology.
Later a solidarity of the Kibbutz in support of the immigrant
group may have to be built up to stand against those who would exclude
them.

"But I don't propose that you should follow this path at once.

I am, generally speaking, for experiments— for trying. . . .
rigid principles. . . .

I have no

I act according to the situation.""’®

^ H o d e s , Martin Buber, p. 197.
5 8 Ibid.
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Model of Openness
The power of personal example is emphasized as a means of influ
ence:
You cannot come along suddenly and say, Now let us invent some
values! But if in your class at school there are some children
from families of new immigrants, and you treat them in your
everyday contact with them as it is prescribed in the admoni
tion, "Love your neighbor as yourself," then that will be a
value, something definite and worthwhile.
The teacher should not talk about it in this light. But
if, for example, you would . . . act in this way, then cer
tainly something will come out of it.59
Of all teacher qualities, the ultimate and critical one for Buber
is the teacher’s commitment to his pupils.
the meaning of this commitment.

He examines very carefully

Without question, many teachers exhaust

themselves in the work of giving to children, but for 3uber the real issue
is the nature of the giving and whether it is selective or broadly encom
passing.

More than anyone, the true teacher practices and exemplifies

welthaftes Wirken, the love of being.

One rightly chooses one's spouse

and close friend, but "the modern educator finds his pupil there before
him."^°

For the lover of being, "Good people and evil, wise and foolish,

beautiful and ugly, become successively real to him; that is, set free
they step forth in their singleness and confront him as Thou. " ^
Every group of children is a heterogeneous group, and every
teacher is allotted the heterogeneous, randomly assembled.

They are

a confusing mix, "like the presence of the created universe; the glance
of the educator accepts and receives them all."

The typical teacher5
*
9

5 9 Ibid., pp. 124-25.
6 ®Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Education," p. 94.

^Buber, I and Thou, p. 15.
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faces the uncooperative, the slow, the deformed— the different.

"Either

[the teacher] takes on himself the tragedy of the person, and offers an
unblemished daily sacrifice, or the fire enters his work and consumes
it ."62 6
4 The egoist educator is moved by what Buber calls "inclination,"
3
seeks to enjoy and dominate people— to manipulate them.

"Education,

the peculiar essence bearing this name, excludes precisely this desire."63
In this sense, the teacher becomes an objective ascetic, but he is a
paradoxical ascetic who rejoices in the world, or a realm of it for
which he accepts responsibility for his influence but not his inter
ference.
If the teacher divides children hierarchically according to indi
vidual competencies, he is to act not out of the motive to enjoy a
select group, but rather out of concern for children as learners.
Still, the teacher is to proceed with great caution and constantly
re-examine his decision.

Buber states the following:

If this educator should ever believe that for the sake of edu
cation he has to practice selection and arrangement, then he
will be guided by another criterion than that of inclination,
however legitimate this may be in its own sphere; he will be
guided by the recognition of values which is in his glance as
an educator.
But even then his selection remains suspended,
under constant correction by the special humility of the edu
cator for whom the life and particular being of all his pupils
is the decisive factor to which his "hierarchic" recognition
is subordinated. For in the manifold variety of the children
the variety of creation is placed before him.64
Teachers, like doctors, clergy, and other members of the helping
professions, must be regulated by a special objectivity, the reliable

62fiuber, Between Man and Man:

"Education," p. 9 4 .

6 3 Ibid.

64Ibid., p. 95.
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counterpoint of giving and withholding oneself, both intimacy and dis
tance.

Such objectivity is not a calculated stance, but arises from

the living tact of the spiritual person.
If this structure and its resistance are not respected then
a dilettantism will prevail which claims to be aristocratic,
though in reality it is unsteady and feverish; to provide it
with sacred names and attitudes will not help it past its
inevitable consequence of disintegration.65
How can the attitude of selectivity be transformed to an atti
tude of openness?
of children?

How can the teacher love indiscriminately the being

This attitude is made possible, Buber says, through the

dialogical experience of inclusion, or making the other present, by
which a common event is lived through from the standpoint of the other
without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of one’s own activity.
Inclusion is the very core of the teacher's relation to his pupil, but
it is a one-sided relation, because the pupil does not experience the
educating of the educator.
The conscious will to influence children creates a great paradox
for the teacher; if the teacher tries to exercise this influence only
from his idea of the pupil and excludes the pupil's own reality, at just
that point his will to influence is impaired by arbitrariness.

Buber

refers to the accounts of Pestalozzi's teaching method to illustrate
how easily arbitrary self-will can be mixed with will in even the
noblest of teachers.

Hence, from time to time the teacher must expe

rience his own action anew from the other side:

"It Is not enough for

him to imagine the child's individuality, nor to experience him
directly as a spiritual person and then to acknowledge him.

Only6
5

6 5 Ibid.
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when he catches himself ’from over there,' and feels how it affects one,
how it affects this other human being, does he recognize the real limit,"
change arbitrariness to true will, and renew his legitimacy.^
The teacher who practices inclusion experiences at once the ten
sion of being limited by otherness and being bound to the other:
He feels from "over there" the acceptance and the rejection of
what is approaching (that is, approaching from himself, the
educator)— of course often in a fugitive mood or an uncertain
feeling; but this discloses the real need and absence of need
in the soul. . . . In learning from time to time what this
human being needs and does not need at the moment, the educa
tor is led to an ever deeper recognition of what the human
being needs in order to grow.
The growth needs of both child and teacher are revealed by inclu
sion.
The educator is led to the recognition of what he . . . is
able and what he is unable to give of what is needed— and
what he can give now, and what not yet. So the responsibil
ity for this realm of life allotted and entrusted to him
. . . points him to that which seems impossible, and yet
is somehow granted to us— to self education.67

Theory of Knowledge
In the school community the common purpose and task is learning.
The reason for learning is to know the truth.

The absolute or ultimate

truth is a single one, says Buber, but human relation to truth is a
human truth, and human beings have no other truth.

This ultimate truth

is given to the human being, therefore, only as it enters, "reflected as
in a prism," into his true life relations, in his participation in
being.68

This means, first, that perfection realization of truth is

66ibid., p. 100.
^Buber, Pointing the W a y :

67lbid., p. 101.
"Goethe's Concept of Humanity,"

p. 79.
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not given to us.

Second, human truth is bound up with personal respon

sibility; the existential person is able to transcend both collective
and individual judgments rooted merely in egoistic and utilitarian
motivations.

In order to do this, the existentialist, the one who

wills for the truth, brings his grasp of absolute values into his
everyday relations and "finds the truth to be true only when he stands
the t e s t . " ^
All human knowing of an object is through relation to that
object.

There are two ways of relating and knowing:

or personal, and the conceptual.'*®
the second is I-It knowing.

the existential

The first is I-Theu knowing end

I-Thou knowing perceives the whole, imag

ines the reality of the object through immediate, personal meeting with
it from which the learner derives meaning.
sive to the knower and the known.

The meeting is always exclu

I-It knowing is the detached objecti

fication of that which has been made present.

It is concerned with

attributes, comparisons, and classifications, which can act either to
enrich or obstruct the meaning discovered in I-Thou knowledge.

I-Thou Knowing
Earlier in the chapter reference was made to Buber's account of
a teacher's first meeting with his pupils.

The process of knowing

began with a problem, the mutual contradiction of teacher and pupils
whose perspectives were diametrically opposed.

The teacher set the

pupils at a distance allowing them to exist as they were; he accepted
the very situation as it was sent to him.

^Buber, Between Man and M a n :

In so doing, the possibility

"Question to the Single One," pp.

81-82.
^®Buber, Knowledge of M a n :

"Han and His Image Works," p. 163.
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was open to him to begin to know the concrete existence and the poten
tiality of each individual.

Then the teacher began to know one pupil

directly as a Thou when he perceived and responded to the pupil's ques
tion and thereby entered into dialogue, not to use but to meet him.
Another example of I-Thou knowing is Buber's description of a drawing
class (also cited earlier).

The pupil perceived the trusted teacher's

valuation of his freely produced sketch, experienced more fully the
presence or active quality of the form, "was drawn to reverence for
it," and responded to its possibility, to what it could actively
b-coins through his ovn action*

Hs I s a m s d a selection of the con

structive forces beyond the motivation of using or getting.
Ideas of reverence for the object and activity of the object
(as opposed to detachment and passivity) are central to Buber's con
cept of I-Thou knowing.

For Buber, authentic art, science, philosophy,

and all other authentic endeavors are indeed confirming and loving
experiences.

What one extracts and combines is only the passivity of

things, but their activity reveals itself to the loving person who
knows t h e m . in this connection, Buber refers to bibical Hebrew:
The decisive event for knowing is to embrace lovingly.

It is "not

that one looks at an object, but that one comes in touch with it."'

Alternation of I-Thou and I-It Knowing
"Every essential knowledge is in its origin contact with, an
existing being and in its completion possession of an enduring con
cept."

This means that in lived life the two aspects of relation,

^Buber, Pointing the W a y :

"With a Monist," p. 29.

72guber, Good and Evil, p. 56.
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I-Thou and I-It, alternate with one another "cooperatively" in knowledge
attainment.

Applied to interhuman relation, one moment a person is over

against another, sees him present, and relates to him exclusively as
such.

"In the other moment he sees everything else collected around him

and from time to time singles out, observes, explores, applies, and uses.
Both these moments are included in the dynamic of lived life."
has dialogical moments alongside of monological ones.

Thinking

The concept, or

the It, of reason originates "ever anew from the fulguration of the Thou
relationship that still affords no objective knowledge.

Now the trans-

position into the structured order of It takes place. . . .
In science a person and what he stands over against is only
presence, the contact of the unique with the unique.

What an "original"

investigator "finds" he discovers precisely in these I-Thou contacts,
for instance, when the intention of the author of a text shines forth
to the genuine philologist.

Certainly, the scientist must step back

and detach himself from the concrete meeting "in order to gain general
insights or even exact formulae, but at the beginning of the way he is
ever again led by the genius of meetings until it can deliver him to
the reliable spirit of objectification."^
Teachers necessarily carry with them a store of conceptual
knowledge which bears upon the real meeting with their pupils.

They

also derive from the meeting new concepts influential of future personal
contacts during the on-going teaching and learning process.

Similarly,

children prior and subsequent to contact with their art form, abstract

^-*Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin
Buber, p. 692.
^Buber, "Responsa," in Philosophical Interrogations, p. 40.
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certain general principles continually refined which bear upon this and
other meetings with the Thou of their art.
The It of reason helps the human being to know with greater pre
cision, to "get to the bottom," by setting right an error in his sense
perception.

But, in Buber's view, reason "cannot replace the smallest

perception of something particular and unique with its gigantic struc
ture of general concepts, cannot by means of it contend in the grasping
of what here and now confronts me."*
7"*

Sharing of Knowledge
In the mode of group life between people in mutual communication,
the unique person attains what Buber calls the "We."

We show one another

what exists, describe for one another, and each, supplementing the other,
helps him to have a "world-shape, a world."
Speech {spoken or silent] in its ontological sense was at all
times present wherever men regarded one another in the mutual
ity of I and Thou; wherever one showed the other something in
the world In such a way that from then on he began really to
perceive it; wherever one gave another a sign in such a way
that he could recognize the designated situation as he had
not been able to before; wherever one communicated to the
other his own experience in such a way that it penetrated
the other's circle of experience and supplemented it as from
within, so that from now on his perceptions were set within
a world as they had not been before. All this flowing ever
again into a great stream of reciprocal sharing of knowledge—
thus came to be and thus is the living We . . . which, where
it fulfills itself, embraces the dead who once took part in
it through what they have handed down to posterity.7°

7^Buber, "Responsa," Philosophical Interrogations, pp. 53-54.
7^Buber, Knowledge of H a n ;

"What is Common to All," p. 106.
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CHAPTER V

MUTUALITY AND EDUCATIONAL MAINSTREAMING

In the beginning of this study it was posited that the needs of
handicapped pupils are best satisfied in the setting where an atmosphere
of mutuality already exists, that mutuality is a necessary condition of
true mainstreaming.

The purpose now is to see why it is a condition by

applying Martin Buber’s particular concept of mutuality.

An attempt

will be made to do this in the following pages, which summarize and
develop several Buberian ideas of mutuality related to the child as
participant, the teacher as participant, peer relations, and ethics
and knowledge.
The "teacher" referred to is in all cases the one into whose
class the handicapped child is mainstreamed.

In team teaching which

combines, say, a regular and a special education teacher, the two,
like parents, share responsibility for a heterogeneous group of chil
dren ever dividing the merging according to individual involvements
and needs.

Each teacher has something unique to contribute, yet the

roles of each so overlap that no major obstacle stands in the way of
the pupil’o contact with other pupils and with the main thrust of the
teaching and learning endeavor.

121

xiuced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122

The Child as Participant in the Mainstream Class

1.

Mainstreaming depends upon the teacher's valuation of what

children can become.

Mutuality implies that each child in a learning

community is valued as a potentially active participant of that commu
nity.

This requires a wholistic view of uniqueness.

Buber's educational convictions derive not from a fixed norma
tive content or educational strategy, but from his anthropology which
asks, What does it mean to be a unique person?

Two aspects are treated.

First, he recognizes humanity as unique among the categories in nature,
and second, he recognizes the fact of uniqueness within the human cate
gory.
What is unique to the human category is the distinctive way in
which its members relate to their world:

they are given a spiritual

power which struggles to comprehend and give order to the world through
bodily participation in it.
ghost-like quality.

Spirit is not to Buber an ethereal or

It is manifested by people in the earthly, every

day communication of mutuality and dialogue, as much as can be realized
in the little bit of territory to which they owe their attention.

This

power conquers the confusing disorder and gives form to things in pic
ture, sound, and idea.
munity.^

Through human association it gives form to com

It is concluded that mainstreaming, as any educational endeavor,

requires that teachers proceed from the realization that all people with
out exception, all children, are endowed with a strong and active

^Buber, Between Man and Man:

"What is Man?", pp. 197-98.
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spiritual force:

each wants to participate in the becoming of things

and wants to become whole by way of the mutual giving and receiving
between the I and the Thou.

Each child regardless of functional limi

tation is positively determined and defined in this way.
The single goal of participation is reached in multiple ways
according to the uniqueness of individuals.

On perceiving a given

child, the teacher recognizes its distance or "oppositeness" as a
self with a separate identity, and this sets the stage for relation
to the child as either a Thou or an It.

I-Thou synthesizes, sees the

child In Its wholeness as Irreducible to attributes.

If is true tha*.

within this wholeness there are qualities that limit and qualities
that free one's participation.

For example, the child may enter the

classroom as highly dependent, recalcitrant, deaf, or slow to read,
and such limitation is a real phenomenon not to be ignored, but dealt
with.

It is seen, however, as an aspect of the child's entire being

whose nature it is to strive for unified growth in the way particular
to it.
I-Thou is the opposite of the radical I-It knowing which con
sistently defines people by their limitations.
the other's wholeness as being and becoming.

I-Thou knowing imagines
I-It knowing reduces the

other to an object— pulls out from it a single attribute, categorizes,
compares, and assigns a fixed label generalized to the whole.
labeled part may not refer to an impairment at all.

The

Sex, age, height,

and skin color are examples of such attributes, just as are intellec
tual giftedness, nationality, and religious affiliation.
Gordon Allport's wholistic view of uniqueness corresponds with
Buber's.

Allport notes that people think naturally with the aid of
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categories.

A label "cuts slices, abstracts from a concrete reality

some one feature only with respect to this one feature.

The very act

of classifying forces us to overlook all other features, many of which
might offer a sounder basis than the rubric we select."
are exceedingly salient and powerful.

Some labels

Labels which refer to some

highly visible feature are of this type, for example, black, Oriental,
as are labels which point to an outstanding incapacity— feebleminded,
cripple, blind person.

They are labels of primary potency.

"These

labels act like shrieking sirens, deafening us to all finer discrim
inations which we might otherwise perceive."

Even though the blind

ness of one person and the darkness of pigmentation of another "may
be defining attributes for some purposes, they are irrelevant and
'noisy' for others."
of one's nature.

Only one’s proper name can refer to the whole

"Thus each label we use, especially those of primary

potency, distracts our attention from concrete reality.

The living,

breathing, complex individual— the ultimate unit of human nature— is
lost to sight."
This partial way of perceiving, belonging to the sphere of the
I-It, shuts out the ineffable Thou in its complexity and unity, and its
power to participate in the world.

2.

Mainstreaming presupposes the teacher's understanding of the

meaning of prejudice and its effects.

When the I-It perception is fixed and enduring, it becomes a con
cept which may take the form of prejudice.

Prejudice is an inflexible

^Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York:
day Anchor Books, 1958), pp. 175-76.
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attitudinal favorableness or unfavorableness which accompanies a prior
and unsupported value judgment.

Allport identifies gross overgeneral

ization and denigration as the two basic ingredients of negative prejudice.

3

His investigation suggests that prejudice at times stems from

conformity to folkways, but that ouch of it is also fashioned and sustained by self-gratifying considerations.

In either case, the reality

of the unique other is unknown, relation is partial and instrumental.
The other is merely observed as an object, which in turn sets the stage
for the possibility of control and exploitation,

Wolfensberger points

out that many societies have condoned the destruction of people viewed
only in terms of a weakness, inadequacy, or handicap.

As a more humane

alternative to destruction, the different person can be segregated from
the mainstream of society and placed at its periphery:
We have numerous examples of this: we segregate the Indian in
reservations, and the Negro in the ghetto; the aged are con
gregated in special homes, ostensibly for their own good, and
these homes are often located at the periphery of, or remote
from, population centers; the emotionally disturbed and the
retarded are commonly placed in institutions far in the
countryside; and we have (or have had) "dying rooms" in our
hospitals to save us the unpleasantness of ultimate deviancy.
However, the I-It perception may be only a transitory occurrence.
Allport notes a natural fear In infants of the strange.

It takes several

minutes, perhaps several hours, for Infants to "warm up" to the stranger.
They may show initial fear if the stranger wears eye-glasses, or if the

3Ibid., p. 32.
^Ibid., p. 12.
3Wolf Wolfensberger, Normalization: The Principles of Normaliza
tion in Human Services (Toronto: National Institute on Mental Retarda
tion, 1972), p. 24.
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stranger's expressive movements are unfamiliar.^

Even handicapped

people have acknowledged, in common with other adults, at least momen
tary distraction and anxiety at times on sudden first encounter with
persons with noticeable handicaps.

Such temporary reaction to the

unexpected and the different does not constitute prejudice.
The separation of human groups is often the result of what
Allport calls an "automatic cohesion," which also has nothing to do
with prejudice.

That human groups tend to stay apart is at times

explained by the principles of ease, least effort, congeniality, or
pride in one's culture.

Ke points out, however, that once this sepa

ration exists the ground is laid for all sorts of psychological elab
oration.

"People who stay apart have few channels of communication.

They easily exaggerate the difference between groups, and readily mis
understand the grounds for it.

And, perhaps most important of all,

the separateness may lead to genuine conflicts of Interest, as well
as many imaginary conflicts."^

The lack of communication even among

people who exist together in space is for both Allport and Buber a
primary concern, and it is central to the problem of mainstreaming.
The literature contains extensive documentation of the ways in
which exaggerated difference takes the form of false role generaliza
tion.

Wolfensberger's historical review describes certain roles thrust

on people, roles which show a remarkable transcendence of time, place
and culture, and most of which reflect clear-cut prejudice.

His

description of these roles include those of the person as subhuman

^Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, p. 286.
^Ibid., p. 18.
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organism (e.g., animal, vegetable, changeling), as menace, as unspeak
able object of dread, as object of ridicule, as diseased organism, as
object of pity, as eternal child, and as holy innocent.
Some corollaries of the subhuman conceptualization are" attri
tion of animal-like qualities or even skills; belittling of the learn
ing capacity; abrogation of a sense of esthetics; need for extraordinary
controls . . . abrogation of human emotions, sensibilities, shame. . . .
Buber has noted that solicitude does not necessarily set a per
son’s life in direct relation with the life of another, but may only
imply one person’s solicitous help in relation with the other's lack
and need of it.

In a similar vein, Wolfensberger writes that the object

of pity attitude is usually benevolent, but it may be devoid of respect.
The "sour humanists," for example, might even look upon the recipient of
services as entitled to basic assistance and sustenance but not as
entitled to the "luxuries, frills, or extras" which others enjoy.

The

holy innocent generalization is well disposed, yet it Implies a reverse
form of dehumanization by elevating a human being almost above the human
level.

Wolfensberger acknowledges the reality of certain child-like

traits which may exist in retarded persons without implying that such
persons are either holy in an exclusive sense or eternal children.
The segregative effects of the generalizations Wolfensberger
describes are more or less apparent.

One of the least obvious and

clear-cut is the impression of the handicapped as diseased.
To Wolfensberger, "the disease model can be expressed in two
variants, one of these embodying the best tradition of medical service

^Wolfensberger, Normalization, p. 18.
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to fellow humans, and the other one being concerned with health but not
with human values.

The latter can be likened to veterinary medicine,

and is particularly apt to be encountered in residential institutions."®
He notes, too, that there often exists a pessimistic preoccupation with
the issue of curability versus incurability.

When this preoccupation

occurs in education it constitutes a major deterrent to mainstreaming.

3.

The view of the child as defective leads naturally to an

exaggerated effort to remediate.

Literature indicates the mainstreaming trend in its present stage
is largely a one-sided effort to change the handicapped through remedial
instruction.

There is less evidence suggesting a substantial coinciding

effort to make the structure of the regular class conducive to their
inclusion.
Education obviously implies for the pupil a continuing process of
change, but in the relation of I-lt, the self may try to change the
essential state of the other, to deprive it of its distance and inde
pendence.

In this connection, Aimd Labreghre, adviser of the French

Ministry of Education, hypothesizes a universal trend toward a focus
on defect and on remediation of the handicapped (the pupil is above all
defective, sick, deficient), which occurs with the advent of the right
to equality of educational opportunity.

Labregfere suggests this to be

a historical stage tending to follow the stage of compulsory education
and preceding the stage of true integration (mainstreaming).
is competitive and selective.

Education

The competition is based on a norm which9

9Ibid., p. 23.
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the pupil is supposed to reach by means of "vigorous action on his
defect."

Such an approach implies that equality of opportunity requires

inequality in the measures taken for the benefit of those disadvantaged
by their handicap.
handicap."

It contains "the seeds of an unlimited notion of

Moreover, "based on comparison with a norm which is after

all variable, it encourages for the purpose of effectively applying
large-scale remedial measures, the setting apart of the handicapped."
The "segregative aspects, both direct and indirect," are thus sug
gested.*^
A related factor in segregation is the misuse of assessments.
In order to identify the nature of the deficiency to be remedied, spe
cial education theorists tend to recommend the use of scientifically
validated tests and systematic observations conducted by classroom
teachers and by specialists.

They suggest also the use of information

available in pupil files which contain educational-medical histories,
and they recommend direct communication between teacher and special
ists about the child.

Some information so derived helps in important

ways to provide for the child's education and general well being, and
some is clearly crucial— evidence of hearing or visual loss, for exam
ple, resulting in corrective medical prescription or modification of
teaching to accommodate the difficulty.

Task analysis tailored to

individual ability can provide a structure by which retarded persons
are helped to acquire important life skills.

*®Aime Labregere, "Conclusions," in Case Studies in Special
Education: Cuba, Japan, Kenya, Sweden, by Unesco (Paris: Unesco
Press, 1974), pp. 175-76.
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Buber would endorse scientific assessments whenever they open
the world more fully to children.

Yet he would never equate them with

real knowing, since they lack immediacy and see the person not as a
whole, but in selected parts and functions.

Exclusive reliance on

this method corresponds precisely to his idea of objectification.
Scientific method, in fact, is m a n ’s most highly perfected
development of the I-It, or subject-object, way of knowing.
Its methods of abstracting from the concrete actuality and
of largely negating the inevitable difference between
observers reduce the I in so far as possible to the abstract
knowing subject and the It in so far as possible to the pas
sive and abstract object of thought. Just for these reasons
scientific method is not qualified to discover the wholeness
of mar..**
Buber would also want communication between colleagues on behalf
of children, but he would ask if anyone is communicating with, not only
about, the pupil in question.
For Buber, real knowing means becoming aware of the signs of
address in a living relationship.

Peter Schrag and Diane Dvoky censure

the "proliferating of categories" assigned to children in the schools;
the system may define all sorts of things and may attach all sorts of
names, yet too often the issue is conformity, not "a child's silent
a g o n y . N i c h o l a s Hobbs asserts that intervention "should be focused
on reducing disturbance within the system as a whole, not just on doing
something to the child.

^Friedman, "Introductory Essay," in Knowledge of M a n , pp. 19-20.
^ P e t e r Schrag and Diane Dvoky, The Myth of the Hyperactive Child
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 24, 117.
^ N i cholas Hobbs, The Futures of Children (San Francisco:
Bass, 1975), p. 236.
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Education does require the recognition of functional handicaps
and interventions which help children to overcome those handicaps.
Thus Annie Sullivan's "remediation" of Helen Keller was effective and
legitimate.

In Conrad Aiken’s Silent Snow, Secret Snow, Paul's pro

gressive withdrawing behavior was a summons to the serious attention
of adults before his breakdown occurred.^
Buber would endorse only those interventions which help the
child's becoming as a person, never the imposition of narrowly fixed
norms.

According to Buber, there is not and never has been a fixed

educational norm, only norms of different eras and societies to which
education has complied.

He attributes to modern culture a dissolution

of spirituality and a "pantechnical mania," with its emphasis on mate
rial welfare and the instant mastery of every situation,^ an emphasis
particularly unsuited to the handicapped and mainstreaming.

Robert

Heiny notes a focus in special education on "code breaking" associated
with the mechanics of reading.^

In reaction to the technical, a few

educators choose the arts as the logical alternative, but this too can
be

rigidly applied— children viewed as uncreative in the arts, if the

defect model were operative, would like their slow-reading counterparts
become the focus of undue analysis and remediation.1
0

■^Conrad Aiken, "Silent Snow, Secret Snow," In Two and Twenty:
A Collection of Short Stories, by Ralph H. Singleton (Hew York: St.
Martin's Press, 1962), pp. 170-90.
15Buber, Between Man and M a n :

"Dialogue," p. 39.

■^Robert w. Heiny, "Renaissance or Retreat for Special Educa
tors:
Issues to Explore before 1984," Journal of Special Education
10 (Winter 1976): 420.
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Whatever the norm may be, if it dominates the child’s will to
take part authentically, remediation assumes an exaggerated importance.
It is taken alone, for its own sake, instead of both an end and a means
to participation.

This in turn creates a conception of the child as

powerless appendage ever remediated through supplementary activity, not
a genuine member of the group in mutual relation with teacher and peers.
Mainstreaming means relation which encourages the whole child’s shared
participation in the life of the school.

The view of the child as

defective relates primarily to some handicapping feature whether real
ozr net,

it thereby obstructs perticipstiou.

£bi& very life of

the school is rooted in the reality of its pupils whose human need is
to be

educated

in and for community.

As Buber writes, education is to

engage children "in fruitful intercourse with the world."

The conven

tional education "sets factory-made human goods, all stamped alike,"
in place of the free sons and daughters of a free nation.*

The Teacher as Participant in the Mainstream Class

1.

Genuine mainstreaming requires that teachers recognize their

own power to participate responsibly in the lives of children.

Teacher

participation is characterized by a confirming attitude, the root of
mutual trust and confidence between teacher and pupil.

Of the professions, Buber holds teaching in high esteem.

In

fact, he calls the effective teacher "a representative of the true God."

^ M a r t i n Buber, Israel and the World:
(New York: Schocken Books, 1948), p. 155.

"On National Education"
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The notable quality of genuine teachers, he believes, is their capacity
to love pupils in a way that is ascetic, since their love and nurturance
are given freely to the more problematic, as well as to children who are
mentally and physically able, to those who cooperate and in general
create no special difficulty for the teacher.

An attitude of mutuality

which includes the presence of the other is meant, not only a feeling.
This attitude resists Che strictly normative and the competitive in
favor of what is uniquely possible to the individual.

The teacher

"must really mean him as the definite person he is in his potential
ity and his actuality.
It does not follow from Buber's idea of the teacher as ascetic
that a given teacher's ability to educate extends to every child,
regardless of the child's nature and regardless of the availability
of resources, but it means that each pupil met in the course of edu
cating is approached

by the teacher as a unique Thou in full equality

with his classmates.

What matters is an attitude of wanting to be

accessible to pupils.

The immediate inclination of the teacher ia not

to remove the different child, nor to describe and relate primarily to
some handicapping feature.

The genuine teacher is disposed to confirm

and educate, rather than cater to a select group who are enjoyed in
the manner of "dilettantism."
The insecurity felt by young newcomers to school is pronounced
in a good many handicapped children.

Their feelings derive from a past

filled with I-It relationships; they have been treated as objects of
pity and ridicule, as holy innocents, as diseased, and so on.

If

^•®Buber, I and Thou, p. 132.
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Buber's humanistic philosophy is applied, handicapped children in main
stream education experience neither rejection nor grudging tolerance,
not even pity, but an openness to their presence and a confirmation of
their being.

Out of that, a mutual confidence and trust grows between

teacher and child— the presupposition of educating and mainstreaming.
Mutuality is a presupposition— much depends on the teacher's awakening
the I-Thou relationship in the pupil, too, who means and confirms the
teacher as this unique person. *

2.
curriculum.

The teacher participates also through becoming involved with
In mainstreaming the choice and the mediation of curriculum

rests predominantly with the teacher.

Buber places tremendous responsibility on teachers who are
charged with the task of choosing and mediating the constructive forces
of the world which children need for their education.

Auxiliary help

and advice from other professional workers are in no way negated, are
crucial to renewing and strengthening the work of the teacher, but the
fundamental responsibility for pupils does not rest with them.

Nor

does the scientifically designed program prove adequate without the
critical evaluation by the teacher of what it holds for the individual
child's striving for participation.

The teacher is also unique.

Authentic educating is possible when suited to the character and con
viction of the individual teacher.

In Buber’s pedagogy, then, teachers

are the primary active agents in the education of their pupils.
mately, they find they must rely on their own resources.

19lbid.
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This point is of great significance for mainstreaming:

One can

choose and mediate for a wide diversity of learners first and foremost
by knowing them, and one knows by means of the direct, on-going dialogue
with children which teachers are in a position to initiate.
chooser and mediator are one and the same.

Thus the

Second, teachers must dia

logue directly with the Thou of content, must themselves become learners
in order that they may educate.

While the choosing and mediating task is

difficult, teaching is made creative by it; the teaching profession
thereby comes of age in fuller maturity.

3.

The teacher's unselective participation in the lives of chil

dren, confirming, choosing, and mediating for them, is made possible by
an inclusive dialogue.

In direct meeting, teachers turn to their pupils and patiently
wait for a look, a question, a word of affirmation or rejection, and
thereby experience the act of teaching from both sides, the pupils' as
well as their own.

The values to which teachers are committed are

shared, not through good selling technique or psychological manipula
tion; values are communicated openly, yet they are conditioned by the
pupil's particular standpoint.
Awareness of the other side discloses to teachers what effects
their actions have on the individual child with whom communication seems
very difficult, reveals the educational needs of both teacher and child.
Although the use of scientific assessments at times conveys special
needs, this method can never replace, only supplement, what teachers
learn from cumulative contacts in the dynamic situation of teaching and
learning.

In this context there is possibility for an ever deepening
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awareness of the unique, many faceted, and unified personality of the
child.
Only confirmation and trust can be mutual between teacher and
pupil, Buber believes; in the teacher-pupil relation, experiencing the
other side cannot be mutual.

If the pupil were to become aware of the

other side, the educative situation would be destroyed, or it would
change into friendship.

This point seems to contradict Buber's prin

ciple of personal example.

At times pupils probably do experience some

of the educative event from the teacher's standpoint as well as their
own— the teacher's selection of the effective and the motives and feel
ings which determine the selection, as well as the effects their actions
have on teachers.

When this happens, does it necessarily follow that

the educative relation ends or changes into friendship?

It is clear,

however, that pupils cannot really reciprocate the teacher's level of
awareness and responsible involvement in their person and life, cud
that the teacher is not sent there to expect that of them, nor to win
their friendship.

Here the counterpoint of intimacy and distance, sub

jectivity and objectivity, applies.
Education, like the relation between therapist and patient, Is
possible only to the person who lives in confrontation with the other,
and yet is detached.20

This objective attitude helps the meeting, even

with those children disposed to rebel against their teacher and peers,
or to withdraw from relating to them in any way.

20Ibid., p. 133.
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Peer Relations and Mainstreaming

1.

The goal of mainstreaming is education for character and

community.

Handicapped pupils in ordinary class attendance often find them
selves isolated from their class peers and the real activity of the
school.

It is readily concluded that such isolation is harmful to the

learning and personhood of all pupils, not alone the handicapped.

This

is supported by Buber's concept of community built on the mutual I-Thou
relation.
The primary goal of education, the growth of character, is iden
tical to the goal of mainstreaming.
education for community.

Genuine education of character is

Since education is a merger of learning and

doing, communal ideals are learned both in reflecting about them and in
the here and now of one's active life.

Therefore a major educational

task is to create an atmosphere of mutuality between members of the
mainstream class, to foster in pupils an awareness of their peers and
an attitude of responsibility toward them.

2.

Mainstreaming exposes children to lives different from their

own, but it also guides them to an awareness of their peers as persons
through direct relation which involves the selves intersubjectively.

If a child never really confronts a handicapped peer enrolled in
the same class because the educational structure sets them apart, both
children are thereby disadvantaged— that is, the school insulates them
from participation in the differentiated world as it exists around them.
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Most important, a potential friendship is denied them.

The ethos of

mainstreaming is the right of handicapped persons, once all the demands
which provide them the medical treatment and education required by their
condition have been met, to experience to the extent of their capacities
the fullness of education to which all citizens are entitled.

21

It is

also the right of all children not to be educated in environments made
sterile of difference through the rigid division of groups.

As Buber

says, the teacher is to guide children into genuine contact with the
reality accessible to them, by which both the I and the Thou establish
their personality reality.

22

Children need to perceive and confirm one another as the persons
they are by means of genuine meetings.

A relation is complete when the

partner knows he is confirmed, and "when this knowledge induces the
process of his inmost self becoming."22

This is the process which takes

place in a disabled child who is seen as a whole person and no longer
reduced in the mind of his peer to his impairment and the wheelchair in
which he sits.

The child is accepted simply for his presence:

"Secretly

and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and which can
come to him only from one human person to a n o t h e r . A t

the same time,

the image of the subhuman or object of pity is replaced by an image of
what is possible, the possibility to be a friend and to achieve in common
with all people, yet in a way which is somehow particular to that child.

^•Labregfere, "Conclusions," in Case Studies, p. 177.
22Buber, I and Thou, p. 63; "Responsa," in Philosophical Inter
rogations , p. 63.
22Buber, Knowledge of M a n :

"Distance and Relation," p. 71.

24Ibid.
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Seeing the other as a whole person with potentiality is not to
deny the existence of a handicap or to apply a euphemism.

"There is

nothing from which I would have to turn my eyes away in order to see,
and no knowledge that I would have to forget."

Inclusion or experienc

ing the other side, the full development of awareness, brings a realiza
tion "from over there" how it is at this moment to suffer a disability—
perhaps it is being immobile while others move freely, or being unable
for some reason to communicate oneself— and the stigma which might
accompany it.

Buber Insists that a person experiences the other side

in this way through direct relation which involves the selves intersubjectively, when one does not remain an untouched observer of what
addresses one.
By being there with one’s whole being in response to the "claim
of the everyday" there grows in one's "thought and recollection the
knowledge of human wholeness."252
6 Buber's own understanding reached a
high point during the First World War when he imagined the wounds and
the killing.

"I was compelled . . .

just at this moment. . . . "

to live it.

Things which went on

In 1919 Buber's friend Gustav Landauer was

killed by anti-revolutionary soldiers in a barbaric way, and again, "I
was compelled to imagine just this killing, but not in an optical way
alone . . . just with my body."

3.

The child's involvement in relation, the source of character

development, also educates to responsibility.

25Buber, Between Man and M a n :
26Buber, Knowledge of M a n :
Carl Rogers," p. 168.

"What is Man?", pp. 124-126.

"Dialogue Between Martin Buber and
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Here the child confronts himself with the question, What does my
partner's special quality or experience imply for me?

The response to

this question expresses the child's true creativity, a creativity never
limited to the poet and the painter, nor to the intellectually gifted.
According to Buber, all people are endowed with the creative power which
has "scattered itself."

Furthermore, the Thou of one's creative

response can be met in anything, animate or inanimate, which addresses
one.

"The Baal-Shem teaches that no encounter with a being or a thing

in the course of our life lacks a hidden significance."27
But community, the creative "sharing in an undertaking and enter
ing into mutuality" with the human Thou is of greatest importance to the
child.

Community educates, and it provides a deep sense of belonging.

Contact with nature and with books and machines, however much they con
tribute, can never replace the mutuality of giving form and being formed
which take place in direct relation with another human being.

The feral

child deprived of human association and brought up by the wolves, Buber
points out, has a human body and a human brain, but it is not fully
human.

It lacks that distance from other selves necessary for its

entering into mutual relation with a Thou and becoming an I.
Buber's view calls into question the validity of those forms of
education in which children are brought together in space, yet remain
spiritually isolated from one another.

Buber would question any practice

which obstructs mutual giving between children, and even one which fails
to promote it.

An education aimed only at individual achievement prepares

27Buber, Hasidism and Modern Man, p. 173.
2®Friedman, Life of Dialogue, p. 164.
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"a new human solitariness which would be the most painful of all."
Participation in the learning community fulfills a real present need,
and it prepares for participation in the broader community.
To a small boy just brought to a mainstream class from special
placement, a musical recorder was a weapon for striking other class
members who could play that instrument.

Children reacted with fear,

there were retaliations, until one of them, led by her teacher, answered
the boy's secret wish to learn the recorder.

This girl's response— her

opposition and reconciliation, help and encouragement, her "being
there"— was the first in a series of relationships which engaged the
newcomer in mutually rewarding interaction and collaboration with his
peers, and provided him an enduring sense of identity with the learn
ing community to which he belonged.

Urie Bronfenbrenner writes, "The

most needed innovation in the American classroom is the involvement of
pupils in responsible tasks on behalf of others.

Opportunities for

experimentation are l e g i o n . B u b e r would endorse such involvement,
not as a duty but as an expression of the child's Thou saying or a
real turning to the address of the other.

Without this turning, a

person may fulfill many "moral duties," may in addition meet the
intellectual challenges of poetry and calculus and the theories of
ethics and democracy, yet still suffer an educational impoverishment.

4.

Handicapped pupils are to be viewed not only as recipients

of help, they are potential contributors.

U.S.S.R.

2 % r i e Bronf enbrenner, Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 157.
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The handicapped clearly contribute because they embody and exem
plify the nobility of the human spirit in the face of a difficult
obstacle to be overcome.

But it must be particularly stressed that each

can offer personal insights and talents which want expression and have
nothing to do with disability, although insights are often deepened by
it.

In one school a cerebral palsied girl, severely restricted physi

cally but skilled in language, helped her teacher who cultivated in
pupils their written expression of the many things they wanted to tell.
In the same school a disturbed boy became a proficient reader to younger
children in their kindergarten.

And a boy with Down’s Syndrome told his

friend, an outstanding scholastic achiever, that it
from lockers.

is wrong to steal

Endless possibilities become apparent once the equality

of children is discovered— that is, each is of unique value, and the
purpose of education is to "unearth” the "treasure" of possibility, to
help pupils authenticate and individuate themselves by becoming what
each can b e c o m e . ^
In the true mainstream community, children are needed, feel
needed, take responsibility.

Although a given class member may be

highly dependent in a number of ways requiring something in excess of
the usual, the goal is the same as for all others:

a gradual shift

of responsibility from teacher to child according to his individual
capacity.

The mainstream community corresponds with Buber's concept

of community, which is formed on the basis of growing personal inde
pendence with each person a vehicle of a different function, and

^®Buber, Between Han and H a n :

"Education," p. 84.
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mutual responsibility and collaboration on that basis.
The teacher is given the task of influencing this growth of
independence, does not relieve class members of doing what they have
grown strong enough to do for themselves.

But over and over the

teacher takes the child by the hand and guides him until he is able
to venture on alone. ‘

Ethics, Knowledge, and Mainstreaming

The opening of education to mutual peer relations stands in con
trast with the modern emphasis on individualized instruction in the
mastery of discrete skills.

In the former, pupils experience more

widely and in greater depth and thereby face the challenge of indi
vidual decision.

The ethical implication is that the child, with guidance from
his teacher, confronts his own potentiality and decides as an authentic
person what is intrinsically good and what is bad in the problematic of
the unexpected, the ever changing situation, regardless of whether it
is immediately useful to himself and his group.

A growing awareness of

what he is meant to be helps him to make the decision independently.
That which Is intended for the individual is personal, "not however In
the sense of a free unfolding of infinite singularities, but of a real
ization of the right ia Infinitely personal shapes."^

This means that

3^-Buber, Paths in Utopia, pp. 130, 131.
3^Buber, Tales of the Hasidim, p. 5.

3%uber, Good and Evil, p. 142.
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the normative truth of human existence is included in the present, con
crete expression of individual responsibility.

Thus group nurturance

and loyalty are normative to human existence but defined in action if
one’s friends are seen tormenting some new member of that group, say
a retarded child, and the question of how to be nurturing and loyal
has to be decided personally within a living context.
In order to decide and act, the child must be taught to make
value judgments based on an interpretation of the facts and their
interrelatedness.

Buber's epistemology suggests that the teacher, as

intermediary of experience, would foster in pupils an openness and a
faithfulness to the facts in order to supplant prejudice with an ade
quate value judgment.

That a retarded person is given the capacities

shared by everyone (love, joy, suffering, achievement) is a fact to be
learned.

Ultimately, this openness links to a receptive, confirming

attitude to the world and a valid "world view."
The facts are
grasp them as
me in this if
strong that I
perceived.34

there; it is a question of whether I strive to
faithfully as I can. Hy world view can help
it keeps my love for this "world" so awake and
do not grow tired of perceiving what is to be

Buber emphasizes that perfect knowledge of the truth cannot be
possessed.
sess?

"What is the real situation?

Can we appropriate it?

and put in our pocket."33

Is there a truth we can pos

There certainly is none we can pick up

What one can do is to "serve the truth,

believe in it," and put a stop in one's own spirit to the "politization

3^Buber, Pointing the Way;

"Education and the World View,"

p. 100.
33guber, Israel and the World;

"The Prejudices of Youth,"

p. 46.
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of the truth and the utilitarizing of truth, and suitability."36

The

approach is similar when one gives "distance" and "enters into relation"
with the Thou of literature.

By setting limits to one's bias and turn

ing attentively to what is there to be perceived, the aspect of meaning
derived supplements one's own knowledge.
The text has been interpreted countless times and in countless
ways.
I know that no interpretation including my own coincides
with the original meaning of the text. I know that my interpret
ing, like everyone else's is conditioned through my being. But
if I attend as faithfully as I can to what it contains of word
and texture, of sound and rhythmic structure, of open and hidden
connections, my interpretation will not have beem made in vain.
. . . I have found something. And If I show what I have found,
I guide him who lets himself be guided to the reality of the
text. To him whom I teach I make visible the working forces
of the text that I have experienced.37
The important truth to be learned by children in their "manifold
togetherness" is the truth of human existence.

In mutual dialogue, the

pupil perceives not only the uniqueness of the other, but also the expe
rience belonging to him as unique.

Although this perception contains

only as much as the reality the dialogue imparts, a concept of human
wholeness in its complexity takes form out of that nucleus.38

"The

work of education points to the real unity that is hidden behind the
multiplicity of aspects. . . . Education unites the participating groups,
through access to the educative forces and through common service to the
facts, into the model of the great community."

Such unity and community

encourage independent valuing tested in life by which the content, reality
and reliability of one's view can be decided as opposed to a groundless

3^Buber, Pointing the Way;

"Education and the World View," p. 101

37Ibid.
of M a n :

3®Buber, Between Han and M a n : "What is Man?", p. 125; Knowledge
"Distance and Relation," p. 71.
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view.

This resists thoughtless attachment and obedience to any "ficti

tious conviction" of a group.

Commitment to the view particular to a

group, Buber points out, can mean "a genuine choice or an awkward
groping, as in blind man's buff."3*

So the experience of the many is

not levelled down, but it is enriched by mutual openness to differing
experience.

In other words, this epistemology gives to individual

pupils what they need for their own understanding and what they cannot
give themselves.*
4®
Through relation children begin to sense their "finitude" and
their "need of completion."

They gain the mutual comprehension of a

single truth from two contrasting points of view.
The question is not one of "tolerance," but of making present
the roots of community and its ramifications, of so experienc
ing and living in the trunk . . . that one also experiences, as
truly as one's own, where and how the other boughs branch off
and shoot up. It is not a question of a formal apparent under
standing on a minimal basis, but of an awareness from the other
side of the other's real relation to the truth. What is called
for is not "neutrality" but solidarity, a living answering for
one another— and mutuality, living reciprocity; not effacing
the boundaries between the groups . . . but communal recogni
tion of the common reality and communal testing of the common
responsibility.41

^Bub e r , Pointing the W a y :

"Education and the World View,"

p. 103.
4®Ibid., p. 102.
41Ibid.
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Summary and Conclusions

1.

Quality of education.

A

gradual modification of the pre

vailing educational practices toward the leading out of individual
potentiality, and the encouragement of mutual awareness and collabora
tion between peers on that basis, will improve the quality of education
for the student population as a whole.
2.

Education as inclusive.

Mutuality is required in main-

streaming, not a conformity of handicapped children to the existing
convention essentially untouched by their presence.
is in any case opposed by human variance.

Such conformity

The mainstream teacher is,

however, charged with the task of "influencing" the pupil to develop
in his uniquely personal way.

The line between influence and indoc

trination, between education and arbitrary efforts to remediate the
child is often difficult to draw— the teacher stands on a "narrow rocky
ridge" where there is no sureness of knowledge.
concept "inclusion" contributes to the solution:

But Buber’s original
The reality of the

child's perception extends the teacher’s own perception and enables
acceptance and confirmation.

What can be known of the point of view of

the child is revealed through personal contact and the strength and
tenderness of personal relations, the very heart of Buber's method.
3.

Education as conscious and willed.

Owing to the long

history of isolation and rejection of the handicapped, it is concluded
that peer relations cannot be left to chance; they must be consciously
influenced by the teacher.

This is qualified by a recognition that
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the teacher is unable to force relations, and that influences outside
of education also shape the attitudes of children.

Given these limi

tations, Buber's writings support the conclusion that teachers can
create an atmosphere of mutuality conducive to wholesome peer rela
tions.

How can this be done?

Primarily through personal contact,

through dialogue, and through becoming a model of openness.
4.

Community of achievement.

The effective mainstream class

is a "community of achievement" characterized by an atmosphere of
mutuality.
3.

Children are educated in and for community.
Responsibility.

or in spirit, is not meant.

Continual togetherness, either physically
The class diverges according to the spe

cial needs, capacities, and involvements of individuals, and it merges
in shared involvement.

But the prevalence of mutual recognition and

responsible help in the common pursuit of learning, which depends on
this possibility of alternate separation and coming together, is the
underlying bond that unites the class, and it is essential to mainstreaming.
6.

Integrative awareness.

Mutual recognition and responsible

service is the base of Buber's epistemology.

Applied to mainstreaming,

handicapped children and those around them learn to see the relativity
of human attributes and the wholeness of the self and the partner encoun
tered.

Ultimately this openness links to a receptiving, loving attitude

toward humanity, an integrative perception of the world, and an inde
pendent "world view."
7.

Uniqueness.

The central question is now repeated, How can

mainstreaming be humanized?

The answer again points to mutuality on
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a necessary condition, but with an emphasis which follows from this
research of Buber's philosophy and from what has been discussed through
out:

The focal point of human learning is the truth of human existence

— what does it mean to be a unique person?

An important way of arriving

at this truth is through the pluralistic relations of the learning com
munity, where children are given mutual access to one another and educa
ted to "character," to becoming unique persons capable of independent,
responsible decision, and whose decisions are influenced by existential
values.
(F)or true human decision, that is, decision taken by the
unified soul there is only One direction. This means that
to whatever end the current decision is reached, in the reality
of existence all the so diverse decisions are merely varia
tions on a single one, which is continually made afresh in
a single direction. . . . My uniqueness, this unrepeatable
form of being here, not analysable into any elements and not
compoundable out of any, I experience as a designed or pre
formed one, entrusted to me for execution, although every
thing that affects me participates in this execution.
That
a unique human being is created does not mean that it is put
into being for a mere existence, but for the fulfilment of a
being-intention. . . . In decision, taking the direction
thus means: taking the direction toward the point of being
at which, executing for my part the design which I am, I
encounter the divine mystery of my created uniqueness, the
mystery waiting for me.
Every ethos . . . is revelation of human service to the
goal of creation, in which service man authenticates himself
. . . as far as he is able, quantum satis. . , ,^2

^Buber, Good and Evil, pp. 142-43.
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